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The question of why parties use secured debt is one of the most
fundamental questions in commercial finance. The commonplace
answer focuses on force: A grant of collateral to a lender enhances
the lender's ability to collect its debt by enhancing the lender's
ability to take possession of the collateral by force and sell it to
satisfy the debt. That perspective draws considerable support from
the design of the major legal institutions that support secured debt:
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code and the less uniform
state laws regarding real estate mortgages.
Both of those institutions are designed solely to support the
liquidation process. Each has four major elements: statutory rules
describing the actions a borrower and lender must take to create a
lien or security interest in a particular asset, statutory and
contractual rules describing the occurrences that entitle the lender
to take possession of the collateral, statutory and contractual
regulations of the mechanics by which the lender can sell the
collateral, and statutory rules allocating priority among various
claimants to the asset or its proceeds.1 All of those rules reflect an
implicit assumption that the central focus of the transaction is the
ability of the lender to liquidate the collateral. Legal and
contractual institutions foster that ability both by enhancing the
practicability of reliable and cost-effective liquidation and by
tempering the potential for inequities in the process of liquidation.
The most general problem with that arrangement is that forced
liquidation has little to do with the system as it actually operates. In
practice, the important element is not force, but strategy. The most
important effects arise from the capacity of a grant of collateral to
influence the actions the parties take short of forced liquidation of
collateral. Although that perspective is contrarian, it is not entirely
novel. Bob Scott suggested the limited importance of forced
liquidation in a passing comment more than a decade ago.2 More
1. See infra notes 301-05 and accompanying text (summarizing those rules).
2. See Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 CoLUM. L. REV.
901, 950 (1986) [hereinafter Scott, Relational Theory]. Scott notes:
[T]he function of secured credit is conceived within the industry as enabling the creditor
to influence debtor actions prior to the onset of business failure. This conception is
markedly different in effect from the traditional vision of collateral as a residual asset
claim upon default and insolvency. Security is taken for its active rather than its passive
properties.
Id. Scott develops a similar point in greater detail in Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the Regula
tion of Coercive Creditor Remedies, 89 CoLUM. L. REv. 730 (1989) [hereinafter Scott, Coer
cive Creditor Remedies] (arguing that the principal effect of creditor remedies is to give the
creditors leverage rather than to enhance the ability to obtain payment coercively). My point
here is quite similar, but focuses on the particular way in which remedies work when the
creditor has collateral.
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recently, my anecdotal r esearch has presented a general
explanation of the reasons for the use of secured credit in which
there is little place for forced liquidation.3 Rather, I have argued
that the most important justifications for the use of collateral are its
indirect effects: enhancing the credibility of limits on future
borrowing

and

repairing

the

loan-induced

incentives

of

the

borrower toward excessive risk.4
But neither Bob Scott nor

I

has done anything to explore the

perception that liquidation is relatively unimportant in the practice
of secured debt. Liquidation certainly occurs: a trip to the steps of
any county courthouse in Texas on the first Tuesday of any month
will prove that.5 But we know little or nothing about just how
frequently it does occur. More fundamentally, if it is relatively
infrequent - as I have argued in my prior work - why? Given the
existence of valuable collateral, why would any competent lender
faced with a borrower that is unwilling or unable to pay refrain
from taking the collateral and selling it?
Those questions raise a related point that is just as central to the
academic discourse on debtor-creditor relations: if liquidation is a
marginal element of the practice of secured credit, just how
important is bankruptcy to the system for disposing of failed
businesses? The recent academic literature on debtor-creditor
issues has expended considerable effort to analyze the ex ante
effects of bankruptcy on the credit market. In that literature, the
basic question is how various rules for the treatment of businesses
in bankruptcy affect two aspects of the world before bankruptcy.
First, at the time the loan is issued the decisions of borrowers and
lenders might be affected by the possibility that a later bankruptcy
3. See Ronald J. Mann, Explaining the Pattern of Secured Credit, 110 HARV. L. REv. 625,
639-40 (1997) [hereinafter Mann, Pattern of Secured Credit] (suggesting that the tendency of
collateral to enhance forced liquidation is less important than its indirect effects); Ronald J.
Mann, The Role of Secured Credit in Small·Business Lending, 86 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming
Nov. 1997) [hereinafter Mann, Small-Business Secured Credit] (arguing that the ability of
lenders to liquidate collateral is generally not relevant to small-business secured debt).
4. See Mann, Pactern of Secured Credit, supra note 3, at 639-58; Mann, Small-Business
Secured Credit, supra note 3.
5. As I have discovered firsthand in efforts to conduct some direct empirical research
about real estate foreclosures, it is not easy to observe the frequency of foreclosure in most
states, because foreclosures generally are scheduled on a case-by-case basis - either by a
public official, in the case of a judicial sale, or by the lender's attorney, in the case of a
nonjudicial sale. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924f (West 1993) (providing for a notice
designating the time and date of a foreclosure sale); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, § 14 (1994)
(same). Texas's situation is different because real estate foreclosures in Texas must be
conducted during nonnal business hours on the first Tuesday of the month. See TEX. PROP.
CODE ANN.§ 51.002(a) (West 1995) (requiring foreclosures sales to occur "between 10 a.m.
and 4 p.m. of the first Tuesday of a month").
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would alter thee.borrower's obligation to repay the loan.6 Second,
during a period of distress the decisions of borrowers and their
lenders might be affected by the way the loan would be treated in a
potential bankruptcy proceeding.7 But those questions have less
direct significance if the ordinary process for the liquidation of
distressed loans proceeds without recourse to bankruptcy.
Surprisingly, no substantial empirical research has investigated
those questions. A number of widely recognized studies by legal
academics have investigated the last part of the credit process what happens when firms enter bankruptcy.8 Similarly, a number
of finance scholars have studied the characteristics of loans that go
into default.9 But there has been no general study of the crucial
period in the middle, when loans have fallen into distress but the
business has not yet failed completely.10
6. The classic treatment appears in William H. Meckling, Financial Markets, Default, and
Bankruptcy: The Role ofthe State, LAW & CoNTEMP. PRoBs , Autumn l'T/7, at 13, 19-24. For
a recent treatment, see Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy and the Entitlements ofthe Government:
Whose Money ls It Anyway?, 10 N.Y.U. L. REv. 993, 1057 n.231 (1995).
7. The most exhaustive treatment is Robert K. Rasmussen, The Ex Ante Effects of
Bankruptcy Reform on Investment Incentives, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1159, 1176-206 {1994). See
also Mann, supra note 6, at 1046 n.188 (offering a more recent discussion of that topic).
8. The most prominent studies to date are a study of small-firm reorganizations by Lynn
LoPucki, see Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control - Systems Failure Under Chapter
11 of the Bankruptcy Code? {pts. 1 & 2), 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 99, 247 (1983), and a study of
large-firm reorganizations by Lynn LoPucki and Bill Whitford that resulted in a series of
articles in the early 1990s, see Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over
Equity's Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U.
PA. L. REv. 125 (1990); Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in
the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publ�cly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 669
(1993); Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Patterns in the Bankruptcy Reorganization
of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 597 (1993); Lynn M. LoPucki &
William C. Whitford, Venue Choice and Forum Shopping in the Bankruptcy Reorganization
of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 11. Teresa Sullivan, Jay Westbrook,
and Elizabeth Warren are in the process of completing a more complete study of business
bankruptcies, but the results of that study will not be available for several years. See
Elizabeth Warren & Jay Westbrook, Searching for Reorganization Realities, 72 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1257 (1994).
9. See, e.g., GEORGE M. VON FURSTENBERG, TECHNICAL STUDIES OF MORTOAOE
DEFAULT RISK: AN ANALYSIS OF THE EXPERIENCE WITH FHA AND VA HOME LOANS
DURING THE DECADE 1957-66 {1971); JOHN P. HERZOG & JAMES S. EARLEY, HOME
MORTGAGE DELINQUENCY AND FORECLOSURE (l'T/0); 1im s. Campbell & J. Kimball
Dietrich, The Determinants of Default on Insured Conventional Residential Mortgage Loans,
38 J. FIN. 1569 {1983).
10. The only major empirical studies of troubled loans of which I am aware are two
studies by Stuart Gilson. See Stuart C. Gilson, Transaction Costs and Capital Structure
Choice: Evidence from Financially Distressed Firms, 52 J. FIN. 161 (19'T/); Stuart C. Gilson et
al., Troubled Debt Restructurings: An Empirical Study ofPrivate Reorganization of Firms in
Default, 21 J. FIN. EcoN. 315 (1990). Those studies have limited value for the questions that I
address because they look only at reorganizations by large firms of publicly traded debt
securities in which collateral is quite rare. Accordingly, although interesting in their own
right, those studies shed no light whatsoever on the role of collateral in the liquidation of
distressed loans.
.
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To fill that gap, I undertook a series of three case studies
designed to provide a picture of what actually happens when
secured loans to businesses11 fall into distress. Each case study was
designed to collect as random a group as practicable of problem
secured loans in the portfolio of an institutional lender and to study
what happened to those loans. To enhance the admittedly limited
robustness of the study, I conducted case studies at three separate
kinds of lenders: an insurance company, a bank, and a commercial
finance company.12 At each lender I reviewed files covering
between twenty-one and twenty-eight problem loans.13 For each
loan, I reviewed all of the files that the lender was able to retrieve
and interviewed one or more loan officers responsible for dealing
with the loan during its time of distress. I then completed a
standardized profile consisting of about twenty questions regarding
the initial lending transaction, the event that caused the loan to be
identified as a problem loan, how the lender responded to the
distress, and what ultimately happened io the collateral and to the
lender's investment.14 To put the problem loans in context, I also
conducted general exit interviews with each of the loan officers
designed to collect information about the lender's general lending
practices.
Although my work does not involve anything approaching a
random sample of all distressed loans, the profiles do provide a rich
picture of secured credit in action, with information of far more
general interest than the specific questions that. ·motivated the
study. On those questions, however, the profiles reveal a world in
which the occurrence of liquidation is surprisingly rare. The pursuit
of collateral was rare not only in the smaller loans typical of the
finance-company study but also in the somewhat larger bank loans
and even in the much larger loans I examined at the insurance
11. As with my prior work about secured credit, I generally steer clear of the difficult
issues associated with consumer credit See, e.g., Mann, Pattern ofSecured Credit, supra note
3, at 635 n.38 (discussing the difficulty of understanding the pattern of secured credit in
consumer finance). The theoretical portion of this study, however, does attempt to explain
why foreclosure is much more common in consumer loans than it is in the business loans that
I studied. See infra section 11.A.3.b.
12. To obtain unlimited access to the files of the lenders, I agreed not to disclose the
specific identities of the lenders or identifying information about any of the debtors whose
loans I examined.
13. I collected a total of 74 profiles at the three lenders. 1\vo of the profiles involved
forced liquidations that were not randomly selected. Accordingly, the sample that I use to
evaluate general practices is based on 72 profiles.
14. Copies of the 74 profiles are available upon request, either in hard copy or on
computer diskette. For the sake of confidentiality, I have numbered the profiles and refer to
them by those numbers rather than by the names of the debtors.
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Officers at all three institutions exhibited a

firm

predisposition to treat repossession of collateral as a last resort, to
be pursued only when all else fails.
More importantly for theoretical purposes, the profiles provide
a persuasive and coherent explanation for the limited significance
of liquidation. The answer has two parts - the relatively high
transaction

costs

of

liquidation

and

the

relatively

effective

alternative ways for debtors to repay their loans - but the effect is
much more pervasive than I anticipated. At bottom, all three case
studies indicate a consistent belief by loan officers that a decision to
repossess collateral and liquidate was tantamount to accepting a
loss on the loan. Those officers generally believed that they could
not hope to liquidate collateral at a value that would be sufficient to
pay off the nominal loan balance and, more importantly, to cover
the costs of repossession and liquidation, including the risks of
litigation associated with any adversarial response.
Moreover, the substantive results of my profiles offer strong
reasons for accepting the perspective of those loan officers. Most
important is
liquidation.

the

direct results

those

Although all three of

sophisticated entities

that use

lenders

received

those lenders are

from
highly

careful underwriting standards

designed to ensure that collateral is adequate to protect their
investments, not a single one of my profiles involved a liquidation
of collateral in which the lender recovered the entire balance of its
loan.

Indeed, even though the overwhelming majority of the

profiles revealed full payment of the loans - particularly at the
bank and finance company15 - not a single one of the cases of full
payment involved repossession or foreclosure. Rather, full
payment almost invariably came either from continued operations
of the distressed business, often for months or years during which
the loan continued in a serious state of default; from a sale by the
debtor of all or part of the underlying collateral; or from a
successful refinancing, where another lender paid off the loan I was
studying.

Taken together, those results provide evidence of a

relatively thick and well-functioning market in which distressed
debtors have a real ability to obtain funds to protect their business
assets even while their lending relationship is in the process of
termination.

Those results are particularly valuable given the

15. In the aggregate, the lenders obtained full payment in 64% of the profiles, including a
surprising 84% of the bank and finance company profiles. Full payment was uncommon in
my insurance company profiles (only 14% of the profiles). For a discussion of possible
reasons for that distinction, see infra note 201.

·
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general assumption of previous scholarship that distressed debtors
face pervasive liquidity problems.16
My analysis proceeds in two steps. Part I presents the empirical
part of my study -the data from the three case studies. For each
lender, I outline the types of transactions in which it engages, the
mechanisms the lender uses for identifying problem loans, the way
in which it responds to problem loans, and the ultimate outcomes
those responses produce.
Part II assesses two separate theoretical implications of my
evidence. The first part of the theoretical discussion addresses the
direct implications of my evidence for the economics of distressed
debt. In particular, I show how the mechanisms evidenced in my
case studies generally allow debtors to protect any equity they have
in assets that they have given as collateral. From that perspective,
the poor prices at foreclosure sales reveal not abuse by creditors,
but the end result of a sorting process in which the only loans that
proceed to the end-game of foreclosure are those in which the
assets have deteriorated to values far below the original loan
amount. Having explained why foreclosure is so rare in my studies,
I close that section by explaining the comparatively high rate of
foreclosures that seem to occur in consumer loans for motor
vehicles and homes.

Building on work by Art Leff and Bill

Whitford, I attribute the relatively high rate of foreclosure in those
areas to a combination of two factors: the unusually high liquidity
of motor vehicles and homes as collateral and systemic obstacles to
consensual resolution of consumer collection disputes.
The second part of the theoretical discussion addresses broader
questions about the relation between the market for distressed debt
and the larger market for the initial issuance of debt. First, based
on the very low frequency of liquidation and the extremely poor
results that lenders obtain on liquidation, I argue that the principal
16.

as guilty of that assumption as anyone. See, e.g., Mann, Pattern of Secured
note 3, at 646 n.74. Steven Schwarcz is the most notable exception to that
perception, arguing that one of the principal benefits of the institution of secured debt is its
ability to provide financing to distressed companies. Indeed, Schwarcz seems to believe that
a large portion of the secured debt market is debt issued by distressed firms. See Steven L.
Schwarcz, The Easy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy: A Response to
Professors Bebchuk and Fried 22-28 (Feb. 24, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author). Although that type of lending certainly exists - and plays an important role in the
market for distressed debt {discussed infra in section 11.A.1) - I do not believe that it is a
significant part of the institutional lending in this country, largely because I have not
observed that phenomenon as a significant share of the market for secured debt in any of the
markets that I have examined in this article or in any of the related work I have done on the
pattern of secured credit. Schwarcz presents no empirical evidence to undermine my
perspective on that point.
I

am

Credit, supra
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reason that lenders take collateral in business loans is the strategic
advantage that it gives them; the enhancement of their power to
liquidate collateral by force is of so little value that it cannot
plausibly be viewed as a general justification for those transactions.
Accordingly, legal reforms of the secured-credit system should
focus more on the serious policy issues raised by those strategic
advantages than on perceived difficulties in obtaining a reliable
right to liquidate.
That discussion closes by addressing the long-standing concern
that rules hindering creditors' collection efforts will affect the
willingness of lenders to issue new loans. My evidence of the low
frequency of business failure and bankruptcy strongly suggests that
the concern is for the most part unfounded, at least in the context of
commercial finance.
I.

LIQUIDATING PROBLEM LOANS

A.

The Finance Company

The first of the three case studies involves a finance company.
Although it is difficult to tell how representative my particular com
pany is of the universe of all finance companies, its size places it
comfortably within the mid-range of American finance companies.
Specifically, its $4 to 5 billion portfolio makes it one of the thirty
largest finance companies in this country.
1.

The Finance Company's Lending Transactions

Because the finance company's treatment of distressed loans is
so dependent on the highly specialized nature of its lending transac
tions, I start by outlining the mechanisms the finance company uses
to make loans. Although different companies specialize in different
areas, inventory lending is a dominant line of business for many, if
not most, finance companies. One of the most common transac
tions - and the subject of most of the loans in my sample - is a
"fioorplan" transaction that involves agreements among three par
ties: the lender, the inventory manufacturer, and the retailer. The
arrangement starts with a fl.oorplan agreement between the lender
and the manufacturer.17 That agreement establishes the general
price that the lender charges retailers to fund purchases from the
manufacturer. For example, in the Consumer Electronics and Ap17. I speak here of manufacturers only for convenience, because in many cases the entity
supplying the inventory is not a manufacturer but a middle man such as a wholesaler.
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pliances area (CE&A) at my finance company, a typical agreement
provides for a 2 to 4% "discount": when a retailer purchases a cov
ered appliance, the lender funds to the manufacturer only 96 to
98% of the purchase price. The 2 to 4% spread between the nomi
nal sales price (owed to the lender by the retailer) and the dis
counted price (paid to the manufacturer by the lender)
compensates the lender for a sixty- to ninety-day period during
which no interest accrues on the loan. The provision obligating the
retailer to pay the full price even though the lender only advances
the discounted price to the manufacturer thus provides the lender a
return for the time value of that interest-free period.18 The amount
of the discount and the length of time before interest starts to ac
crue are negotiated on a manufacturer-by-manufacturer basis, gen
erally determined by the parties' respective negotiating strengths.19
Those terms then apply generally to most retailers that purchase
under the agreement, without regard to the specific credit strength
of the individual retailer.20
The fioorplan agreement also contains a repurchase commit
ment by the manufacturer. If the lender finances inventory under
the agreement and ends up repossessing the inventory from the re
tailer, the manufacturer in specified cases is obligated to purchase
the inventory from the lender at the original sales price.21 At least
theoretically, that arrangement gives the lender a substantial pro
tection against losses from defaults by its debtors, because it pur
ports to ensure that the lender can liquidate the collateral at an
amount equal to the amount the lender advanced against the collat18. See Interview with Account Manager (Aug. 1, 1996) [hereinafter Account Manager
Interview]. Throughout this article I have declined to indicate the location of the interviews
and the names and employers of the interviewees in order to preserve the anonymity of the
companies.
19. See Interview with Branch Operations Manager (July 26, 1996) [hereinafter Branch
Operations Manager Interview].
20. See Account Manager Interview, supra note 18; Branch Operations Manager Inter
view, supra note 19. Retailers face higher credit terms only in unusual cases in which the
financial strength of the retailer is marginal. The finance company's need to preserve a posi
tive relationship with the manufacturer gives the finance company a strong incentive not to
quibble about the financial strength of individual retailers.
21. See Floorplan Agreement§ 3, at 1 (on file with author). The agreement provides:
Whenever [the lender] deems it necessary in its sole discretion to repossess or if [the
lender] otherwise comes into possession, actual or constructive, of any Merchandise in
which it has a security interest or other lien, Vendor will purchase such Merchandise
from [the lender] at the time of its repossession or other acquisition or possession
[at]
an amount equal to (i) the total unpaid balance (being principal and finance charges)
owed to [the lender] with respect to such Merchandise, or Vendor's original invoice price
for such Merchandise, whichever is greater, and (ii) all costs and expenses (including,
without limitation, reasonable attorneys' fees) paid or incurred by [the lender] in con
nection with the repossession of such Merchandise.
. • .

Id.
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eral. For a variety of practical reasons discussed below, however,
the repurchase obligation turns out to be significantly less valuable
than it appears on first impression.22
The second leg of the financing arrangement is an agreement
between the lender and a retailer that purchases inventory from a
covered manufacturer. Several provisions of that agreement have
the effect of making the lender's financing "at-will." First, it im
poses no binding obligation that the lender advance funds for any
particular item of collateral.23 Moreover, the agreement specifically
allows the lender to terminate the entire relationship without cause
on thirty-days' notice.24 As discussed above, the terms on which
the lender advances funds for inventory purchases normally are
standardized on a manufacturer-by-manufacturer basis, not a
debtor-by-debtor basis. Accordingly, the individual debtor agree
ments do not set forth a specific discount percentage and interest
free period to govern the retailer's purchases. Rather, each
purchase is governed by the terms applicable to the manufacturer
from whom the retailer purchased that particular item. Then, when
a debtor purchases inventory from a covered manufacturer, the
lender remits the agreed-upon percentage of the nominal sales
price to the manufacturer and accepts an obligation from the re
tailer for the gross (undiscounted) amount of that price. As men
tioned above, the discount off the nominal price thus compensates
the lender for allowing the retailer to defer payment interest-free
for an agreed-upon period - usually at least thirty days. At that
point, interest begins to accrue at an agreed-upon floating rate, usu
ally in the range of prime plus 4-8% per annum. If the debtor fails
to make a scheduled payment, the late amount accrues interest at

18%

per annum.25

The lender has two common types of payment schedules, which
are established on a debtor-by-debtor basis. The most common is a
scheduled payment plan ("SPP"), in which the time of payment is
22. See infra text accompanying notes 77-81.
Agreement for Wholesale Financing§ 1, at 1 (on file with author) ("[The lender] may
extend credit to Dealer from time to time to purchase inventory
[The lender's] decision
to advance funds will not be binding until the funds are actually advanced.").
24. Agreement for Wholesale Fmancing, supra note 23, § 17, at 4. The agreement
stipulated:
Either party may terminate this Agreement at any time by written notice received by the
other party. If Lthe lender] terminates this Agreement, Dealer agrees that if Dealer
is not in default hereunder, 30 days notice of termination is reasonable and sufficient
(although this provision shall not be construed to mean that shorter periods may not, in
particular circumstances, also be reasonable and sufficient).
25. See Account Manager Interview, supra note 18.
23.

• • • .

•

•

•
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established without regard to the actual date on which the debtor
resells the inventory. For example, a typical arrangement might call
for "4 Pay 120": four payments of one-fourth of the purchase price
at 30 days, 60 days, 90 days, and 120 days after the financing.26 By
establishing a payment schedule that makes the time of resale irrel
evant, the arrangement substantially diminishes the need for the
lender to monitor the retailer's sales and allows the lender to dis
pense with frequent inventory audits and the attendant costs.
At the same time, the rigid payment schedule imposes substan
tial risks on the parties. The debtor faces a problem if the inventory
turns more slowly than the payment schedule suggests: if the
debtor does not sell the inventory for five months, it will have to
pay the lender for the inventory out of its own pocket before it
obtains funds from the ultimate customer. Conversely, the lender is
at risk if the inventory turns too quickly: the inventory - the
lender's collateral
will disappear while the debt remains. The
lender attempts to minimize those risks by designing a payment
schedule that accurately reflects the rate at which each debtor turns
over its inventory.27 But the impracticability of designing schedules
that match the turnover rates precisely28 necessarily leaves one or
the other, if not both, of the parties exposed to substantial risks.
The riskiness of that arrangement is aggravated by a relatively
obscure quirk of U.C.C. § 9-312.29 By complying with U.C.C. § 9312(3), the lender can obtain a first-priority security interest in the
-

26. See Telephone Interview with Branch Operations Manager (Mar. 19, 1997) [hereinaf
ter Supplemental Branch Operations Manager Interview].
27. See id.
28. This can be true not only because the lender and the debtor might agree to a schedule
that is shorter or longer than the debtor's customary inventory turnover, but also because the
actual turnover might vary from time to time depending on the season of the year or other
market conditions.
29. U.C.C.§ 9-312(3) reads:
(3) A perfected purchase money security interest in inventory has priority over a
conflicting security interest in the same inventory and also has priority in identifiable
cash proceeds received on or before the delivery of the inventory to a buyer if
(a) the purchase money security interest is perfected at the time the debtor receives
possession of the inventory; and
(b) the purchase money secured party gives notification in writing to the holder of
the conflicting security interest if the holder has filed a financing statement cov
ering the same type of inventory (i) before the date of the filing made by the
purchase money secured party, or (ii) before the beginning of the 21 day period
where the purchase money security interest is temporarily perfected without fil
ing or possession (subsection (5) of Section 9-304); and
(c) the holder of the conflicting security interest receives the notification within five
years before the debtor receives possession of the inventory; and
(d) the notification states that the person giving the notice has or expects to acquire
a purchase money security interest in inventory of the debtor, describing such
inventory by item or type.
u.c.c.§ 9-312(3) (1987).
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inventory that it finances even if other lenders have financing state
ments on file against the debtor at the time the lender starts lending
to the retailer.30 Unlike most rights under Article 9, however, that
priority does not extend to accounts receivable that the debtor re
ceives as proceeds of the inventory: U.C.C. § 9-312(3) limits the
purchase-money priority to "identifiable cash proceeds." Because a
sale of inventory by the retailer is in the ordinary course of busi
ness, as well as "authorized" by the retailer's agreement with the
lender,31 the sale by the retailer strips the lien from the inventory.32
Because U.C.C. § 9-312(3) prevents the lender's lien from attaching
in first priority to the account received for the inventory, the lender
is left empty-handed at the time of the sale. That problem is aggra
vated by the reality that for SPP loans of modest size it is not practi
cal for the lender to do periodic inventory audits.33
30. That rule is significant because, as I note below, the finance company's debtors almost
always have other financing statements on file against them at the time that the finance com
pany initiates its relationship. See infra note 47 and accompanying text. As it happens, the
lender generally is not willing to rely on the U.C.C.§ 9-312 priority in SPP transactions. See
Telephone Interview with General Counsel (Feb. 12, 1997) [hereinafter General Counsel In
terview]. Accordingly, on loans that exceed $250,000, the lender normally insists on ob
taining subordinations from lenders with prior filings, even if those filings would be
subordinate to the lender under Article 9. See Account Manager Interview, supra note 18.
The lender treats SPP transactions differently because of two problems that make it difficult
to maintain purchase-money status in SPP transactions. First, most SPP collateral has no
serial number; accordingly, it is hard for the lender to match up the individual items in the
debtor's stock with the particular loan advances by the lender. Also, because the SPP pro
gram calls for payments at arbitrary dates that will not necessarily correspond to the date of
the sale, the debtor at any time is likely to have substantial amounts of collateral for which
the lender has been partially paid and substantial amounts of debt remaining for which the
matching collateral has already been sold. In many jurisdictions, that circumstance could call
into question the purchase-money status of the loan. See General Counsel Interview, supra
(explaining the lender's concerns); see also DouGI.AS G. BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON,
CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY
402-05 (1987) {discussing the "strict tracing requirement" imposed by Article 9); JOHN O.
HONNOLD ET AL., SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 329 (1992) {discussing diffi
culties in determining which items of collateral secure which obligations); LYNN M. LoPucKI
& ELIZABETH wARREN, SECURED CREDIT. A SYSTEMS APPROACH 682-83 (1995) (discussing
problems in retaining purchase-money status in cross-collateralized loan transactions). Pro
posed revisions to Article 9 would eliminate this problem. See U.C.C.§ 9-107(e) (Reporter's
Interim Draft 1997).
31. The lender cannot practicably forbid sales of the retailer's inventory because those
sales are the very point of the retailer's business.
32. See U.C.C.§ 9-306(2) (1987) (providing that a security interest does not continue in
collateral sold by the debtor if the sale is "authorized" by the lender); U.C.C. § 9-307(1)
(1987) (providing that a security interest does not continue in collateral sold in the ordinary
course of the debtor's business).
33. See Branch Operations Manager Interview, supra note 19. The branch manager ex
plained that cost effectiveness is the overriding concern in the frequency of audits and that
the lender is working steadily to conduct more and more audits: "[We c]an't afford to go
every month. It's not worth it. But going out every year? We're really working toward
that." She explained further that the increasing number of audits is a function not only of the
lender's trend toward larger loans, but also "a function of the false reports we've gotten.
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The other major type of payment arrangement is a pay-as-sold
("PAS") arrangement. Under that arrangement, the debtor is obli
gated to make payments to the lender promptly upon the sale of
each item of collateral. The lender enforces that schedule by regu
larly scheduled, on-site inventory audits that compare the items of
inventory on hand with the lender's records of the inventory it has
financed. Although such audits ordinarily discover some amount of
inventory that has been sold but not yet paid for - items that are
sold and unpaid ("SAU") - that is not necessarily a cause for con
cern. Given the typical practice of making one payment to the
lender each week,34 it would be no surprise if an audit revealed a
shortfall of twenty-five percent of a month's normal sales. Accord
ingly, the branch operations manager explained that the lender is
not troubled by persistent SAU shortfalls as long as they do not
exceed thirty percent of a month's sales. When I commented to
him that the arrangement leaves the lender chronically short of col
lateral, he responded without concern, "That's just the way that
program works."35
The other significant lending product covered by my case study
was a line of business that the lender terms "asset-based lending"
("ABL"). Although an outside observer might characterize all of
the lender's lending as asset-based, the lender limits the term ABL
to loans on which the lender does not have repurchase agreements
to protect itself. The finance company enters into those transac
tions either because the loan covers inventory for which the lender
does not have a repurchase arrangement or because the loan covers
accounts receivable and other noninventory collateral. Because
there is no repurchase agreement, those loans would be structured
with significantly lower advance rates, typically in the range of fifty
to sixty-five percent of the wholesale value of the collateral.36
To protect itself on the ABL transactions, the lender requires its
debtors to have the account debtors - that is, the ultimate consumEvery time we have a loan go bad we try to find out what we can do to prevent that from
happening again." Interview with Branch Manager (Aug. 1, 1996).
34. See Branch Operations Manager Interview, supra note 19. The applicable agreement
states without elaboration that the debtor is obligated to pay for PAS collateral "when such
Collateral is sold, transferred, rented, leased, otherwise disposed of or matured." Agreement
for Wholesale Financing, supra note 23,§ 9, at 2.
35. Branch Operations Manager Interview, supra note 19. The results of my profiles sug
gest that this quirk does not appear to impose a huge risk on the lender when compared to
the practical difficulties of eradicating that risk, especially for retailers that sell relatively
inexpensive items.
36. See, e.g., Profile 17 (advancing 60% on carpets); Profile 18 (advancing 65% on guns,
35% on ammunition, and 50% on accounts receivable).
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ers who purchase on credit - make payments directly to a "lock
box," a post-office address for a bank account under the lender's
control.37 Tue lender's lockbox program appears to be relatively
successful. After a "growing period" to "retrain" customers to have
payments sent to lockboxes, eighty-five to ninety percent of ac
counts receivable typically are paid to lockboxes.3s Tue lender
monitors the payment situation closely so that it can take action
promptly if it observes a decline in the percentage of payments be
ing made into the lockbox.39

2. · Selecting Loans for Study
After some introductory interviews attempting to get a sense of
the lender's business, the next task was to decide how to select a
group of files to examine. Because the lender does not organize its
records in a way that would allow me to sample all of the distressed
loans over a certain period of time, I was unable to draw a direct
sample of all of the loans in which debtors had defaulted during a
particular time period. Moreover, because the lender's right to ter
minate without cause allows it to terminate relationships before the
debtors commit a default, a sample that included only the loans on
which debtors defaulted would not accurately represent the uni
verse of distressed debtors. Accordingly, I asked each of three dif
ferent account executives to allow me to review the files on the nine
loans that they had "liquidated"40 most recently. That term was
slightly overinclusive because in the lender's usage it includes files
in which the debtor voluntarily terminated the relationship. After
excluding four of the twenty-seven files because the debtors volun
tarily terminated the relationship, I was left with a group of twenty
three files: nine from asset-based lending and fourteen from fioor
plan arrangements - seven of those from management informa
tion systems and seven from consumer electronics and appliances.
Because the sample included so few cases of adversarial liquidation,
I also examined two older files - not part of my random sample one of which involved a bankruptcy and one of which involved
forced liquidation of the collateral.41
37. See Branch Operations Manager Interview, supra note 19 (stating that all accounts
receivable lending in his branch requires payments to a lockbox).
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. "Liquidation" is the tenn that the lender uses for the process of tenninating a financ
ing relationship.
41. In the bankruptcy case, the lender was paid in full with interest within five months
after the bankruptcy filing. See Profile 24. In the forcible liquidation case, the debtor con-
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The biggest problem with the selection of files at the finance
company is the possibility that the process was skewed by the need
for me to take files from the three officers mentioned above. As it
happens, the product lines for which those officers are responsible
appear to include some of the smaller items of collateral on which
the lender makes loans: office equipment, home appliances, and
the like. It is possible that the results would have been different if I
had reviewed files in which loans against larger assets, like boats or
farm equipment, had been liquidated. I doubt, however, that the
skewing is substantial because the general trend of the profiles from
the finance company closely resembles the general trend of the
profiles from the bank, which tended to make loans on more sub
stantial assets.

3. Results of the Profiles
a. The Debtors. The lender's standard loan review forms pro
vide a considerable amount of standardized information about the
debtors. Accordingly, I start by outlining some of this information
about the twenty-three distressed debtors covered by my profiles.
At the time of the distress, all twenty-three debtors were corpora
tions.42 In each case, without exception, the lender had a guaranty
from at least one of the principals of the business, and in most of
the cases had a guaranty from each individual that owned stock in
the debtor,43 along with the spouses of those individuals.44 The me
dian debtor had one location,4s had annual sales of

$2.4

million,46

ducted a liquidation sale that reduced the loan balance from about $190,000 to $80,000; a
year later, the lender is still pursuing the guarantors for the remainder. See Profile 25.
42. One account executive explained: "[One hundred percent] of those entities may be
owned by one guy, but they tend to be organized as corporations. It's not that we're looking
to finance corporations, it's more that the size of the borrower that we're looking for tends to
be a corporation." Account Manager Interview, supra note 18.
43. All stockholders signed guaranties in 21 of the 23 profiles. In one of the remaining
cases, the lender had guaranties from individuals owning only 56% of the shares, see Profile
10, and in the other from individuals owning only 65% of the shares, see Profile 12.
44. The interest in the guaranty was evidenced on the form for evaluating each loan by a
specific place to indicate whether all guaranties had been signed not only by the principals
but also by their spouses. It appears that the desire to obtain signatures from the spouses of
the stockholders was not motivated by any interest in marital status, but more out of a desire
to avoid marital-property defenses to enforcement of the guaranty. See Telephone Interview
with General Counsel (Nov. 6, 1996).
45. Eight of the debtors had multiple locations. See Profile 3; Profile 6; Profile 16; Profile
17; Profile 18; Profile 19; Profile 20; Profile 22. The high was about 20, see Profile 17, with an
average of 2.6 locations overall.
46. The number for annual sales requires some judgment, because use of the final figure
(at the time of liquidation) - in most cases quite a small figure - would not reflect accu
rately the previous scope of the business. The figure in the text is based on the last full year
reported before the year in which the debtor's distress became an issue for the lender.
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and had been in business for fourteen years. U.C.C. searches at the
time the lender extended its loan indicate that the lender advanced
funds in the face of a large number of secured lenders of record.47
At the time the lender decided to terminate the relationship, the
median debtor had been borrowing money from the lender for
three years, with a range from less than one year to seventeen
years; had a credit line of $300,000, with a range from $15,000 to
$6,000,000; and had an outstanding balance of $82,000, with a range
from $700 to $4,000,000. Interestingly, twenty-one of the twenty
three debtors had funds available under their credit line at the time
the lender decided to terminate the relationship.48
b. Selecting Debtors for Termination. Some of the most enlight
ening information that I obtained related to the circumstances that
motivate the lender to terminate its lending relationships.49 Most
striking was the lender's relative lack of concern for late pay
ments.50 Of the twenty-three profiles, fifteen noted late payments
in the last periodic review before termination, but the late pay
ments were the basis for termination in only five cases.s1 In eight of
the other ten late-payment profiles, the basis for termination was
general concern about the financial strength52 of the debtor or its
47. The lender was the exclusive lender in only 3 of the 23 cases. See Profile 5; Profile 16;
Profile 17. The average number of secured lenders of record at the time of the lender's loan
was 3.9. My evidence is not direct evidence of the number of secured lenders from whom a
typical borrower will obtain funds, because of the possibility that distressed debtors do not
accurately represent the universe of all debtors; distressed debtors might have more secured
lenders than nondistressed debtors. I do find, however, some probative value in the surpris·
ingly large number of lenders outstanding at the time when the lender initially made the loan
- that is, at a time when the debtor appeared to be healthy.

48. Of the other two, one debtor was at its $2 million limit, see Profile 17, and a second
was $100,000 over its $500,000 credit line, see Profile 21.
49. Determining the baSis for termination of a loan that is in default and also is a demand
relationship is relatively subjective. I base my assessments on my review in each profile of a
memorandum written by the responsible account officer recommending a course of action.
The course of action becomes effective only upon approval by a number of higher executives.
In the cases where those executives selected a different course of action, the reasons for their
decisions were evidenced by handwritten notes on the memorandum prepared by the respon·
sible account officer.
50. The relative insignificance of late payments as a basis for termination flies in the face
of the traditional academic perspective that late payments are the focus of lender decision·
making on termination decisions. See, e.g., LoPucKI & WARREN, supra note 30, at 257
("Most defaults actually acted upon by secured creditors are defaults in payment.").
51. See Profile 3; Profile 4; Profile 12; Profile 13; Profile 15. In one of those cases, the
payment default was aggravated by the debtor's failure to deliver a letter of credit required
under the debtor's agreement with the lender. See Profile 13.
52. The principal indicators of financial strength that the lender follows are the debtor's
gross revenues and tangible net worth, as well as the ratio of the debtor's leverage (debt to
tangible net worth). The lender calculates those indicators based on its own records of inven·
tory sales and information provided by the debtors.
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guarantor.s3 In another profile, the termination was based on the
debtor's refusal to provide a financial statement, notwithstanding
seventeen separate requests over a period of about ten months!
That debtor's two late payments during the period of the financial
statement problem were not significant to the lender's decisionmak
ing process.s4 Finally, in the last profile, the basis for the termina
tion was an apparent fraud by the debtor: at an on-site inventory
inspection, the debtor attempted to pass off empty containers as
containing unsold inventory.ss
The relative lack of concern with payment defaults is also evi
denced by the fact that eight of the relationships were terminated
even in the absence of a payment default. In three cases the rela
tionships were terminated because of general concern about the
debtor's financial strength, which was accompanied in each case by
violation of a financial covenant.s6 The other five relationships ter
minated without a payment default were terminated because of in
adequate use of the credit facility.s7 Although that might seem like
a strange reason for termination in the abstract, it justifies termina
tion for two separate reasons. First, a decline in usage of the credit
facility often is associated with a general decline in sales, which the
lender understandably views as a significant leading indicator of fi
nancial distress. Second, even if the debtor is not in financial dis
tress, its failure to make frequent use of the credit line limits the
income that the lender earns from the relationship. Because the
lender incurs substantial fixed costs in reviewing and monitoring
each credit line, a credit line becomes unprofitable if it is used
infrequently.
In sum, concern about financial strength was the leading basis
for termination (11 profiles, 48%), followed by the related problem
53. If the late payments alone had been enough to justify termination, the debtors would
have been terminated in response to those payments; the lender would not have waited to
terminate the debtor until a regularly scheduled periodic review of the loan. The relevant
financial concern focused on problems with the debtor itself in several profiles. See Profile 1;
Profile 2; Profile 10; Profile 18; Profile 19; Profile 21. In Profile 6, the principal of the debtor
suffered a foreclosure on an unrelated judgment. The lender terminated the relationship
with the debtor when the principal was not able to offer a satisfactory explanation. In Profile
16, a manufacturer had guarantied the loan. The lender terminated the relationship when the
manufacturer refused to extend the guaranty.
54. See Profile 5.
55. See Profile 7. Because that debtor was on a pay-as-sold program, the absence of the
inventory without prior payment constituted a payment default. It is clear from the file that
the fraud at the inspection was the basis for termination, not simply the late payment.
56. See Profile 17 (reporting debtor's violation of tangible net worth and leverage cove
nants); Profile 20 (reporting debtor's violation of tangible net worth covenant); Profile 23
(reporting debtor's violation of tangible net worth and leverage covenants).
57. See Profile 8; Profile 9; Profile 11; Profile 14; Profile 22.
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(5 profiles, 22 % ), payment defaults

and one case each of refusal to deliver financial

statements and fraud

(4%

each). Those statistics significantly un

dermine any image of the lender waiting by its mailbox eager to
seize on a technical payment default to justify termination. On the
contrary, the facts suggest a lender motivated to continue every re
lationship, even in the face of fairly frequent default, as long as the
lender has any reason to believe that the relationship will be
profitable.58
The at-will nature of the lender's program is central to its ability
to rely so heavily on financial strength in selecting loans for termi
nation. Because the lender can terminate relationships on thirty
days' notice without cause, it does not have to substantiate to the
debtor the basis for its decision to terminate the relationship. In a
more traditional term-loan context, a lender could terminate based
on :financial considerations only if it could identify and substantiate
a specific event of default. In the at-will context, by contrast, the
lender's own decision that the debtor's financial strength is unsatis
factory is enough to justify termination. The at-will nature of the
relationship thus gives the lender the ability to terminate the rela
tionship before the occurrence of a serious payment default.
Another interesting fact is that the presence or absence of an
adequate collateral cushion rarely seems to be of significance.
Although a few of the debtors were short on collateral at the time
the lender decided to terminate the relationship, in the overwhelm
ing majority of the cases the lender believed that it was fully collat
eralized at the time that it decided to terminate the relationship.59
In one case, for example, although the debtor had failed to satisfy
leverage and tangible net worth covenants for quite some time, the
lender ultimately decided to terminate the relationship because of
its perception that the debtor's principal was focusing his attention
on a new and unrelated business. At the time of the termination,
58. The lender's incentive to continue relationships rests not only on its desire to con
tinue individual relationships as long as there is a possibility of future profits, but also on its
need to maintain a good relationship with its manufacturers. If the lender cuts off the manu
facturer's retailers too quickly, the manufacturer might decide to shift its lending arrange
ments to a different finance company.
59. The lender believed that there were significant shortages on three profiles. See Pro
file 15; Profile 16; Profile 21. It was concerned about possible shortages on three additional
profiles. See Profile 1; Profile 5; Profile 19. In the other 17 profiles, the lender believed that
it had adequate collateral. As I explain infra at note 326, it is difficult to tell whether that
assessment indicates that an actual liquidation would make the lender whole. The relevant
point, though, is that the lender was not motivated to take action by concern about the value
of the collateral.
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the lender was wildly oversecured, with funds outstanding equal to
about thirty percent of the repurchase value of its collateral.60
That approach seems to me to tie into the previous discussion of
financial strength. The at-will nature of the relationship allows the
lender to terminate debtors soon after they become shaky, allowing
liquidation of the loan generally to occur at a time when the lender
still can obtain full payment.61 A relationship that required a more
objective justification for termination of the relationship would be
likely to result in considerably larger losses for the lender.62

c. The Process of Termination.

As the previous section sug

gested, the process of termination of loans by the lender is more
proactive than reactive. The process in the great majority of cases
occurs as a result of a scheduled periodic review rather than in re
sponse to a specific default.63 Perhaps the most surprising effect of
that proactive approach is that it makes it possible for the lender to
exit its relationships in a relatively nonadversarial manner. The
overwhelming majority of the cases are terminated by allowing the
debtors to liquidate the loan in the ordinary course of business
through sale of the collateral or refinancing with another lender.
Thus, although the legal rights of the parties under Article

9 and the

Bankruptcy Code always remain as a background against which the
parties bargain, the ordinary course of liquidation results in com
plete payment of the lender without any use of the Article 9 reme
dies and with only limited reliance by the debtor on rights under the
Bankruptcy Code.64
Contrary to the traditional academic perspective, not a single
time in my twenty-three profiles did the lender exercise its Article

9

rights to repossess collateral and sell it in satisfaction of the debt.65
60.

See Profile 17.

61. That perspective is evidenced by the frequency with which reviewing executives call
for termination of a relationship on the theory that the early signs of distress indicate that it is
"time to get out." See, e.g., Profile 12 (offering that rationale for temiination of an ade
quately collateralized loan).
62. That would be true whether the need for an objective justification arose from a con
tractual agreement between the parties or from the interposition of a mandatory legal re
quirement through lender-liability rules. See infra note 244 and accompanying text
(criticizing legal rules that limit parties' ability to create flexible termination provisions).
63. Of the 23 profiles, only 3 (13%) were liquidated outside the course of scheduled peri
odic reviews. See Profile 3 (special mid-year review in response to persistent payment de
faults); Profile 5 (failure to supply financial statement for ten months, despite 17 separate
requests from the lender); Profile 7 (fraudulent passing off of inventory).

64. The debtors filed bankruptcy in one case,
another, see Profile 12.

see Profile

23, and threatened a filing in

65. During their entire time at the lender, which covered the liquidation of a total of
about 100 accounts, none of the three account executives had ever repossessed collateral and
removed it from the debtor's possession. See Branch Operations Manager Interview, supra
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Rather, in each · transaction the lender left the collateral in the
debtor's control, allowing the debtor to sell the collateral in the or
dinary course of business or obtain substitute financing to repay the
loan. 66 When questioned about their reticence to repossess collat
eral, the account executives uniformly pointed to the general suc
cess of allowing the debtor to sell the collateral: the executives
ordinarily expect to get full repayment if they leave collateral iii the
debtor's possession and rarely expect to get full repayment if they
do not. Surprisingly, that perception seems to be well justified. In
only one of the twenty-three cases did the lender fail to recover the
entire amount of its principal and interest.67 That was the only case
in my twenty-three profiles in which the debtor was not able to liq
uidate the collateral in the ordinary course of its business:

the

debtor filed for bankruptcy and the bulk of the collateral was sold
at an auction conducted under order of the bankruptcy court.68
When I started the study, I wanted to investigate the hypothesis
that the reason that the lender could trust its debtors to liquidate
the collateral was the idea that it could pursue the guarantors if the
business did not repay the debt. Although that hypothesis might be
true in some cases, the results of the study suggest that it is not
generally accurate: the lender frequently leaves debtors in posses
sion to liquidate even in cases where the guarantors have little or no
net worth. For example, the account executive in one case ac
knowledged that the guarantor "had no net worth," but left him in
possession to liquidate because "he wanted to stay in business" and
"he was sending constant payments. "69
note 19 (about 30 accounts); Interview with Account Executive (Aug. 6, 1996) (17 accounts);
Account Manager Interview, supra note 18 (about 50 accounts). The closest incidents in
volved two situations in which the lender allowed debtors to conduct liquidation sales with
lender personnel on site to monitor the sale. See Branch Operations Manager Interview,
supra note 19. Profile 25 is a nonrandom review of one of those files, which I do not include
in my sample.
66. One arguable exception is Profile 15, in which the lender and the debtor agreed to
"transfer" some of the collateral to another one of the lender's debtors. The manufacturer
issued a credit to the distressed debtor for the collateral, and the lender was repaid for that
collateral when it was sold by the second, healthy retailer. Even in that case, however, the
lender did not force the debtor to relinquish the collateral and never took possession of the
collateral itself.
67. See Profile 23. That is not to say that none of the lender's loans ever go bad.
Although its chargeoffs are impressively low, they are not invisible: 1995 chargeoffs came to
about 20 basis points of the lender's net loan volume for that year. See Interview with Fi
nance Company Credit Executive (April 1996) [hereinafter Finance Company Credit Execu
tive Interview).
68. See Profile 23. In that case, the lender eventually charged off about $150,000 of a loan
that had about $1,200,000 outstanding when the debtor went into default.
69. Profile 1. For other cases where the principals of the debtor had negligible net worth
but were still allowed to control disposition of the collateral, see Profile 3 (reporting that a
.
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The fundamental reason for the lender's willingness to allow its
debtors to control liquidation of collateral was the prevailing pessi
mism of account executives as to the results that they could expect
to obtain through more adversarial approaches to liquidation. The
general perception was that the lender could never hope to get paid
in full if it repossessed the collateral and sold it in satisfaction of the
debt. The dominating basis for that perception was a belief that the
debtors almost universally could sell the collateral for more than
the lender. As one executive stated in connection with a troubled
firearms debtor: "If he couldn't sell [some obsolete hunting equip
ment], we certainly couldn't."70 Even in the profile mentioned
above where the lender eventually wrote off about $150,000, the
lender consciously decided to leave the collateral in the possession
of the debtor on the theory that the debtor ultimately could com
plete manufacturing its inventory and sell the resulting goods for an
amount far greater than any amount that the lender could have ob
tained from a sale of the raw materials and work in process.71 Of
course, that approach leaves lenders exposed to the risk that the
indigent principals of their borrowers might abscond with the as
sets. But the cases I reviewed suggest that the poor results ex
pected on repossession were adequate in most cases to motivate
lenders to trust their borrowers to retain the collateral.
Transaction costs are another common problem that make re
possession impractical for small or remotely located debtors. For
example, in one case the executive justified his dedsion not to re
possess collateral from a video dealer in South Dakota as follows:
"For fifteen thousand dollars [the outstanding loan balance], to go up
to South Dakota, to try to repossess him, to take whatever inventory
was left and try to send it back to the manufacturer probably would

wife of one of the stockholders had significant assets, but never signed a guaranty); Profile 22
(reporting "no tangible net worth" of guarantors); Profile 24 (nonrandom file examined be
cause it involved a rare bankruptcy filing) (reporting that the debtor was left in possession
despite a negative net worth). I do not mean to suggest that the guaranty itself is irrelevant.
On the contrary, the lender's periodic reports highlight information regarding the absence of
a guaranty from any shareholder or the spouse of any shareholder. In one of the rare cases in
which the lender did not have a guaranty from all of the owners, the absence of a guaranty
from one of the owners was one of the factors motivating the lender's termination of the
relationship, even though the existing guarantor had a tangible net worth that exceeded the
balance of the loan. See Profile 10.
70. Profile 18.
71. See Profile 23; see also Profile 25 (nonrandom file selected because it involved a liqui
dation sale) (reporting that the debtor was allowed to conduct a liquidation sale on the view
that "[e]ven if it was a liquidation sale, it clearly was better than the liquidation sale [the
lender] could have conducted").
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cost us five thousand dollars." Had we repossessed him it probably
would have been a break even, so we tried to collect it by phone.72

The legal costs associated with repossession posed a similar
problem. For example, in one case the lender's decision not to re
possess was motivated in part by the concern that the lender might
be held liable for repossession because it had allowed the debtor to
continue operating for several years notwithstanding persistent de
faults.73 In another case, the lender accepted a debtor's commit
ment to repay a loan in almost a year's worth of weekly payments
rather than test the debtor's threat that it would file for bankruptcy
if the lender attempted to repossess the collateral.74 Concerns
about the costs of the legal system slowed the push for repossession
even in one profile that involved blatant fraud by the debtor.1s As
the branch operations manager explained: " 'If we go after him,
we'll have to sue him, so it's better to save the money you'd have to
give to attorneys by collecting internally yourself (through letting
him pay you voluntarily)."'76
I also was surprised at the limited use by the lender of its repur
chase option. When I first learned of the lender's repurchase ar
rangement, my natural focus on legal rights and remedies led me to
assume that the repurchase arrangement would enhance the
lender's incentive to repossess collateral because of the high likeli
hood that the lender would be able to resell the collateral at cost to
the manufacturer. In fact, however, the lender makes only limited
use of the repurchase option.
Two general problems motivate the lender's reluctance to exer
cise the repurchase option. The first is the legal and practical costs
of repossession. Despite the general pride that legal academics
take in the creation of Article 9 as an ostensibly efficient system for
liquidating collateral,77 the transactions that the statute is supposed
to facilitate remain relatively impractical. Essentially, the problem
72. Profile 22. That loan eventually was repaid in full out of the business's ordinary cash
flow. Similar concerns about the cost effectiveness of using repossession for small loans were
mentioned as significant factors in two profiles. See Profile 8; Profile 14.
73. See Profile 17.
74. See Profile 12. It is not clear how significant that threat was, because it appears from
the lender's practices in other cases that the lender probably would have accepted the
debtor's workout proposal even without the threat.
75. See Profile 7. The characterization of the fraud as blatant is mine, based on my re
view of the documents in the file. The debtor denied any fraudulent activity.
76. Profile 7. As discussed below, that debtor repaid its loan in full a few months later.
77. For a typical example of the highly laudatory perspective that legal academics have on
Article 9's procedures, see LoPucKI & WARREN, supra note 30, at 110-11 (offering a func
tional analysis of the improvements of Article 9 as compared to real estate procedures).
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is that the lender is highly unlikely to get paid 100% if it exercises
its repurchase option, of only because of the legal exposure.78 Just
as significant as the transaction costs and legal risks associated with
taking possession of the collateral is the difficulty of forcing the
manufacturer to repurchase the collateral. As it happens, much of
the collateral left in the possession of a debtor whose business is
having trouble tends to be old, and thus perhaps obsolete, or dam
aged, and thus not subject to repurchase.79 For example, in one
profile where the debtor was terminated for committing fraud in
connection with an inventory audit, the lender nevertheless allowed
the debtor to continue operating and selling the remaining collat
eral in the ordinary course of business.80 The outstanding balance
of the loan - after a prompt payment made in response to the
inspection - was $20,000, and the lender thought it could get only
$2,000 for the collateral against which it had advanced the $20,000.
The debtor ultimately repaid the entire amount outstanding on the
loan without litigation.st
One of the most important factors in fending off repossession is
the debtor's ability to persuade the lender that the debtor can be
trusted to "do the right thing" and pay off its obligation. Surpris
ingly, the lender's evaluation of the debtor's character usually pro
ceeds with little or no personal interaction; in only four of the cases
did the account executive ever have any significant personal knowl
edge about the principal o� the debtor.82 Much more crucial to the
situation was the debtor's pattern of payments when faced with dis
tress. When the debtor could convince the lender that it was mak78. To be sure, the applicable provisions of the standard fioorplan agreement, quoted at

supra note 21, require the manufacturer to reimburse the lender for the costs of repossession.
That contractual assurance, however, is not sufficient to assuage the concerns of the deci
sionmakers faced with problem debtors. Among other things, it is doubtful that it covers the
lender's exposure to a tort judgment for a misstep in the repossession process. Another
plausible reason, suggested to me by Paul Shupack although not raised in my discussions with
the account executives, is the need to maintain good relationships with the manufacturers,
which would tend to limit the desire of the lender to call the manufacturer on its repurchase
obligation.
79. That is a particular problem in the computer industry, where products become obso
lete in a matter of months. See Telephone Interview with Andrea J. Dunn, Worldwide Credit
Manager, Corporate Treasury, Hewlett-Packard Company (Jan. 4, 1996) (discussing Hewlett
Packard's reluctance to agree to repurchase obsolete computer equipment). The lender
monitors that situation closely; its standard report forms include information about the
amount of collateral that is "out of " repurchase.
80. See Profile 7.
81. For a similar situation, see Profile 19, which refers to a "very weak" repurchase agree
ment as a basis for refraining from repossession.
82. See Profile 12; Profile 17; Profile 18; Profile 23. In one other case, the lender was
influenced by a positive impression of the professional reputation of a newly hired comptrol
ler. See Profile 19.
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ing payments as it sold the collateral, the lender generally would be
comfortable allowing the situation to continue undisturbed.83 Simi
larly, a debtor that responded to termination by making a commit
ment to pay off the outstanding balance over a specified period of
time ordinarily was given an opportunity to meet that payment
schedule, even in cases where the schedule proposed by the debtor
was quite prolonged.84
One final reason for leaving the debtor in possession is that it
enhances the likelihood that the debtor can obtain refinancing.
Legal scholars generally assume that a decision by a lender to ter
minate a line of credit exerts tremendous leverage on a debtor be
cause of the debtor's inability to obtain financing from a new lender
in the face of one lender's decision to terminate a relationship.ss
As it happens, however, debtors in at least four of the twenty-three
cases (17 %) paid off the balance that they owed to the lender
through funds obtained from a new lender.s6 In two of the twenty
three cases, the lender's decision to put off repossession was explic
itly motivated in part by a desire to enhance the debtor's opportu83. See, e.g., Profile 10 (explaining that the lender was not worried that payments regu
larly came in late during liquidation of the loan because they were no later than they had
been before the relationship was tenninated).
84. See Profile 1 (stating that the lender "trusted" the debtor because he was sending
constant payments); Profile 2 (stating that there was "no reason [for the lender] to do any
thing" because the debtor was making the payments it had promised); Profile 5 (reporting a
decision not to repossess that was motivated by the debtor's current payment status and the
small size of loan); Profile 6 (reporting a decision not to repossess because the debtor was
"basically current or close to it"); Profile 12 (reporting that the debtor's "[c]onsistent pay
ment perfonnance" as promised gave the lender "a lot of faith and confidence" in the debtor
and that the lender accepted a 46-week payment schedule proposed by the debtor).
85. The following recent explanation is illustrative:
[I]n most situations in which loans are made payable on demand, the parties know full
well that if the bank calls the loan without warning, the debtor would not be able to pay
and would go into default. One might expect that debtors would be reluctant to agree to
repayment terms they know they cannot meet. That appears, however, not to be the
case.
LoPucKI & WARREN, supra note 30, at 258; see also DAVID G. EPSTEIN & STEVE H. NICK·
LES, DEBT: BANKRUPTCY, ARTICLE 9 AND RELATED LAws, MODERN CASES AND MATERI
ALS 207 {1994) (offering a similar discussion of the difficulties of a borrower obtaining funds
in the face of acceleration by the primary existing lender); Mann, Pattern of Secured Credit,
supra note 3, at 646 n.74 {discussing the reasons distressed debtors might have difficulty at
tracting new financing and citing other scholars adopting the same perspective).

86. See Profile 13; Profile 18; Profile 20; Profile 21. Four other profiles involved miscella
neous sources of payment other than liquidation of the collateral. See Profile 3 (lender drew
on a letter of credit); Profile 6 {loan paid off with funds from a one-time sale of intellectual
property); Profile 7 {debtor completed its repayments with a lump-sum payment from an
unknown source that could have been a new lender); Profile 17 (loan paid off with a new
capital contribution). Excluding the single failed business, see Profile 23, the remaining situa
tions {14 of 23, 61 % ) apparently were paid off through the sale of the collateral in the ordi
nary course of business.
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nity to obtain a new lender to pay off the lender.87 For example, in
one case the executive explained that a "very weak" repurchase
agreement made "[g]iving them a chance to find a new lender . . .
the best way to get paid."88 In another case, the lender decided to
let the debtor operate through the Christmas season, on the view
that if the lender "[l]eft them in to do their best sales [and] get a
[fiscal year end] statement," the debtor could "try to get a new
lender. "89
The overall picture of the termination process shows a process
much more leisurely, and much less destructive, than academics
have assumed. The classic picture of liquidation of a secured loan
shows a lender calling in the loan in response to default and de
stroying the debtor's business immediately.90 That scenario did not
occur in a single one of the finance company profiles. Indeed, only
one debtor's business failed during the course of liquidation of the
debt, and in that case the failure was not precipitated by the
lender's actions against the debtor. On the contrary, the debtor in
that case filed for bankruptcy with the approval of the lender out of
a desire to fend off unsecured trade creditors.91
In sum, the lender's decision to terminate its relationship with
the debtor was much more an incident of ongoing business than a
watershed event. As mentioned above, several of the debtors sim
ply replaced the lender with another institutional lender. Others
might have shifted the focus of their businesses, no longer selling
inventory from the manufacturer whose sales the lender financed,
substituting inventory from other manufacturers from whom fi
nancing was available. Still others, of course, ultimately might have
failed for lack of adequate financing. But a slow death of that sort
is far different from the immediate termination assumed in the
scholarly literature.92
'01. See Profile 19; Profile 21.
88. Profile 19.
89. Profile 21. That strategy paid off when Chase Manhattan paid the loan in full the
following February.
90. See, e.g., EPSTEIN & NICKLES, supra note 85, at 207; ROBERT L. JORDAN & WILUAM
D. wARREN, SECURED 'TRANSACTIONS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 262 (3d ed. 1992); LoPuCKI
& WARREN, supra note 30, at 275; Scott, Relational Theory, supra note 2, at 926-27 (discuss
ing the leverage arising from a creditor's ability "both to seize the debtor's assets . . . and to
terminate the financing necessary for the operation of the business"); see also Mann, Pattern
of Secured Credit, supra note 3, at 645-49 (discussing that leverage).
91. See Profile 23.
92. I should add that the picture might be different at a finance company Jess dependent
on repurchase agreements. That type of finance company might be more likely to finance all
of a debtor's inventory, wherever purchased. In that case, a decision by the lender to termi
nate might have a more catastrophic effect on the debtor. I doubt, however, that it would be
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d. The Costs of Termination. A final topic is the costs of termi
nation: To what extent do lenders profit from financial distress
through fees imposed on debtors at the time a loan is selected for
termination? In the case of the finance company that I studied, the
answer is simple: not much. Ordinarily, the only fee imposed by
the lender is a default interest rate, substantially higher than the
normal contract interest rate, which is assessed only on amounts
that a debtor does not pay in accordance with its regular payment
schedule. Because the lender ordinarily does not accelerate the en
tire amount of the indebtedness when it sends a notice of termina
tion,93 debtors ordinarily have a substantial opportunity to avoid
that charge. The only profile in which the lender actually charged
any other fees was the profile in which the debtor filed for bank
ruptcy. In that transaction the lender charged a modest amount of
about $25,000 in attorney's fees on a debt of $1.2 million (about 2%
of the debt).94 Surprisingly, the "no-fees" policy was applied even
in profiles in which the lender incurred out-of-pocket expenses for
audits and the like.95 As the branch operations manager explained
in discussion of one transaction, there is
"[n]o point in pissing the dealer off if you can get him to cooperate in
a downside situation. It's better to keep on a good working relation
ship with the dealer so you can collect your money. If you get a
dealer mad by charging him $2,000 for an audit fee, he can do little
things that make your life a lot harder (like paying somebody else
before he pays you)."96

much different, because several of the profiles that I examined in the asset-based lending
area - where the lender does not have repurchase agreements - appeared to involve fi
nancing of all, or substantially all, of the debtor's inventory. Those profiles, however, showed
the same pattern of termination practices as the repurchase-based lending in the other prod
uct lines offered by the lender.
93. In all but 3 of th� 23 profiles (13% ), the lender gave at least 60-days' notice of termi
nation before declaring the entire balance due and payable, and in 2 of the 3 exceptions the
lender gave 30-days' notice. See Profile 7 (40-days' notice of termination in response to fraud
at an inventory audit); Profile 12 (debt accelerated 30 days after 60-day letter based on
debtor's failure to make payments during the intervening 30 days). The sole case of immedi
ate acceleration involved an odd case in which a manufacturer unilaterally terminated its
guaranty of the debtor's obligations. See Profile 16.
94. See Profile 23. My characterization of those fees as modest is based on the evidence
in Robert M. Lawless et al., A Glimpse at Professional Fees and Other Direct Costs in Small
Firm Bankruptcies, 1994 U. ILL. L. REv. 847, 868 (suggesting that the average professional
fees in a small-business chapter 1 1 proceeding amounted to 8.66% percent of all assets).
95. See Profile 12 (reporting that audit expenses were not passed on to the debtor).
96. Profile 1.
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The Bank

The second of the three case studies involves a bank. The bank
is the largest operating subsidiary of a midwestern bank holding
company that at the time of my study was about the fiftieth largest
banking company in the country, with a 1996 market capitalization
of about $3 billion.
1.

The Bank's Lending Transactions

The bank's lending transactions are much less routine - and
thus much more individualized - than the lending transactions of
the finance company. Nevertheless, it is reasonably accurate to say
that all of the transactions I examined fell into four general types of
loans. The first group are amortizing working-capital loans. Those
loans provide a one-time infusion of cash, usually either to fund a
debtor that is purchasing or establishing a business; occasionally
those loans refinance similar existing loans. The second group of
loans are standard commercial real estate loans. Those loans ordi
narily are relatively long-term amortizing loans, secured by a mort
gage on one or more parcels of real estate. The third group of loans
are revolving working-capital lines of credit. Those loans typically
require relatively small monthly payments and have relatively short
terms, allowing the bank to decide on a fairly frequent - usually
annual - basis whether it wishes to continue the relationship. The
final group of loans are purchase-money loans, specifically, amortiz
ing term loans usually in the three to five year range, used to fund
the purchase of specific items of personal property.
2. Selecting Loans for Study
As with the finance company, I started my work at the bank
with a number of introductory interviews designed to ascertain the
most practicable way to collect the information I wanted without
undue interference with the lender's daily operations. Ultimately, I
decided to review all of the distressed loans that were liquidated by
a single bank officer during 1996. The bank provided me a tracking
report that listed the file numbers for all such loans and gave me
free access to the portions of the files for those loans located in the
division at the bank that handles distressed loans, a total of fifteen
to twenty feet of files. The printout showed a total of forty-five
files. I ultimately excluded seventeen of the forty-five files, either
because the information available in the files was insufficient to
complete my profile or because the liquidation process had not yet
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been completed. I thus ended up collecting profiles on a total of
twenty-eight bank loans.97
The biggest problem with the selection process at the bank is the
possibility that the process was skewed because it represented the
portfolio of files assigned to the particular bank officer who was
assisting me. The officer in charge of the Special Assets Division
does not assign files randomly, but rather based on the skills and
workload of the officers in his division. That officer assured me,
however, that the sample would not be skewed toward any particu
lar group among the bank's debtors. If anything, he suggested, the
loans assigned to this officer might be slightly larger than the aver
age loans that came to his division. Given the wide variety of the
loans I reviewed, as discussed below, I do not believe that the prob
lem is critical.
3. Results of the Profiles
a. The Debtors. Although the bank's files do not reveal nearly
so much information about its debtors as do the finance company's
files, it is useful to start by outlining some basic information about
the twenty-eight debtors covered by my bank profiles. Thirteen of
the debtors were organized as for-profit corporations, fourteen
were individuals or sole proprietorships, and one was a benevolent
corporation (a church). In each of the cases involving the for-profit
corporations, the bank held guaranties from all of the shareholders
of the debtor entity.98 As with the finance company's debtors, the
great majority of the debtors had a single location.99 Finally, at the
time of the distress, the median debtor had been borrowing money
from the lender for seven years, with a range from one year to
twenty-eight years, and had an outstanding balance of between
$65,000 and $70,000, with a range from $10,000 to $2.3 million. 100
Of the six profiles in which the bank had outstanding lines of credit,
97. See Profiles 26-53.
98. In one of the profiles involving a for-profit corporation, one of the shareholders did
not accept complete responsibility. See Profile 32. That debtor had two shareholders; one
shareholder's guaranty was limited to 25% of the debt. In the profile involving the benevo
lent corporation, there was no guaranty on the loan. See Profile 29. As for the rest of the
profiles, the bank's records do not make it clear whether all spouses of the shareholders
signed the guaranties.
99. Only eight debtors had multiple locations, see Profile 31; Profile 32; Profile 37; Profile
38; Profile 40; Profile 43; Profile 49; Profile 50, and three of those were real estate developers
that were not operating retail businesses at the locations, see Profile 40; Profile 49; Profile 50.
The greatest number of locations was nine. See Profile 38. Excluding the three multiple
location real estate loans, the average number of locations was 1.5.
100. Although the median problem loan for the bank is only slightly smaller than the
median problem loan for the finance company ($82,000), that obscures the generally larger
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three of the debtors had funds remaining available under the
line.101

b. Selecting Debtors for Termination. The bank's process for se
lecting loans for termination has two steps.102 First, when a loan is
identified as a serious problem, the loan is transferred from the
originating loan officer into a separate group in the bank called,
somewhat euphemistically, the Special Assets Division. The most
objective occurrence that would result in such a transfer would be
the debtor's failure to make two consecutive monthly payments. If
a loan becomes ninety days past due, the bank places the loan on
"nonaccrual" status: for internal purposes, the bank ceases to re
gard the asset as accruing interest on an ongoing basis.103 Because
it would reflect poorly on the vigilance of the originating officer if
the loan went onto nonaccrual while it still remained in his control,
the originating officer ordinarily transfers the loan to the Special
Assets Division before the debtor has been delinquent ninety
days.104 In addition to payment defaults, loans might be transferred
into the Special Assets Division for more subjective reasons, includ
ing a perception that the value of the collateral is insufficient to
repay the debt, or concern that the debtor will be unable to repay
the loan at its scheduled maturity date.10s
When the loan is transferred to the Special Assets Division, the
officer to whom the loan is assigned promptly reviews the file and
constructs an exit strategy for the bank, reflecting the officer's best
assessment as to how the bank can maximize its recovery from the
loan.106 Because the strategy in many cases will be to do nothing
but wait and hope for the �est,107 the factors that go into the deternature of the finance company's problem loans: the finance company's average problem loan
was in the amount of $484,000, while the bank's average problem loan was "only" $244,000.
101. Three profiles had funds still available, see Profile 26; Profile 47; Profile 53, and
three did not, see Profile 27; Profile 31; Profile 42. Those figures appear to contrast with the
finance company data, in which 21 of the 23 debtors had funds available at the time the
finance company decided to terminate the relationship. The small number of the bank credit
lines, however, dissuades me from placing any significant weight on the difference.
102. The description of the bank's process for selecting loans for termination is based on
an informal interview with the loan officer who handled the loans that I studied. See Inter
view with Bank Officer (Nov. 1, 1996) [hereinafter Bank Officer Interview].
103. Nonaccrual status is a wholly internal device, designed to aid the bank in maintain
ing a conservative estimate of the value of its loans. It does not affect the liability of the
debtor. The bank's records include a second balance - the "borrower's balance" - that
continues to accrue interest even after the loan is placed on nonaccrual status. See id.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. Because my work is based on loans that actually were liquidated, it is not a random
sample of the loans transferred to the Special Assets Division. That is, it does not include
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mination of that strategy are the factors relevant to my study: the
factors that motivate the lender to terminate its relationship with a
debtor.
On that point, the results are in some ways similar to the results
of the profiles from the finance company.10s For example, the
debtor's failure to make one or more monthly payments was a sig
nificant basis for termination in only three of the twenty-eight
profiles (11 %),109 although there were payment defaults in thirteen
of the twenty-eight files (46%).110 P ut another way, even in cases
where a debtor that had failed to make monthly payments was ter
minated, the payment default was the basis for termination less
than a quarter of the time (3 of 13 profiles, 23 %). In the other ten
payment-default cases, the most common justification (7 of 10
profiles, 70%) was general concern about the ongoing financial sta
bility of the debtor or its assets.111 The remaining three cases in
volved financial distress as well, but more immediate: in two of the
profiles the debtor voluntarily closed its business,112 in the third the
debtor advised the bank that it could not successfully pay off the
loan and believed that foreclosure was the best altemative.113
The relative insignificance of payment defaults also is evidenced
by the surprisingly high percentage of the loans that were termiloans where the bank left the loan in place and received payment as agreed in the ordinary
course of business. I chose loans the way I did because my goal was to study loans that
lenders wish to terminate, not loans that concern them at some lower level insufficient to
justify termination. I doubt, however, that the distinction is important; my impression is that
very few loans are transferred to the Special Assets Division and left in place without further
action.
108. Determining the precise basis of termination is more difficult for the bank than it
was for the finance company, because some of the bank's files did not contain specific memo
randa addressing the appropriate course of action. In those cases, I relied upon oral state·
ments from the responsible loan officer regarding his motivation at the time he decided to
terminate the relationship. The justifications that he offered do not appear to reflect any
attempt to portray the bank's actions in an unduly positive manner. As explained below, the
principal conclusion of note that I draw from his explanation of those motivations is that the
bank frequently terminates loans for reasons not related to payment defaults.
109. See Profile 30; Profile 40; Profile 46. The 11 % figure arguably overstates the signifi·
cance of the monthly-payment defaults, because one of those cases was justified by a combi
nation of persistent payment defaults and a serious shortage of collateral.
110. In 8 of the 13 cases noting monthly-payment defaults, the loan reached its scheduled
maturity date before the bank terminated the relationship. As I explain below, maturity
alone was never a basis for termination.
111. See Profile 28 {failure to pay withholding taxes); Profile 34 (inadequate cash flow to
service debt); Profile 38 {chronic inability to maintain property); Profile 41 {deterioration in
value of barge that served as collateral); Profile 44 (general lack of confidence in the busi
ness's future); Profile 47 (obsolescence of the business's main product lines); Profile 50 (neg
ative cash flow).
112. See Profile 35; Profile 52.
113. See Profile 43.
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nated even in the absence of a failure to make a monthly payment
(15 of 28 profiles, 53%). In those cases, general concern about fi
nancial strength again was the most common motivating factor (7 of
15 profiles, 47% ).114 Another significant group of files (5 of 15 non
late payment profiles, 33 % ) involved situations where the debtor
voluntarily "surrendered": two cases where the debtor voluntarily
closed its business,115 two cases where the debtor advised the bank
that it was unable to satisfy its financial obligations,116 and one case
where the debtor filed bankruptcy for reasons unrelated to the
creditor's pursuit of its remedies.117 The last three non-late pay
ment profiles (20% of that group) involved assorted character
related problems serious enough to motivate the lender to take ac
tion: one case in which the debtor fraudulently fail�d to report
sales of several automobiles in which the lender had a lien;118 one
case in which the debtor refused to provide inventory reports and
:financial statements;119 and one case in which the debtor was a phy
sician convicted of felony sexual abuse of his patients.120
In sum, like the finance company, the bank's principal justifica
tion for deciding to terminate its relationships was concern about
:financial strength (14 profiles, 50% ) Indeed, to give adequate
weight to financial strength as a motivating factor, those profiles
should be aggregated with the substantial group of profiles in which
the debtor voluntarily determined that it could not satisfy its finan
cial obligations, as evidenced either by a direct communication to
the bank or a decision to close its business (8 profiles, 29% ). Taken
together, those two groups constitute more than seventy-five per
cent of the bank profiles. Payment default is much less significant,
being the stated reason for termination in only three of the bank
profiles (11 % ), the same as the character-problem terminations.
The last significant piece of the bank's process for termination is
the role of the maturity date. Each of the bank loans that I studied
called for monthly payments that included both principal and inter.

114. See Profile 26 (filing of state tax liens against a related party that provided supplies
to the debtor); Profile 27 (precipitous decline in sales); Profile 32 (negative cash flow); Profile
45 (poor credit reports on debtor); Profile 49 (inadequate debt-service coverage); Profile 51
(rapid decline in value of securities pledged as collateral); Profile 53 (poor financial results
that left debtor overextended on its line of credit).
115. See Profile 39; Profile 42.
116. See Profile 29; Profile 37.
117. See Profile 48 (reporting that the debtor filed for bankruptcy without committing
any default whatsoever on the loan).
118. See Profile 31.
119. See Profile 33.
120. See Profile 36.
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est; thus, a continued schedule of those payments eventually would
pay off the loan. In only a few cases, however (7 profiles, 25 %),
was the term long enough to allow the payments to amortize the
loan completely. In the other twenty-one profiles, the loan was
scheduled to mature with a significant balance still outstanding.
The nature of the bank's business - primarily the incentive to con
tinue lending relationships as long as they appear to be profitable
- leads the bank to renew loans at maturity as a matter of course
just as it leads the finance company to continue lending relation
ships that technically are at-will. Maturity alone rarely would be a
reason for termination, absent some underlying concern about the
continued profitability of the transaction. The maturity date does,
however, give the bank a free opportunity to terminate loan rela
tionships without pointing to a particular default.
My profiles suggest that the relatively short maturity dates play
a functional role similar to the role of the "at-will" feature of the
finance company's arrangement. They allow the bank to use the
maturity date as a clear and objective justification for terminations
based on subjective concerns about financial strength, obviating any
need for requiring the bank to justify those concerns to the debtor.
Thus, of the fourteen profiles where financial strength was the
lender's primary reason for terminating the relationship, the loans
had matured in eleven. Because one of the other three cases in
volved a persistent payment default,121 the lender had to rely on
financial problems as a basis for termination in only two of the four
teen cases in which that was the actual reason.122

c. The Process of Termination. The next step is to examine what
happened after the bank decided to terminate the loans. The gen
eral picture at the bank resembles the picture at the finance com
pany in two ways. First, even in cases in which the bank decides
that it wants to terminate the lending relationship, it is quite unu
sual for the bank forcibly to repossess and liquidate its collateral.
Second, as with the finance company profiles, the bank's demand
for payment or refusal to extend a maturing loan is not at all likely
to lead to a business failure or bankruptcy; it is much more likely
that the debtor will repay the bank by selling the property or refi
nancing the loan with another institutional lender. Indeed, all but
121. See Profile 50 (reporting the termination of a loan where the debtor's business was
failing to make payments because of negative cash flow).
122. See Profile 51 (reporting the termination of a loan when a precipitous decline in the
value of pledged securities left the bank undersecured); Profile 53 (reporting that poor finan
cial results left the debtor overextended on its line of credit).
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one of the business failures in my bank profiles arose from a volun
tary decision of the debtor that was made before the bank decided
to take action.
First the repossession point. Like the finance company profiles,
not a single one of my twenty-eight bank profiles revealed a forced
repossession and liquidation of collateral. Only one profile even
reached the first step: a forced repossession.123 The bank was moti
vated to act in that case by a combination of several circumstances.
The bank decided that it wanted to terminate the relationship in
response to a report from an affiliated bank of a serious default on
a loan to the debtor's main supplier, an entity under common own
ership with the debtor. The bank met with the debtor several times
over the course of seventy-five days but eventually decided to pur
sue repossession when it was unable to obtain either a payment to
reduce the loan balance or current financial statements for the
debtor. Interestingly, even in that case the bank did not liquidate

the collateral after repossession. Rather, it held the collateral for
about a month and then released the collateral to the debtor when
the bank's loan was paid off through refinancing by another bank.
The reason for the reluctance to repossess was put most suc
cinctly by the officer in charge of the Special Assets Division, who
explained his general perception on repossession: " [A] decision to
go out and get the collateral

is a decision not to get paid in full."124

As long as the bank does not go out and get the collateral, the bank
has a substantial chance of being paid in full through one of several
reasonably likely courses of events: a sale of the business, a refi
nancing of the loan by another lender, or continued operation of
the business long enough to defray the outstanding balance of the
debt.
By contrast, a decision to repossess collateral ordinarily ends the
possibility that payment will come from any of those three alterna
tives and leaves the lender only with the possibility that payment
can be obtained from liquidation of the collateral and pursuit of the
debtor's principal for any deficiency. On that point, the files I re
viewed are replete with evidence of frustration at the limited likeli
hood that the bank could obtain full repayment through liquidation.
For example, even in the profile where the bank did repossess col
lateral forcibly, it determined that the collateral could be sold for at
most

$50,000,

hardly a positive outcome for a loan with an out-

123. See Profile 26.
124. Interview with Bank Division Manager (Nov. 14, 1996) [hereinafter Bank Division
Manager Interview].
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standing balance of about $295,000. The bank waited thirty days
and it was paid in full when another bank refinanced the loan.125
That perspective appeared in cases governing a wide variety of
collateral, including used automobile-repair equipment,126 obsolete
data-processing equipment,127 street-construction equipment,12s
and commercial real estate.129 The problem was exacerbated when
the collateral was located out of state because the bank would have
to hire third parties to act at a distance or incur the expenses of
sending an officer to the remote location.130
The fear of repossession governed the bank's actions even when
the collateral included highly liquid items like motor vehicles. For
example, in a profile involving loans to an automobile dealership,
the officer indicated that the most he could have received upon re
possession would have been a net of ninety-seven percent of the
original invoiced cost. Because the debtor was out of balance on
the line of credit, that would not have been enough to repay the
loan. By allowing the business to continue to operate, the bank
made it possible for the entire business to be sold in place at a sig
nificantly higher price.131 Similarly, in a loan in which the collateral
was a single automobile, the officer indicated that he decided not to
repossess the car because the owner had moved to another town which elevated the cost of repossession - and because he had per
sonal knowledge that the car was in poor condition. In that case the
debtor eventually repaid the loan in full, with interest and late
charges, through small monthly payments.132
Again, as with the finance company, the strategy of leaving the
debtor in control of the collateral worked surprisingly well. The
bank took a loss in only seven of my twenty-eight bank profiles
(25%). Of those seven, four were profiles in which the debtor
closed its business before the lender took any action and one was a
125. See Profile 26.
126. See Profile 34; Profile 44.
127. See Profile 32. .
128. See Profile 28.
129. See Profile 40.
130. See Profile 33 (inventory of out-of-state discount store); Profile 46 (out-of-state
travel agent).
131. See Profile 31. The bank still took a loss of about $100,000 on a loan of $1,000,000.
The deficiency after the sale of the business was about $160,000. The bank released one of
the two guarantors - the one that the bank considered less culpable - for a payment of
$60,000. It was unable to collect from the second guarantor because that guarantor had a
stroke shortly after the sale of the business, became insolvent, and ultimately filed for
bankruptcy.
132. See Profile 30.
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profile where the debtor asked for a foreclosure based on its own
determination that it would not be able to repay the loan. In all,
the bank took a loss in only two of the twenty-one profiles in which
it left the debtor in control of the collateral even after the bank
decided to terminate the relationship. To put that number in per
spective, note that five of the seven profiles in which the bank took
a loss came in the six profiles in which the debtor itself decided that
the assets should be liquidated.133 The bank lost money in five of
six profiles (83%) in which the debtor decided that the assets
should be liquidated, but in only two of twenty-one profiles
in which the bank refrained from repossession.134

(10%)

The profiles offer two related explanations for the general suc
cess of the bank's strategy of leaving the debtor in control. First,
even after their finances had deteriorated to the point that the bank
no longer wanted them as customers, the debtors were able to ob
tain refinancing from other institutional lenders with a frequency
that I found astonishing. In nine of the twenty-eight profiles (32 % )
the bank was paid in full through a straight refinancing by another
financial institution, with six of the refinancings coming from other
banks.135 In another three profiles, which involved real estate col
lateral (11 % of all the bank profiles) , the debtor paid the loan in
full by selling the collateral to a third party at a sales price that
exceeded the amount of the bank's debt.136 Those numbers are
even more impressive when I remove the two profiles in which

133. The bank took a loss in the profile where the debtor asked for foreclosure, see Pro
file 43, and in four profiles where the debtor voluntarily closed the business, see Profile 35;
Profile 39; Profile 42; Profile 48. The bank did not take a loss in Profile 52, even though the
business failed.
134. Those two profiles included the profile involving the automobile dealership, see
supra note 131 and accompanying text, and the one significant bankruptcy proceeding, see
infra notes 139-141 and accompanying text. The two groups of profiles - 21 in which the
bank did not repossess and 6 in which the debtor voluntarily gave up - do not add up to 28
because there is one additional profile, which presented the odd situation where the bank
repossessed the collateral but did not liquidate it. See Profile 26. That strategy resulted in
full payment.
135. See Profile 26; Profile 27; Profile 34; Profile 36; Profile 40; Profile 41; Profile 44;
Profile 45; Profile 50. That figure is conservative because it includes only the cases where the
bank knew that the debtor repaid the loan through refinancing. In one case the bank did not
know the source of the funds the debtor used for repayment. See Profile 46.
136. See Profile 29; Profile 37; Profile 49. In one of those cases, the new financing came
from the bank itself, impressed with a personal guaranty from the purchaser that made the
collateral safer than it was in the hands of the existing debtor. See Profile 29. In two other
profiles, the bank consented to sales at amounts inadequate to satisfy the debt. It ended up
taking a modest loss on one of those transactions, see Profile 31, but was paid in full in the
other, see Profile 47.
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there was no operating business137 and the six profiles in which the
debtors themselves decided that the assets should be liquidated .138
The debtors used a sale or refinancing to repay their obligations in

full in twelve of twenty profiles (60%) in which the debtor was still
in operation at the time the bank decided to terminate the
relationship.
The second reason that the bank's strategy was successful re
lates closely to the wide availability of refinancing: businesses sur
vived. It was quite unusual for the bank's decision to terminate the
loan to result in a failure of the debtor's business. Indeed, of the
twenty profiles in which a business was operating at the time the
bank decided to terminate the loan, nineteen of the businesses still
were operating at the time of my research.
The only exception was a profile in which a manufacturing busi
ness filed bankruptcy after the bank decided to stop making ad
vances under the business's line of credit.139 Even in that case, the
bank did not intend to force the debtor into bankruptcy when it
stopped making advances under the line of credit.

The bank

stopped making advances because the debtor's deteriorating sales
had allowed the amount outstanding on the line of credit to move
beyond the authorized amount and - more troubling to the bank
- apparently quite far beyond the value of the existing collateral.
At the time, the bank believed that the debtor had sufficient raw
materials on hand to continue operations for quite some time. The
bank also thought that negotiations toward resolving the problem
by altering the scope of the debtor's operations were going well
when the debtor unexpectedly sought relief under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code. The officer viewed the bankruptcy filing as a
mistake from the debtor's perspective,140 which he attributed to the
inexperience of the debtor's attorney:

137. Profile 30 involved a note secured by an automobile without any operating business.
Profile 51 involved a note secured by securities that had been given in satisfaction of a previ
ous real estate loan.
138. See supra note l33 {listing those six profiles).
139. See Profile 53. There was one other debtor bankruptcy, see Profile 48, but the
debtor on that loan filed for bankruptcy even before the bank became aware of the business's
financial distress. See infra text accompanying note 142.
140. After about two years in bankruptcy, the bankruptcy court approved a plan of reor
ganization under which the business was liquidated and all of the proceeds of the sale were
distributed to the bank. The liquidation of the tangible collateral and most of the accounts
produced enough to repay with interest all but about $130,000 of the $1.1 million that had
been outstanding at the time of the bankruptcy. The bank then entered into a settlement
agreement under which it agreed to release the guarantors in return for a share of payments
from future collections on the remaining accounts. Under that arrangement, the bank ended
up being repaid all of the debt, including costs and attorney fees, except for about $50,000.
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It was a puzzle to us because nobody really expected it. One week we
had a meeting saying, 'hey, you're not performing, we're concerned,'
and the next week they filed bankruptcy. . . . They could have made it.
If they had the right help, they could have made it. The only reason
they filed bankruptcy is that they thought we were coming to get
them. They overreacted. We could have worked it out. If they had
[an attorney] who had been through this situation before, they could
have gotten through it: gotten rid of the [relatively incompetent son
in-law of the original operator], worked through it.

It is possible of course that the bank officer's explanation paints
his actions as more accommodating than they appeared to the
debtor at the time. On the other hand, the bank's actions in the
other profiles I reviewed convince me of the plausibility of the of
ficer's perspective. Among other things, it is clear that the bank
had not moved decisively to collect the loan. When the debtor filed
for bankruptcy the bank had taken no steps to obtain possession of
the collateral. Specifically, the bank had not sought to repossess
the tangible collateral or taken steps to collect any of the debtor's
accounts receivable. It is understandable that the debtor would ex

pect the hammer to fall at any moment, but the fact remains that
the bank was not in the habit of taking that kind of decisive action,
and an attorney experienced in such matters would have known
that.141
Related to the general ability of the debtors to survive is the
relative infrequency of bankruptcy. In addition to the case dis
cussed above, only one other debtor filed for bankruptcy.142 In that
transaction, the debtor took its business straight into a Chapter

7

liquidation even before the bank was aware of the debtor's financial
distress. That profile offers a good example of the general destruc
tiveness of liquidation. The bank's loan balance at the time of the
bankruptcy was $64,000. The collateral was liquidated for $15,800
at a cost of $4,300, twenty-seven percent of the sales price. The
bank then recovered ninety percent of the loan balance by exercis
ing

its

rights

under

a

guaranty

from

the

Small

Business

Administration.

141. Given the relative rarity with which lawyers are involved in the disposition of dis
tressed debt, it is understandable that a practicing attorney would not have a good under
standing of the likelihood that a bank would respond forcibly in such a situation. As
mentioned below, the lender retained legal counsel in only 2 of the 28 profiles. See infra note
153. That occurrence is similar to the results of the finance company profiles, in which the
lender incurred attorney's fees in only 1 of the 23 profiles. See supra notes 93-96 and accom
panying text (discussing costs incurred in finance company profiles). I should add that in
house counsel did not appear to have spent any significant time on any' of the cases in which
outside legal counsel was not retained.
142. See Profile 48.
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The only other incidents of bankruptcy were three cases in
which individual principals of debtor corporations filed bankruptcy
after liquidation of the loan to the corporation. In one of those
cases, the bank recovered the rest of its outstanding debt from the
proceeds of a foreclosure on a deed of trust securing the bank's
guaranty.143 In the other two cases, where the guaranties were un
secured, the bank did not participate in the bankruptcy and did not
receive any recovery.144

d. The Costs of Termination. The bank's response to recovering
costs in financial distress is much more difficult to assess ·than that
of the finance company. As discussed above, the finance company
did not often charge fees on distressed loans, largely because of a
desire to keep the debtor's principals motivated to work the prob
lem out successfully. The bank, by contrast, does appear in at least
a few cases to profit from the distressed state of its debtors.
The first point to note about the bank's response to recovering
costs is that the Special Assets Division at the bank is a separate
division responsible for its own profitability.145 Accordingly, the di
vision has a substantial direct incentive to maximize the income
from its portfolio. Under current conditions the division actually
earns a profit, even though the only assets under its control are the
bank's most distressed loans.146 Of course that does not mean that
the division is earning as high a return as the divisions that hold
performing assets, but it does indicate some success at collecting
revenues from the distressed debtors for which it is responsible.
The second point is that both the division manager and the loan
officer who had handled the loans in my sample responded to my
question about their ability to profit from the distress of their debt
ors with the same general answer. As a general matter, they ex
plained, one of their most common responses to distress is to

143. See Profile 47.
144. See Profile 31; Profile 42. In Profile 31, the bank considered filing a motion seeking
to except the debt from discharge on the theory that the individual debtor had committed
fraud. The individual had sold several automobiles on which the bank had a lien without
reporting the sales to the bank. The bank ultimately decided that it was not worth the effort
of filing the motion. Instead, it referred the matter to the FBI for investigation. That investi·
gation terminated when the individual suffered a stroke.
145. The profitability of the division is determined as the difference between (1) the in
come the division earns from payments on the loans for which it is responsible, and (2) the
sum of the amounts written off as unrecoverable and an imputed interest expense based on
the bank's current cost of funds.
146. In order to ensure that the separate loan-originating divisions of the bank have an
adequate incentive not to originate problem loans, the profit or loss of the Special Assets
Division is allocated in pro rata shares back to the various divisions from which its loans
came.
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require an increase in the interest rate as a condition1of any exten
sion beyond the stated maturity date of the loan.147 The reason for
the increase is simple: it gives the debtor the most direct incentive
to deal with the problem by refinancing or selling the underlying
collateral.
My profiles confirmed the use of that strategy but indicated that
it may not be quite as uniform a practice as they suggested. In the
eleven profiles in which the lender granted a formal extension of
the date of maturity, the lender raised the interest rate in six
profiles (55%).148 In three (27%),149 the lender did not change the
interest rate at all, and in three (27% ) ,1so the lender in fact dropped
the interest rate. In the few cases where the bank dropped the rate,
the motivation appeared to parallel the finance company's philoso
phy: a gesture of good faith to enhance the likelihood that the
debtor would pay something.1s1
Given the low rate of losses on any of the loans, it is difficult to
assess the success of the strategy; a direct ev�uation of the strategy
would require a process in which lenders tried both foreclosure and
extension on loans that appeared to them to be identical in relevant
respects. It is worth pointing out, however, that the bank did not
lose money on any of the loans in which it agreed to an extension.
That might reflect the skewing of the group of loans in which the
bank agreed to an extension. One explanation would be that the
bank agreed to an extension only in cases in which it believed the
debtor was highly likely to succeed in paying off the loan at a later
date; the results then would mean only that the bank was correct in
all eleven of the profiles in which it made that determination.
The bank officer's explanation, however, does have considera
ble plausibility. It is easy to see that the increased interest rate can
be an effective device for motivating the debtor to seek refinancing.
If a savvy debtor understands the limited likelihood that the bank
147. Both officers indicated that the bank's desire to raise interest rates in that situation
was not tied to a need to adjust rates to reflect changes in prevailing market rates. Instead, as
the text suggests, the motivating factor was the desire to induce the debtor to respond to the
problem.
148. See Profile 34; Profile 36; Profile 37; Profile 38; Profile 45; Profile 50.
149. See Profile 32; Profile 44; Profile 49.
150. See Profile 29; Profile 38; Profile 40. The number of profiles does not add up to 11
because in one case, Profile 38, the lender did both: it raised the interest rate in connection
with one extension and subsequently dropped the interest rate in connection with a later
extension.
151. The textual explanation is not particularly valuable as a general explanation of the
bank's policies because of the small number of cases and because the officer to whom I spoke
strongly disagreed with the decision to lower the interest rate in Profile 38. It is, however,
the best explanation I have to offer.
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actually will repossess, the bank has few significant levers to en
courage the debtor to go to the trouble to find a new lender. By
adjusting the cost of continuing to do business with the terminating
bank to a rate that reflects the elevated risk of the distressed loan,
the bank can put the debtor in a situation where it can save money
by refinancing and switching to another lender - presumably a
lender that specializes in loans that are riskier than those that the
bank prefers to hold and presumably at an interest rate higher than
the rate the bank initially was charging yet lower than the elevated
rate the bank is charging after the extension.152
Aside from the increased interest rate, the incidence of charges
connected with default was relatively small and unlikely to be prof
itable for the bank. In nineteen of the profiles, the bank charged no
fees whatsoever - excluding from consideration any of the inter
est-rate increases described above. In four profiles, the bank
sought reimbursement for various expenses.153 In only six of the
profiles did the bank assess charges that did not clearly reflect ac
tual expenses that it had incurred: late charges in five profiles154
and a $250 extension fee in one profile.155 Although the files did
not contain information sufficient for me to determine the precise
amount of those charges, the officer characterized them as nominal
in most of the cases. The only profiles in which the officer thought
the charges were significant were two profiles in which the officer
deliberately was attempting to put as much pressure as possible on
the debtor.156

152. For a more general discussion of the way in which the market for distressed debtors
responds to distressed debtors by moving them to more risk-tolerant lenders, see infra sec·
tion II.A.I.a.
153. See Profile 26 (legal fees and liquidator's fees associated with repossession); Profile
27 (cost of third-party inventory audit); Profile 48 (liquidator's fees); Profile 53 (payment
from Chapter 11 estate of accountant fees of debtor and attorney's fees incurred by lender).
Because the bank ordinarily charged its debtors fees to compensate for the time of its in·
house counsel, I can determine that the bank did not retain in-house or external counsel in
any cases other than those listed above.
154. See Profile 26; Profile 30; Profile 31; Profile 38; Profile 47.
155. See Profile 49.
156. See Profile 26 (reporting that the bank repossessed collateral in response to a per
ception that the debtor was not negotiating with the bank in good faith); Profile 38 (reporting
that the bank officer assessed all possible late charges as part of a concerted effort to moti
vate the debtor to refinance the loan).
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The Insurance Company

The third of the three case studies involves a large national life
insurance company with a portfolio that consists almost exclusively
of commercial real estate loans.1s7

1. Selecting Loans for Study
The process of obtaining files of distressed loans at the insur
ance company was considerably more difficult than at the finance
company and the bank. For reasons that should become clear from
the results discussed below, the process of liquidating distressed
loans at the insurance company

is much more protracted than it is

at the bank and the finance company. Accordingly, the need to find
a group of files in which liquidation had been completed forced me
to draw my distressed loans from a historical portfolio of distressed
loans at some time several years in the past. Not surprisingly, it was
clear from my first conversations with personnel in the real estate
investment division of the insurance company that efforts to review
files from older loans would be hampered both by turnover of per
sonnel during the intervening years and by the difficulty of locating
complete files.
Ultimately, my contact at the insurance company provided me a
list of all of the loans in the insurance company's portfolio as of
May

1992, when she began to work at the insurance company.

The

list assigned a rating to each loan ranging from one to five, in which
one is the highest rating, three is the standard rating, and five is the
lowest rating. Based on discussion with my contact, I decided that
loans rated four and five would be the best loans for my project.
Because loans rated one, two, and three are either normal or above
normal, it was clear that they should be excluded. It was clearly
appropriate to include loans rated five because those are loans for
which the insurance company expects to take a loss of all or a por
tion of its principal. I decided that I also would include loans rated
four, based on a description of that rating as covering loans "with
some hair on them," normally with debt-service coverage dropping
down to 1.0, or some other basis for believing that default is immi
nent.1ss The portfolio included

117

loans with those two ratings,

157. See, e.g., MICHAEL T. MADISON & ROBERT M. ZINMAN, MODERN REAL ESTATE
FINANCING: A TRANSAcnONAL APPROACH 360-64 (1991) (reporting statistics indicating that

insurance companies tend to invest in long-term real estate loans and offering reasons for
that tendency).
158. By debt-service coverage, I refer to the extent to which cash flow "covers" debt
service - the ratio of cash flow to debt service. My description of the rating system is drawn
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from which I randomly selected sixty.159 The insurance company
then collected all of the files that it could locate for those sixty loans
and brought them to a central location, a total of about 150 boxes of
files.160
My review of the loans consisted of examination of the relevant
files and discussions with several executives at the insurance com
pany, including officers with legal and business responsibility for
distressed loans during the time that the insurance company dealt
with the loans in my sample. Because of the difficulty of locating
complete files several years after the distressed loans I wanted to
study, and because of the turnover of personnel at the insurance
company, I was able to gather sufficient information to complete a
usable profile on only twenty-one of the sixty loans.
In some ways, the process of selection at the insurance company
is superior to the process I used at the bank and finance company.
In particular, because the sample was drawn randomly from the in
surance company's entire portfolio, the risk that the group is unrep
resentative because of selection bias is much less than it is at the
finance company and the bank, where I worked from problem loans
of particular officers at particular times. The small yield of my se
lection process (21 of 60, 35%) does not strike me as a serious prob
lem because I see no reason to expect a connection between the
company's ability to locate complete files on the transaction several
years after the event and the results I would have found for the
transaction.161
2. Results of the Profiles
a. The Debtors. The insurance company's files revealed nothing
surprising about the composition of the debtors that fell into dis
tress. The most common form of entity for the twenty-one debtors
was a limited partnership (7 debtors, 33 % ), followed by trusts (6
from Interview with Insurance Company Executive (Dec. 20, 1996) [hereinafter Insurance
Company Executive Interview).
159. I took every second Joan rated four and every second loan rated five. To get my
sample up to 60 Joans, I then took the Joan located at the center of the remaining unselected
loans.
160. It should be obvious that this process reflected the insurance company's commit
ment of a substantial amount of resources to my project.
161. One reader suggested that incomplete files might correlate with the complexity or
difficulty of the cases. That certainly is possible but seems unlikely. If anything, complex
cases seemed more likely to leave a significant enough paper trail for me to reconstruct the
transaction sufficiently for my purposes even when a large portion of the file was missing.
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debtors, 29%),162 general partnerships (5 debtors, 24%), corpora
tions (2 debtors, 10%), and one sole proprietorship (5 %). The
great majority of the projects (15, 71 % ) were office buildings, with
the remaining six projects including two hotels (10% ), one luxury
condominium building, one enclosed mall, one community shop
ping center, and one apartment project (5 % each). The debtors
were concentrated in the northeast, with five each from New York
- four of which were from Manhattan - and New Jersey, four
from Massachusetts, two from Virginia - both of which were from
suburban Washington, D.C. - and one each from New Hampshire,
Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and South Carolina.
In two important respects, the loans were quite different from
the bank and finance company loans. First, all of the loans were
nonrecourse, with the insurance company's sole avenue for repay
ment being recourse to the collateral; the insurance company had
guaranties in none of the transactions.163 Second, the loans were
much larger. The median outstanding loan amount was $12 million,
with a range from $1.65 million to $91 million; the average amount
was $20.9 million.
b. The Process of Termination. The process by which the insur
ance company responds to troubled loans is significantly different
from the processes at the bank and finance company. In particular,
the decisions to terminate the relationship and to remove the
debtor from possession of the collateral are much more closely re
lated than they are at the bank and the finance company. In the
insurance company context, a decision that the relationship cannot
be salvaged ordinarily is associated with relatively prompt action to
remove the debtor from possession of the collateral.164 Accord162. The high incidence of trusts is explained by the volume of Massachusetts loans in the
lender's portfolio. The four Massachusetts loans provided four of the six trust profiles in my
sample. The Massachusetts business trust has long been a traditional vehicle for operating
businesses, which has never really caught on elsewhere.
163. 1\vo of the profiles had guaranties ensuring financial stability at the beginning of the
transaction. One guaranteed that the project would be leased up. See Profile 70. The other
guaranteed that debt·service coverage would reach a specified level. See Profile 72. In each
case, the guaranty had lapsed before the loan fell into the distress that led to its low rating.
164. Although it is a bit beyond my purpose here to explain the difference in approach, I
tentatively would attribute the difference to some fundamental differences in the loan trans
actions. The transactions of the bank and finance company frequently involved operating
businesses that could generate funds to reduce the loan amount through the ordinary process
of selling individual items of inventory or services. The insurance company's transactions, by
contrast, almost always involved single-asset transactions wher� the loan was likely to be paid
off only through a one-time sale of the entire collateral. Furthermore, although the results of
the insurance company profiles indicate that the borrowers frequently are the highest-valuing
users of the assets that they have pledged as collateral, I do not think that real estate suffers
nearly as precipitous a decline in value upon a transfer of possession as the operating per
sonal-property businesses I examined at the finance company and the bank.
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ingly, the appropriate inquiry is to determine exactly what it takes
to motivate an insurance company to remove its debtor from
possession.
The basic answer to that inquiry resonates with the results of the
bank and finance company profiles. The debtor's inability to con
form to the agreed payment schedule is rarely an adequate reason
for the insurance company to remove a debtor from possession.
The key question for the insurance company is whether the debtor
is contributing value to the asset to justify allowing the debtor to
remain in possession with the concomitant opportunity to recover
value from future appreciation of the asset.165 The contribution
could take the form of cash contributed to cover cash-flow
shortages or it could take the form of expertise or management
services that support the value of the asset more cheaply than the
insurance company could if it took possession itself. But as long as
the insurance company believes that the debtor is making such a
contribution, the insurance company is likely to leave the debtor in
possession.166
The first piece of evidence supporting that thesis is the insur
ance company's response to payment defaults in my sample
profiles. Every one of those profiles involved a serious failure to
adhere to the payment schedule. 1\velve of the twenty-one profiles
(57%) involved complete financial collapse: the debtor either
stopped making payments entirely or advised the lender that it was
unable to make payments.161
Although the other nine profiles did not involve a complete ces
sation of payments, they did involve two types of payment
problems that justifiably put the lender in a position of serious con
cern. The bulk (7 profiles, 33% of the insurance-company sample)
involved the debtor's failure to refinance the loan at its maturity.1 68
Unlike the bank and finance company, the insurance company is
165. As I see it, that question is structurally similar to the implicit question the bank and
finance company executives ask in determining whether to leave their debtors in possession.
In those contexts, the debtor's contribution is clear: operating the business allows the collat
eral to be sold at retail value instead of being liquidated for almost nothing. Steve Harris has
suggested to me that one way to explain the different results in the insurance company
profiles is to acknowledge that the answer to that question is much less uniform for real
estate collateral because it often requires considerably less specialized skill to operate.
166. The general discussion in the foregoing paragraph is based on the Insurance Com
pany Executive Interview, supra note 158.
167. See Profile 56; Profile 57; Profile 58; Profile 59; Profile 60; Profile 62; Profile 64;
Profile 65; Profile 66; Profile 67; Profile 69; Profile 72. In Profiles 73 and 74, the debtor
advised the lender that it would not be able to make payments before it actually stopped
making the payments.
168. See Profile 54; Profile 55; Profile 61; Profile 63; Profile 68; Profile 70; Profile 71.
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deeply troubled when one of its debtors fails to arrange for repay

ment of one of the insurance company's loans before the scheduled
date of maturity. The basic reason for the insurance company's

perspective is that the insurance company, unlike the bank and :fi
nance company, does not operate on the assumption that it will re

new its lending relationships indefinitely: the baseline response to

maturity is an unwillingness to extend rather than a desire to ex

tend. Among other things, a voluntary decision to extend a loan

past the originally scheduled maturity date would require an evalu
ation of the loan commensurate with the evaluation that was made

at the time the loan originally was issued. Because the insurance
company's portfolio managers constantly shift their investment cri

teria to enhance the balance and diversification of the insurance

company's portfolio,169 it is quite ordinary for the insurance com

pany to prefer that a loan be repaid at the stated date of maturity.

That could be true even if the debtor had performed as agreed dur

ing the term of the agreement and even if the debtor exhibited no

objective signs of serious :financial distress; termination of such a

loan would be quite an unusual response for the bank or :finance
company. To be sure,

I

note below the insurance company's deci

sion to extend several of the loans in my sample; those extensions,

however, were viewed as the most prudent response to distress -

making the best of a bad situation - not as affirmatively positive
extensions of credit.

In the final two profiles (10% ),170 the debtor had not defaulted
on payments owed to the insurance company, but instead had failed
to make a property-tax payment. Given the serious consequences
of a debtor's failure to maintain tax payments, which include the
prospect that a tax lien will gain priority over the insurance com
pany's mortgage,171 the insurance company justifiably views that
type of default as a basis for immediate action.
Notwithstanding those serious defaults, the first response of the

insurance company was not to move unilaterally to take possession

of the collateral at the first opportunity. Rather, the most common
response (12 profiles, 57%) was for the lender to agree to a formal
arrangement accepting less onerous payment terms than those to

169. See, e.g., MARCIA STIGUM, THE MONEY MARKET 106-09 (3d ed. 1990) (summarizing
the need for portfolio managers to match the duration of assets and liabilities).
170. See Profile 57; Profile 69.
171. See, e.g., BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 30, at 636; LoPuCKI & WARREN, supra note
30, at 748.
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which the debtor originally had agreed.172 In each of those twelve

loans, the arrangement involved a diminution of the scheduled

monthly payment; in most (10 of those 12 profiles) the arrangement
also involved an extension of the date of maturity.173

The key question for my purposes is what debtors had to offer

to convince the lender to agree to such a modification. The easiest

situations were those where the principals of the debtor agreed to
make present or future cash contributions to support the property.

In eight of the twelve profiles in which the lender agreed to formal

payment concessions, the debtor agreed to make significant cash
contributions of one form or another.174 Those contributions in

cluded one-time cash infusions,11s unspecified contributions to fund
chronic cash-flow deficits,176 funds needed for tenant improve

ments111 or to resolve environmental hazards,178 and agreements to
increase the rate at which interest accrued on the loan.119

In a few profiles (2 of the 12 in which the lender granted formal

payment concessions), the lender's principal motivation was the less

objective determination that particular expertise or management

skills on the part of the debtor would provide the lender a signifi
cant benefit that justified leaving the distressed asset in the debtor's

control.180 In one case involving a property in Maryland near

Washington,

D.C., the lender left the debtor in control based on its

perspective that the debtor was unusually able and active in its ef

forts to maintain value in the face of a significant decline in the

172. See Profile 54; Profile 56; Profile 57; Profile 61; Profile 62; Profile 63; Profile 64;
Profile 65; Profile 66; Profile 67; Profile 73; Profile 74.
173. The lender did not extend the maturity date in Profile 64 (shortening the maturity
date by one year) or Profile 66 (retaining the same maturity date).
174. See Profile 54; Profile 57; Profile 62; Profile 65; Profile 66; Profile 67; Profile 73;
Profile 74.
175. See Profile 73 (reporting an infusion of a total of $25 million on a group of distressed
properties, including $6 million to reduce the balance on the loan I studied by about 30%);
Profile 74 (reporting an infusion of $200,000 to reduce the balance on the loan I studied by
about 2.5%).
176. See Profile 54.
177. See Profile 57; Profile 67. In Profile 67, the debtor agreed to contribute those funds
after the lender had obtained a receiver; in return for that contribution the lender had the
receiver removed and allowed the debtor to go back into possession of the collateral.
178. See Profile 65.
179. See Profile 62; Profile 66. Even though those modifications increased the rate at
which interest accrued (from 9.625% to 9.875% in Profile 62 and from 13.25% to 16% in
Profile 66), they lowered the current payment obligations by establishing a significantly lower
"pay rate" (8% in Profile 62; 7% in Profile 66).
180. See Profile 56; Profile 63.
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local property market.181 In the other case, the lender was moti
vated less by an unusual level of managerial skill than by a specific
determination that it would not be able to resell the property. In
that case, the lender allowed the debtor to remain in control, but at
the same time obtained a right to eighty percent of future apprecia
tion of the value of the property. As the officer responsible for the
file put it, " [b]asically we're getting him to manage for free for a
hope certificate."182
Managerial expertise was also significant in several of the cases
in which a cash contribution contributed to the lender's willingness
to leave the debtor in control.183 For example, in one case, the
main source of distress was the imminent expiration of a major
lease in a Manhattan office building by a tenant with whom the
debtor had a longstanding relationship; the lender believed that
"the borrower has the best shot at getting [the tenant] to renew its
lease."184 That ability, together with a willingness to increase the
rate at which interest accrued on the loan, was enough to convince
the lender to leave the debtor in control of the property.185 A simi
lar concern motivated the lender in one case in which the property
was part of a large development controlled by the same developer:
the lender feared it would face significant leasing difficulties if it
took the project back and was forced to compete against the devel
oper's other nearby projects.186
The last two of the twelve profiles in which the lender granted
formal payment concessions involved specially tailored arrange
ments. In one case, the lender was compensated for its agreement
to lower the rate of interest by a one-year reduction in the term of
the loan and a twenty-five percent participation in future apprecia
tion of the property.181 In the other case, the lender agreed to an
181. See Profile 63. In that case, the debtor also made a nominal capital contribution to
pay the legal costs of the restructuring. It was also relevant that the debtor had performed as
agreed on four previous loans from the lender.

182.

Profile

56.

183. That motivation is similar to the motivation a bank or finance company lender
would have in determining that its debtor could sell inventory at a higher price than the
lender. As I mentioned above, that determination would not be as uniformly clear for real
estate as it would be for most kinds of personal property held for sale. See supra note 165.

184.
185.

Profile

66.

In a similar situation, the lender allowed a debtor that agreed to fund cash-flow
deficits to remain in control of a condominium building based on particular skill at selling off
individual condominium units. That situation, Profile 54, was one of only three insurance
company profiles in which the lender did not take a loss.

186. See Profile 57 (reporting that the debtor agreed to contribute future funds for tenant
improvements).
187. See

Profile

64.
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extension of three years, during which it would obtain all cash flow

from the project, in return for execution by the principal of the
debtor of an unusual agreement that included a complete guaranty
of the outstanding indebtedness that would terminate only if the
debtor voluntarily conveyed the property to the lender.188

In addition to the twelve profiles in which the lender granted

formal payment concessions, the lender and the debtor disposed of
the property by agreement in an additional six profiles

(29% ).189

In

three cases, the debtor agreed to turn the property over to the
lender.190 In the other three, the lender released its lien at substan

tial discounts, accepting payments in those transactions of about

20%, 29%,

and

75%

of the outstanding balances.191

At the other end of the spectrum from the twelve profiles in

which the parties agreed upon a resolution of the dispute - either

through a grant of formal payment concessions or through immedi

ate liquidation of the debt - were three profiles

(15%)

in which

the lender proceeded against the collateral without the consent of

the debtor. The basic motivation in those cases was the flip-side of
the motivation in the loans discussed above: the debtor's unwilling

ness to contribute funds to the property or to establish some other
basis for retaining control of the property. The results of those

transactions help explain the lender's general willingness to avoid
action against collateral. In two of those three cases, the debtor

responded by instituting litigation. One involved a lender liability
action that the debtor litigated all the way to the federal court of
appeals; after a year and a half of litigation (in which the lender
prevailed), the lender released its lien for a discounted payment of
about sixty-seven percent of the loan amount.192 The other in

volved a Chapter

11 bankruptcy proceeding that ultimately was dis-

188. See Profile 61.
189. See Profile 55; Profile 58; Profile 59; Profile 60; Profile 71; Profile 72.
190. See Profile 55 (deed in lieu of foreclosure); Profile 60 (consent foreclosure); Profile
71 (deed in lieu of foreclosure). In all three of those transactions, the lender ultimately sold
the properties for considerably less than the debt. See Profile 55 (reporting that, taking ac
count of environmental cleanup costs, lender sold property at a loss of $6 million on an
original $6 million loan); Profile 60 (reporting that property with original loan of $26 million,
which increased to about $34 million by the time of foreclosure, ultimately was sold for
$13.23 million); Profile 71 (reporting that property with original loan amount of $8.5 million
ultimately was sold for $5 million).
191. See Profile 58 (reporting that the lender released its lien in return for payment from
separate assets of 20% of the loan amount, $20 million on an outstanding balance of about
$100 million); Profile 59 (reporting that the lender released its $2.4 million lien to permit a
sale to a tenant for a price of $1.8 million, 75% of the loan amount); Profile 72 (reporting that
the lender released its $42 million lien in return for proceeds of refinancing of about $12
million, 29% of the loan amount).
192. See Profile 68.
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missed as a bad-faith filing. The lender succeeded in foreclosing

only after a delay of twenty-two months.193 The only case in which

the debtor did not respond by instituting litigation was one in which

the debtor was a trust that apparently was not eligible for relief
under the Bankruptcy Code.194

One final point about the lender's response in cases of disagree

ment relates to its use of a receiver. The conventional wisdom is

that many lenders refrain from seeking a receiver in connection

with a distressed real estate loan based on concerns about the cost
of that procedure and the relative ineffectiveness of a receiver's

management.195 Although the small number of profiles involving
adversarial disposition of collateral makes any conclusions tenta
tive, my findings are in some tension with that conventional wis

dom. My profiles include a total of seven cases in which the lender

moved against collateral without the consent of its debtor.196 The

lender sought and obtained a receiver in three of those transactions
(43 % ) .197 When I questioned the responsible loan officer about the

decision to seek a receiver, he acknowledged the force of conven

tional wisdom but explained that the lender nevertheless seeks a
receiver in states where the foreclosure process is unusually pro-

193. See Profile 69.
194. See Profile 70 (noting the problem that the only form of trust that can file for bank
ruptcy relief is a "business trust"); see also 11 U.S.C.§ 109(b) (1994) (permitting bankrupt
cies by a "person"); 11 U.S.C. § 101(41) (defining "person" to include corporations); 11
U.S.C.§ 101(9)(A)(v) (defining "corporation" to include business trusts). A trust that does
not operate an active business is not a business trust and accordingly is not eligible for relief
under the Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., Shawmut Bank Connecticut v. First Fidelity Bank (In
re Secured Equipment Trust of Eastern Air Lines, Inc.), 38 F.3d 86, 89-91 (2d Cir. 1994)
(holding that a trust with title to an airplane was ineligible for bankruptcy relief); Mosby v.
Boatmen's Bank (In re Mosby), 791 F.2d 628, 628 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that a personal or
spendthrift trust was ineligible for bankruptcy relief); In re Treasure Island Land Trust, 2 B.R
332, 333-36 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1980) (dismissing a bankruptcy petition by an Illinois land trust
based on the determination that the debtor was not a business trust for purposes of the
Bankruptcy Code).
195. See, e.g., GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. W HITMAN, REAL EsTATE TRANSFER, FI
NANCE, AND DEVELOPMENT. CASES AND MATERIALS 389-91 (4th ed. 1992).
196. In addition to the three profiles in which adversarial disposition was the principal
response, there were three profiles in which the lender first proceeded against the property
without the consent of the debtor and then reached an agreement with the debtor before
completing foreclosure proceedings, see Profile 59; Profile 67; Profile 72, and one profile in
which the lender initially agreed to a workout but then sought foreclosure when the debtor
was unable to comply with the terms of the workout, see Profile 66.
197. See Profile 67; Profile 68; Profile 72. Those limited figures are similar to the only
other empirical evidence of which I am aware - although, as I discuss in infra section II.A,
the other evidence appears to involve loans much smaller than those that I studied. See
Steven Wechsler, Through the Looking Glass: Foreclosure By Sale as De Facto Strict Foreclo
sure - An Empirical Study of Mortgage Foreclosure and Subsequent Resale, 10 CORNELL L.
REV. 850, 872-73 (1985) (finding that receivers were appointed in '7 of the 21 commercial
foreclosures conducted in 1979 in Onondaga County, New York).
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tracted, offering New Jersey and Massachusetts as examples,198 I

thus was not surprised that two of the three receivers were ap
pointed in New Jersey transactions.199 The third receiver was ap

pointed in a Virginia transaction in response to frustration by the
lender that the debtor was diverting cash flow from the project to
personal uses.200

c. The Results of Termination.

The insurance company profiles

reflect losses that are much more frequent than the finance

company and bank profiles. The insurance company suffered losses
in eighteen of the twenty-one profiles

(86% );

in many cases the

losses approached or even exceeded the original loan amount.201
All three of the successful profiles appeared in transactions in
which the debtor made a substantial cash infusion in connection

with a workout. In one of them, the debtor subsequently paid the

loan in full through sales of individual units in the property, a lux
ury Manhattan condominium project.202 In the other two, the
properties stabilized after the workouts and now are generating

revenues at amounts that appear likely to repay the loans in full
through regular amortization.203
Removing two profiles in which the lender sold the loans to

third parties,204 my sample includes nineteen profiles in which I can

identify the ultimate disposition of the collateral. The most com
mon disposition (11 profiles, 58%) was for the debtor to retain con

trol of the property. In two of the profiles, as mentioned above,

that occurred when a workout allowed the debtor to stabilize the
collateral at a value that exceeded the loan amount.2os In the other

198. The two New Jersey foreclosure proceedings in my sample were settled after 20
months, see Profile 67, and 17 months, see Profile 68. The only Massachusetts foreclosure
proceeding was completed in 21 months. See Profile 70.
. 199. See Profile 67; Profile 68.
200. See Profile 72.
201. I have no firm explanation for the difference in results. I doubt that it is attributable
to the lack of personal guaranties in the insurance company profiles because the bank and
finance company profiles revealed few instances of collection based on pursuit of the guaran
tors. My best explanation is a combination of the generally riskier nature of real estate lend
ing and the fact that the loans I examined appeared to reflect conditions at the low point of a
business cycle for real estate lending. See infra note 327 (reporting statistics indicating a
systemically higher rate of default on insurance company real estate loans and suggesting that
default rates reached a half-century peak in the early 1990s).
202. See Profile 54.
203. See Profile 73 (northern Virginia hotel); Profile 74 (South Carolina apartment
project).
204. The prices the lender obtained on those sales were quite favorable: approximately
80% of the loan amount in one case, see Profile 56, and approximately 55% in the other, see
Profile 64.
205. See Profile 73; Profile 74.
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nine of those eleven,2°6 the lender accepted a discounted payoff of
the loan from the debtor, often recognizing a loss of staggering
magnitude.207 Although the lender did not have information as to
the source of funds for the payoff in all of the cases, the records did
indicate that the source was refinancing from another lender in
three of the nineteen profiles (16%) for which I know the ultimate
disposition.208
Even after my research at the finance company and the bank, I
was surprised at the frequency with which debtors maintained con
trol of the collateral. I would not have expected it to have been a
common occurrence for the lender to accept a substantial loss and
still leave the debtor in possession of the asset with complete con
trol over future appreciation of the collateral. As a matter of the
underlying economics, however, that outcome should not be sur
prising. Given the debtor's longstanding relationship with the pro
ject, frequently as the original developer, it would not be at all
surprising if the developer was the highest-valuing user of the prop
erty and thus willing to pay more for the project than any third
party would be willing to pay. That could be true both because of
the information costs that a third party would have to incur to eval
uate the project - which the already-informed debtor would not
need to incur - and because of special expertise and skills related
to the project that many third parties might not have.209 For exam
ple, an executive at the insurance company described to me a trans
action in Portland, Maine - not one of my profiles - in which the
lender was reluctant to take possession of the collateral. The lender
explained that the debtor controlled such a significant share of the
Portland real estate market that the lender, or any third party,
206. See Profile 57; Profile 58; Profile 61; Profile 62; Profile 63; Profile 65; Profile 67;
Profile 68; Profile 72.
207. See, e.g., Profile 57 (accepting a 60% discount on a $20 million balance); Profile 72
(accepting a 70% discount on a $40 million balance); Profile 58 (accepting an 80% discount
on a $100 million balance). I cannot present complete information about the discounted
payoffs because I was unable to locate the precise numbers in several of the profiles in which
the lender accepted payoffs. But the smallest discount for which I was able to get reliable
information was over 25% of the Joan amount ($15 million on a $6 million balance). See
Profile 68.
208. See Profile 57 (mezzanine financing); Profile 68 (Joan from Bank of New York);
Profile 72 (mezzanine financing). In five of the other profiles in which the loan was paid off
at a discount, the lender's records did not indicate the source of the funds used to pay off the

� ����������� �����

valved, it is likely that several of those transactions involved refinancing.
209. Jim Bowers has explored in great detail the reasons why debtors might be best
placed to deal with their assets upon financial distress. See James W. Bowers, Groping and
Coping in the Shadow of Murphy's Law: Bankruptcy Theory and the Elementary Economics
of Failure, 88 MlcH. L. REv. 2097, 2113-41 (1990).
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would have had great difficulty leasing the property if it forcibly
took control of the project from the debtor.210 Accordingly, if the
lender was unable to work out a "sale" of the project to the debtor,
the lender ultimately would be faced with the prospects of a sale to
the highest-valuing third-party user, which, by hypothesis, would
bring a lower return than a sale to the debtor.
In the remaining eight profiles, the debtor lost control of the
collateral. In two profiles (11 % ) , the lender released the lien upon
a sale of assets by the debtor, one of which resulted in full pay
ment211 and one of which resulted in a loss of about 35% of the
loan amount.212
In the last six profiles (32 % ) , the lender took control of the col
lateral, three times with the consent of the debtor,213 and three
times through an adversarial foreclosure proceeding.214 The disap
pointing results of those transactions suggest that the lender's fre
quent willingness to compromise its loan and allow the debtor to
retain ownership of the property is prudent.215 In each of those
cases the lender subsequently sold the property at an amount signif
icantly lower than the original loan amount.216 The best outcome,
which happened in the second smallest transaction, involved a loss
of forty-two percent of the loan amount. The average percentage of
loss in those profiles was seventy-two percent of the loan amount.
Because the larger loans tended to have worse outcomes, the aver
age loss rises even higher when I weight the losses to account for
210. See Insurance Company Executive Interview, supra note 158. The executive pointed
out that a prudent lender would focus on the "thinness" of that market before entering into
the transaction and take account of any concern in setting the initial terms of the transaction.
For a similar problem, see Profile 57 (accepting a 60% discounted payoff on a property that
was part of a single large development controll�d by the debtor).
211. See Profile 54.
212. See Profile 59.
213. See Profile 55 (deed in lieu of foreclosure); Profile 60 (consent foreclosure); Profile
71 (deed in lieu of foreclosure).
214. See Profile 66; �rofile 69; Profile 70.
215. Of course, those results do not prove that compromise is always prudent. Direct
evidence of the value of the strategy would come only from a test in which the lender tried
both strategies on substantially similar loans.
216. Including interest or maintenance expenses or both that were not covered by cash
flow from the properties, the lender's records reflect losses of the following percentages of
the original loan amount: Profile 55 (sold for a 100% loss, $6 million on an original loan
amount of $6 million); Profile 60 (sold for an 81 % loss, $21 million on an original loan
amount of $26 million); Profile 66 (sold for an 82% loss, $75 million on an original loan
amount of $91 million); Profile 69 (sold for a 71 % loss, $17 million on an original Joan
amount of $24 million); Profile 70 (sold for a 57% loss, $11 million on an original loan
amount of $17.5 million); Profile 71 (sold for a 42% Joss, $3.5 million on an original loan
amount of $8.5 million).
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the amount of the loans: an average loss of seventy:seven percent
of the loan amount.211
The last piece of the puzzle is the frequency of bankruptcy. In
the nineteen profiles in which I know the ultimate disposition, the
debtors sought relief in bankruptcy in four cases (21 % ) .21s The
cases do not conform to any one pattern, but two of them reflect
the situation that I would have anticipated based on my experience:
a debtor filing for bankruptcy to delay the lender's exercise of its
remedies. In the first of those cases, the lender responded to a
$900,000 tax default by pressing promptly for foreclosure.219 The
debtor in tum responded by filing for bankruptcy under Chapter
The bankruptcy court dismissed the filing for bad faith two

11.

months later, which led to an immediate foreclosure by the lender.
In the second case, the property became distressed when the Reso
lution Trust Corporation announced plans to repudiate a lease of a
portion of the property that a failed bank had used for office
space.220 When the debtor completely stopped making payments
despite positive cash flow from the property, the lender obtained a
receiver. The debtor then responded by filing for bankruptcy. At
that point, the parties agreed to a workout under which the debtor
made a substantial payment against the note, in return for which
the lender forgave a substantial amount of the remaining debt and
agreed to allow the debtor to remain in.possession. The lender ulti
mately accepted a deeply discounted payoff of the note.
The other two bankruptcies reflected problems that are less eas
ily categorized. In one case, the debtor filed for bankruptcy after a
personal bankruptcy by the debtor's principal removed any possi
bility that the debtor could make future contributions to the pro
ject.221 The lender's view at the time was that the bankruptcy was
filed not because of concerns related to this particular project, but
as part of the general strategy in the personal bankruptcy of the
principal. When the debtor was unable to confirm a plan over the
lender's opposition, the lender sold the project at a consensual
sale222 about eighteen months after the bankruptcy filing.
217. The lender lost $133.S million on the $173 million it invested in those six loans. The
percentage lost on the three cases of forced foreclosure (78%) was only slightly higher than
the percentage lost on the three cases of consensual foreclosure and reconveyance (75%).
218. See Profile 60; Profile 69; Profile 72; Profile 74.
219. See Profile 69.
220. See Profile 72.
221. See Profile 60.
222. The sale was held pursuant to 11 U.S.C.§ 363(f) (allowing the sale of property "free
and clear of any interest in such property of [a lender] . . . if . . . [the lender] consents").
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In the last case, a limited-partnership debtor that owned an
apartment project filed for bankruptcy fairly soon after a market
downturn reduced net cash flow on the project below the level nec
essary to keep the note current.223 It appeared that the bankruptcy
was a protective measure to avoid the serious adverse tax conse
quences a foreclosure would have for the limited partners of the
debtor; apparently even the debtor recognized that a foreclosure
was not likely. The lender readily agreed to a plan of reorganiza
tion in which the limited partners of the debtor contributed addi
tional funds to stabilize the property. The loan remains in the
lender's portfolio, one of only three insurance company profiles in
which the lender did not take a loss in connection with the
distress.224
JI.

IMPLICATIONS

The case studies summarized in Part I do not provide definitive
empirical evidence of the ways in which lenders respond to distress
in their secured loans. Indeed, they do not even provide definitive
evidence of the ways in which particular kinds of lenders respond to
distress. For example, even though th� evidence that I present of
finance company responses to distressed debt is more detailed than
anything in the existing literature, the conclusions I would draw
from that evidence could be erroneous because of the possibility
that the finance company that I examined is not representative of
finance companies in general. I thus would have been more confi
dent that I had obtained a representative picture of finance com
pany practices if I had done case studies at three separate finance
companies instead of case studies at three different types of lenders.
My goal, however, is not to demonstrate the details of the prac
tices of finance companies - or banks or insurance companies, for
that matter. Rather, the purpose of this project is to provide an
empirical foundation for a general theory of the mechanisms that
commercial lenders and their business debtors use to respond to
distress. The best evidence on which to base such a theory is not a
complete picture of the practices of any one type of lender, but
rather evidence from as many sectors of the secured-lending mar
ketplace as possible. Notwithstanding the limited value of my evi
dence as proof of practices in any single area, the variety of the case
223. See Profile 74.
224. I do not discuss the costs of tennination in the insurance company profiles because I
was unable to gather adequate information on that point from the files available to me.
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studies in fact enhances the probative value of my findings in areas
where all three case studies agree: it seems quite unlikely that I
would observe similar practices at three lenders from three com
pletely different markets unless those practices are at least reason
ably representative of a substantial portion of the entire market for
secured lending.
Approaching the evidence in that spirit, the remainder of this
article assesses the implications of my case studies for theories
about debtor-creditor relationships. Section II.A addresses the
most direct implications of my study: the nature and effectiveness
of the mechanisms of the financial market that face distressed debt
ors. Section II.B turns to a more indirect topic: the implications
that my view of the market for distressed debt has on the market
for lending in general.
A.

The Economics of Distressed Debt

When academics discuss the process by which secured creditors
liquidate secured debt, they ordinarily telescope the entire process
into a single moment: the foreclosure sale. Starting from a focus
on that moment, the predominant commentary - which relates for
the most part to real estate foreclosures - understandably high
lights the obvious ways in which the foreclosure sale differs from an
arms-length voluntary sale, and then concludes that the foreclosure
sale frequently allows creditors to obtain property from their debt
ors even though the value of the property, as evidenced by resale
after the foreclosure sale, substantially exceeds the amount of the
debt.225 Moreover, some commentators argue, creditors frequently
225. See, e.g., LoPucKI & WARREN, supra note 30, at 71-87 (offering a discussion of
problems with foreclosure sale procedures, generally supporting the conclusion that "the sale
process does a poor job of valuing the collateral," and suggesting that "[t]hreatening to blow
the property to bits would accomplish as much, and the explosives might be less expensive");
1 GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL EsTATE FINANCE LAw§ 8.8 (3d ed. 1993)
{discussing "abuses of the foreclosure sale process" and urging "fundamental reform of the
foreclosure sale system" that would require foreclosing lenders to employ "customary com
mercial methods . . . including the use of real estate brokers and normal commercial descrip
tive and pictorial advertising"); EUZABE'IH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE
LAw OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 82 (3d ed. 1996) ("Judicial sales are notorious for bringing
low prices for the items sold."); Patrick B. Bauer, Statutory Redemption Reconsidered: The
Operation of Iowa's Redemption Statute in Two Counties Between 1881 and 1980, 70 IowA L.
REV. 343 (1985) (relying on empirical evidence of redemption after foreclosure as evidence
of frequent inadequacy of price at foreclosure sales); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Critiquing the
Foreclosure Process: An Economic Approach Based on the Paradigmatic Norms of Bank
ruptcy, 79 VA. L. REv. 959, 959 (1993) (providing an economic analysis of foreclosure sales
starting from the premise that "[i]n the vast majority of cases, the sale price realized at such a
foreclosure sale will be so inadequate that not only will the mortgagor lose her home but she
will also lose any equity she owns in the property"); Wechsler, supra note 197, at 870 (report-
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resell the foreclosed collateral at large pro:fits.226 As a related point
often made in the context of loans secured by personal property,
academics often express concern about the ability of the secured
lender to exercise its rights against personal property to destroy a
valuable business.221
My empirical evidence supports a completely different perspec
tive on the situation: it suggests that the concerns expressed in the
existing literature are seriously overstated, at least in the commer
cial context.228 The key problem with the existing analysis of the
foreclosure process is that it focuses on the last step of the process
- the foreclosure sale - without giving adequate attention to the
earlier stages of the system of which that sale is but one small part.
My empirical evidence suggests a group of related conclusions that
work together to convince me that it is extremely unusual for debt
ors that have equity in their businesses to be subjected to forced
repossession of collateral. I explain my perspective in two steps,
first by direct exposition of the mechanisms that allow debtors to
protect their equity, and then by indirect inference, by discussing
the evidence regarding the :financial results lenders obtain from
foreclosure and repossession of collateral.

1.

The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency

Distressed debtors have three major ways of obtaining funds to
protect any equity in their business: refinancing of their debt, cash
flow from operations, or sale of the business. My case studies suging evidence that lenders resold foreclosed properties at prices that exceeded the unpaid
debt).
226. See, e.g., LoPuCia & WARREN, supra note 30, at f!f1 ("The
lien holder
gets the
property for the amount of the lien and resells it for a price approaching market value,
thereby capturing the debtor's equity."); Johnson, supra note 225, at 960 (discussing "hue and
cry" about situations in which foreclosed homes are resold at prices exceeding the amount of
the unpaid debt); Wechsler, supra note 197, at f!flO (reporting an empirical study concluding
that "[m]ortgagees made profits in about half of the cases in which they purchased and
quickly resold the foreclosed properties"); see also 1 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 225,
§ 8.8 (suggesting reforms that would produce surpluses at foreclosure sales).
227. See, e.g., supra note 90 and accompanying text.
228. Discussion of consumer real estate lending is generally beyond the scope of this
study. A variety of circumstances make the residential process considerably different, most
obviously the fact that consumer real estate is not ordinarily an income-producing asset in
the way that business collateral is. My economic analysis hinges on my belief that the finan
cial markets function sufficiently well to allow even distressed debtors to capture a large part
of the value of their income-producing assets. I do suggest below that lenders that take
possession of homes on which they have loaned money are generally successful at recovering
a substantial portion of their loans through disposition of the collateral. See infra notes 2frl89 and accompanying text. But I have no confidence, or even reason to believe, that the
markets for the sale of residential real estate function to protect their borrowers nearly so
well as the analogous markets available to commercial real estate borrowers.
. • .

. • •

Secured Debt

November 1997]

215

gest that each of those alternatives provides a realistic and fre
quently successful avenue for solving the problems of debtors faced
with dissatisfied secured creditors.
The most surprising single result that I found in
my studies is the frequency with which distressed debtors in all

a. Refinancing.

three of my case studies successfully obtained third-party refinanc
ing in the face of a decision by their existing lender to terminate
their relationship. In my seventy-two profiles,229 debtors responded
to distress by taking their business to another lender in at least six
teen cases (22% ) .230 Even that figure probably understates the inci
dence of refinancing significantly, given the substantial number of
profiles

(7

cases,

10%)

in which loans were paid off in lump sums

without the lender knowing the source of the money.231 Anecdotal
evidence from an interview with another banker supports the idea
that my evidence provides a conservative estimate of the frequency
with which debtors successfully refinance troubled loans.232
The natural question is why a second lender would agree to ex
tend a loan to a business that is in such serious financial distress
that the business's current lender is attempting to terminate the re
lationship. After all, the potential for asymmetric information is
striking. Among other things, the lender that wants to terminate
the existing relationship

is highly likely to have a more thorough

understanding of the financial prospects of the existing business

than the new refinancing lender that has not yet had a lending rela
tionship with the business.233
229. Throughout this part of the article I report aggregate statistics based on a total of 72
profiles, including the two profiles in which the insurance company liquidated its position by
selling its loan to a third-party investor. See supra note 204 and accompanying text. My
rationale is that sale of the loan to a third party is one of the dispositions that a lender can
choose to obtain payment, a disposition just as realistic as forced liquidation or strategic
restraint Of course, some more substantive liquidation strategy might well occur after the
sale - a circumstance that ultimately would put the loan into one of the other categories. In
any event, removing those two profiles would raise the percentages calculated in this Part
only slightly, by lowering the universe of profiles from 72 to 70.
230. The share of refinancing outcomes is relatively balanced across the three case stud
ies: 4 of the 23 finance company profiles (17% ), 9 of the 28 bank profiles {32% ), and 3 of the
21 insurance company profiles {14%). The lowest of those shares occurs in the study in
which I had the largest number of unidentified payments, see infra note 231 and accompany
ing text, so the shares might be more closely aligned if I had more complete information.
231. See supra note 86 (one profile in the finance company study); supra note 135 (one
profile in the bank study); supra note 208 {five profiles in the insurance company study).
232. See Telephone Interview with Michael R. James, Executive Vice President, Wells
Fargo Bank, transcript at 14 (Mar. 5, 1997) (transcript on file with author) [hereinafter James
Interview] (containing a statement by the supervisor of workouts for small-business loans
that "a very high percentage" - at a minimum "over 50[% ]" - of the loans his bank termi
nates are paid off through refinancing with another lender).
233. But cf. Mitchell A. Petersen & Raghuram G. Rajan, The Benefits of Lending Rela
tionships: Evidence from Small Business Data, 49 J. FIN. 3, 14 {1994) (reporting a statistical
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The most plausible consideration that could overcome the in
herent informational difficulties would be a difference in risk pref
erences. For example, consider the possibility that the refinancing
lender specializes in slightly more risky businesses than the termi
nating lender, presumably charging slightly higher interest rates for
accepting that risk. If so, the refinancing lender might be interested
in obtaining the soon-to-be-terminated debtor as a customer even if
the terminating bank does not wish to continue its existing
relationship.
Not surprisingly, given the reticence of lenders to suggest that
they specialize in risky loans, it is difficult to get any direct support
for that hypothesis. Several scattered items, however, convince me
that the "differential-risk" explanation best explains the phenome
non.234 The nature of the refinancing lenders, which tend to spe
cialize in riskier transactions, provides the most persuasive
evidence. For example, in my insurance-company profiles, two of.
the three profiles in which I could identify a refinancing lender in
volved funds from a mezzanine financier,235 which typically236
would be involved in transactions much riskier than those that
would interest an insurance company.237 Similarly, an executive
vice president who supervises commercial-loan workouts for a large
west-coast bank explained to me that most of the lenders that refi
nance his loans are nonbank lenders that tend to charge higher in
terest rates to reflect the higher risks of their transactions.238
study of small-business lending finding no significant connection between the price of credit
and the length of the lender's relationship with the debtor).
234. The other most obvious explanation would be misjudgment of risk by either the first
or the second lender: the first lender in overestimating the risk or the second lender in un
derestimating it. Although such errors undoubtedly occur, I am reluctant to attribute such a
significant feature of the marketplace to human error. Moreover, such an explanation would
be particularly hard to credit when the second lender would be motivated to evaluate the risk
carefully, given the great likelihood that it would be aware of the negative assessment of the
first lender.
235. See supra note 208.
236. See, e.g., Beth Randolph, New Private Fund Intends To Invest in Ame.t Listings,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 1996, at All (describing mezzanine financing as "a layer of capital that
sits between equity and debt both in tenns of risk and returns"); Richard Wright, Taking
Lending to the Nett Level, PROFIT, Sept. 1, 1996, at 62, available in 1996 WL 9559655 ("Mez
zanine financing . . . falls between conventional debt secured against property, and unsecured
debt or pure equity financing, both in tenns of the degree of security expected against the
loan, and in tenns of cost.").
237. The third refinancing lender was a bank that obtained a personal guaranty from the
debtor. See Profile 68.
238. See James Interview, supra note 232. My sense is that those lenders are lenders for
whom the primary source of repayment on which their underwriting relies is liquidation, as
opposed to cash flow. Given the losses that are inherent in forced liquidation, that kind of
underwriting focus should result in higher interest costs - because of the likely losses in the
event of liquidation - but it also should result in better protection against the downside
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The more difficult problem for my explanation is the frequency
with which other banks refinance distressed bank loans.239 To ex
plain that part of the pattern I have to posit not only a spectrum of
different types of lenders with different risk preferences, but a spec
trum internal to the banking industry, in which different banks spe
cialize in bank loans of differing levels of risk. I received precisely
that explanation when I raised that problem with the manager of
the Special Assets Division at the conclusion of my examination of
the files at the bank. He readily agreed with my suggestion that
different banks might be willing to make loans to different debtors.
He explained that the most common basis for the differential un
derwriting standards is probably the length of amortization differ
ent banks expect on their commercial loans. He suggested that the
heavy takeover pressures in his market give his bank a strong incen
tive to require relatively high current payments on its loans; accord
ingly, the loans in his bank's portfolio amortize more quickly,
allowing a shorter time during which the bank would be exposed to
a risk of loss from business reverses. A different bank more willing
to take risks might accept lower current payments, and a corre
spondingly longer amortization period, extending the time during
which the second bank would be exposed to a risk of loss.240 Be
cause the loan offered by the second bank would have lower pay
ments than the loan offered by the bank that I studied, a debtor
unable to produce cash flow to repay a loan from my bank might
have adequate cash flow to satisfy the second bank's lower current
payment standards. Of course, the refinancing bank might charge a
higher interest rate for its more slowly amortizing product, but that
reflects only the fact that it has made a riskier investment than the
terminating bank.241
losses that cash-flow reliant underwriters face in the event of liquidation. See Mann, Small
Business Secured Credit, supra note 3 (discussing that problem for small-business bank lend
ers). That focus also might explain the apparent fact - pointed out to me by Lynn LoPucki
in comments on an earlier draft of this article - that almost all businesses enter bankruptcy
with all of their assets encumbered by secured debt of one kind or another.
239. Six of my 28 bank profiles (21 %) were paid off with refinancing proceeds from an
other bank. See supra note 135.
240. See Bank Division Manager Interview, supra note 124.
241. I received a similar perspective in a telephone interview with a loan officer that
recently had moved from one major national bank, NationsBank, to another relatively large
midwestem bank, ComericA. He explained that the differing cultures of the two banks with NationsBank focused much more on cash flow and ComericA focused more on recover
able collateral - resulted in quite different evaluations of the same business. Indeed, he
stated that after he moved to ComericA, his division at ComericA approved a number of
loans to debtors that he personally had rejected while working at NationsBank! See Tele
phone Interview with James R. McNutt, Vice President and Commercial Banking Officer,
ComericA Bank, Texas (Oct. 10, 1996).
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The evidence of persistent refinancing would make little sense
in a world with only two classes of debtors - good and bad - and
only a single class of lenders, which make loans to good debtors and
decline loans to bad debtors. A better view contemplates a contin
uous spectrum of debtors ranging from the most credit-worthy all
the way to the financially moribund, and an analogous, though ad
mittedly less populated, spectrum of lenders that specialize in ac
cepting different levels of risk.242
The market for refinancing distressed debt operates to align the
riskiness of each particular debtor with a lender that specializes in
bearing the particular level of risk presented by that debtor at any
given time. When the riskiness of a debtor's business changes, the
market moves the debtor to a more appropriate lender. If the
debtor's risk profile improves, the debtor pays off its loan and
moves to a lender that specializes in higher quality debtors. If the
debtor's risk profile deteriorates, the lender terminates the relation
ship and forces the debtor to seek financing from a more risk
tolerant lender.243
That perspective suggests that the operation of the market is
enhanced considerably by mechanisms - for example, the at-will
and short-term features that dominated the finance company and
bank profiles - that allow a lender to move a debtor promptly af
ter determining that the debtor's risk has become unacceptably
high. The sooner the debtor is moved, the sooner the debtor must
pay a price for the risk it imposes on its lender. In that way, the
lender can lower the amount of the premium that it must charge its
portfolio to account for the costs of bearing risks that it views to be
unacceptably high. The importance of those mechanisms to the
market as a whole makes me skeptical of the propriety of recent
litigation and academic proposals to limit the ability of lenders to
use those mechanisms to terminate their lending relationships.244

In sum, when distressed debtors attempt to find new financing
to protect the equity in their existing business, they face a relatively
robust and well-developed market that frequently allows them to
242. The text simplifies by suggesting that lenders specialize along lines of greater or
lower risk. They certainly specialize their risks in other dimensions as well - for example,
line of business, expected duration of the credit, and exposure to interest-rate fluctuation.
243. Of course, at some point the debtor will reach the most risk-tolerant available
lender. At that point, refinancing may no longer be a serious possibility.
244. The leading case is KMC Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 766 (6th Cir. 1985)
{affirming a $7.5 million verdict against a lender for failing to use good faith in terminating a
demand line of credit). See LoPuCKI & WARREN, supra note 30, at 268-73 (providing a
sympathetic discussion of KMC and criticism of judicial decisions limiting the reach of the
KMC rationale).

November 1997]

Secured Debt

219

protect themselves from financial collapse by transferring their
business from a lender for whom they are a problem loan to be
eradicated to a lender for whom they are a welcome addition to the
portfolio.

b. Cash Flow from Operations. Tue second significant way in
which debtors can protect the equity in their businesses is by keep
ing their businesses operating long enough to repay their loans
through cash flow from continued operations. Although lenders
obviously could prevent their debtors from taking advantage of that
opportunity, the normal consequence would be the destruction of
the business, which would leave the lenders no source of repayment
other than forced liquidation of collateral. As my case studies sug
gest, there are good reasons for believing that lenders rarely come
out whole in transactions in which they liquidate collateral. If that
is true, I would expect lenders to show great flexibility in allowing
their debtors an opportunity to repay loans through continued op
erations. In fact, that course of action occurred successfully in my
profiles with about the same frequency as refinancing, an aggregate
of sixteen profiles (22%).245 That percentage, however, seriously
understates the feasibility of that response, because my data include
thirty profiles246 in which the debtor either was not an operating
business or had closed the business before the lender decided to
respond to the distress. Those sixteen profiles are more than a third
(38%) of the profiles in which the debtor had an ongoing business
at the time the lender responded to the distress.
Because the success of the cash-flow-from-operations strategy
hinges on the lender's willingness to refrain from action, the
debtor's ability to use cash flow from operations to avert a loss
through foreclosure is much less direct than its ability to use funds
from refinancing. But in a universe where lenders correctly view
repossession as equivalent to loss, the lender's legal right to shut
down its debtor's businesses is largely hypothetical. Thus, the cash
flow-from-operations strategy in fact appears to be every bit as
practical as the refinancing strategy. Indeed, in the context of loans
to operating businesses - like the loans in my finance-company
study - it appears to be the most common solutio�.
245. See supra note 86 (14 of the finance company profiles); Profile 28 (bank profile);
Profile 32 (bank profile).
246. That group consisted of all 21 of the insurance company profiles, see Profiles 54-74,
the one failed business in the finance company profiles, see Profile 23, and the eight bank
profiles in which there was no ongoing business at the relevant time, see supra notes 133 &
137.
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The final way in which debtors can protect

their equity is by selling all or a portion of the collateral.247 Going
into my research, I was not sure how frequently that strategy would
work. On the one hand, the assets of such a debtor by definition
are distressed, which should limit their marketability considerably.
On the other hand, given their inherent informational advantage,
debtors often are in a better position than lenders to obtain the best
possible price for the collateral.248 Balancing those expectations, I
was not surprised to find that debtors used that alternative in a fair,
but not large, number of my profiles:

eight out of seventy-two

(11 %).249
One major reason for the lower frequency of that alternative,
compared with the use of refinancing or cash fl.ow from operations,
is undoubtedly the consequences of a sale: the debtor must give up
control of the business, something it need not do if it can satisfy the
lender with refinancing proceeds or cash fl.ow from operations. In
many cases - especially with smaller, closely held businesses loss of the business is a highly unpalatable alternative to be avoided
if at all possible. On the other hand, using sale proceeds to "cash
in" any equity makes a great deal of sense in cases involving collat
eral held for investment purposes. In my three case studies, that
description applies best to commercial real estate loans. Accord
ingly, it is not surprising to see that seven of the eight profiles in
which debtors took that course involved commercial real estate
loans.250 Of the twenty-eight commercial real estate loans2s1 in all
three studies, the cases of repayment with sales proceeds are a more
significant twenty-five percent.
247. Lynn LoPucki and Elizabeth Warren note the possibility that debtors can protect
equity in their assets by selling collateral before foreclosure, but the tone of their discussion
suggests that they do not view it as a practical alternative. See LoPucKI & WARREN, supra
note 30, at 87 (suggesting that relying on foreclosure procedures to motivate debtors to sell
their property is tantamount to "[t]hreatening to blow the property to bits").
248. For a thorough theoretical explanation of the debtor's potential advantages, see
Bowers, supra note 209, at 2113-41.
249. See Profile 6 (paying off finance company loan with proceeds of a one-time sale of
intellectual property); Profile 29 (selling of collateral by debtor to satisfy bank loan); Profile
31 (same); Profile 37 (same); Profile 47 (same); Profile 48 (same); Profile 54 (settling of
insurance company loan for sales proceeds); Profile 59 (same). Stuart Gilson has shown that
asset sales are a common strategy in the restructuring of the debt of large, publicly traded
companies. See Gilson, supra note 10, at 167, 172 (presenting evidence that large, publicly
traded firms that restructured their debt out of court experienced a median asset decline of
37.6% during the time around that restructuring).
250. The one exception is a finance company loan that was paid off through a one-time
sale of intellectual property. See Profile 6.
251. This group consists of all 21 of the insurance company profiles, as well as seven
profiles from the bank case study. See Profiles 29; Profile 36; Profile 37; Profile 40; Profile 45;
Profile 49; Profile 50.
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Like the cash-flow-from-operations strategy, the sales-proceeds
strategy has inherent limitations to its general applicability. Never
theless, at least in loans involving investment collateral, the strategy
appears to be practical. Debtors' ability to sell assets thus does not
appear to be substantially hindered by the distressed nature of their
existing financing.2s2
*

*

*

The market institutions that are available to distressed debtors
are not perfect, or even close to those that appear in classic markets
like the New York Stock Exchange. But they do appear to function
better than the market that would face even the most sophisticated
lender in its attempts to dispose of the distressed assets on its own
account. However imperfect, the markets that the debtors face thus
appear to be "good enough," in the sense that they present debtors
of all types with a variety of realistically prgcticable strategies that
enable them generally to protect valuable assets from their secured
creditors.

2.

The Unprofitability of Foreclosure and Repossession

In the end, the most important evidence relates to what actually
happens when the lender obtains control of the collateral.
Although the considerations outlined above suggest that debtors
have practical mechanisms for preventing lenders from taking con
trol of collateral in which they have equity, the best evidence on
that point must come from the actual outcomes: What happens in
the cases in which lenders in fact take possession of the collateral?
Interestingly, my case studies do not provide much direct evi
dence on that question because the lenders whom I studied believe
that the results will be so bad that they almost never do it. Only
once in my bank and :finance-company studies did the lender forci
bly repossess collateral, and in that case the lender released it to the
debtor when the debtor successfully refinanced the loan a few
months later.253 Thus, out of my seventy-two profiles, the lender
ultimately took over the collateral only six times (8% ), all of which
involved the insurance company.254
252. Recent empirical inquiry bolsters my view that the sale option is valuable by demon
strating the strength of the market for so-called "vulture" investments in distressed firms.
See Edith S. Hotchkiss & Robert M. Mooradian, Vulture Investors and the Marketfor Control
ofDistressed Firms, 43 J. FIN. EcoN. 401, 401-04 (1997).
253. See Profile 26.
254. See supra notes 213 & 214 (listing \hose six profiles).
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As summarized above, it is fair to characterize the results in
those six profiles as disastrous: the lender's proceeds on resale of
the properties left the lender losing more than seventy-five percent
of the original loan amounts in those profiles.255 Given the limited
number of cases in my sample in which lenders took possession of
the collateral, those figures standing alone would not be particularly
probative, especially in the personal-property area, where my
profiles found no foreclosures whatsoever. Nevertheless, I find the
results to be powerfully suggestive, given their general consistency
with the bulk of the preexisting evidence of which I am aware256
and with the analysis that the various lending executives used to
support their aversion to taking over collateral.
To be sure, my conclusions differ starkly from the conclusions of
the only other published study on the profitability to lenders of re
possession and foreclosure, Steven Wechsler's

1985

study of fore

closures in Onondaga County, New York.257 Wechsler used public
records to analyze the outcomes of the
ducted in Onondaga County in

1979.

118 foreclosure

sales con

One goal of his study was to

"measure the frequency and profitability of resales of properties
purchased at foreclosure sales by mortgagees . . . ."258 Although
most of his sample involved residential loans, it did include twenty
one commercial loans.259 Based on his analysis, he concluded that
lenders resold the collateral at a price exceeding their debt in al
most half of the cases - thirty-five of the seventy-two resales for
which he obtained a sales price.260 Most important for my purposes
are his conclusions about the commercial properties. On that point,
he did not present data in the text, but did state that "the likelihood
of profit or loss on resale did not hinge on the type of property
involved . . . "261
.

255. See supra notes 213-17 and accompanying text (summarizing the outcomes of those
profiles).
256. For anecdotal evidence bolstering the view of the lenders from my case studies that
liquidation of personal property can be as ineffective as liquidation of real property, see
Mann, Small-Business Secured Credit, supra note 3. For another, unpublished study of the
effect of foreclosures on a lender's portfolio, see Brief for Amici Curiae Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation at 23, BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531 (1994) (No. 921370) (reporting statistics indicating that the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation lost
an average of $792,110 on each of the 156 apartment complexes that it resold after foreclo
sure in 1992).
257. See Wechsler, supra note 197.
258. Id. at 851.
259. See id. at 872.
260. See id. at 880.
261. Id. at 882.
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For several reasons, however, Wechsler's actual data do not sup
port the conclusion that the lenders in his study frequently managed
to resell foreclosed collateral at values sufficient to recoup their in
vestments in the commercial properties.262 First, as Wechsler ac
knowledges, the method of his study makes it impossible for him to
determine the lender's ultimate profit or loss.263 His conclusions
depend on a simple comparison of the price at the foreclosure sale
to the price on which the lender paid real estate transfer taxes at
the time it resold the property.264 He thus cannot account for carry
ing costs or expenditures to improve the property or remedy haz
ardous conditions on the property. The problems with that
approach are evident from one transaction where his methodology
indicated a profit of
for only

$189,743.

$648,953

on resale after foreclosure of a loan

As Wechsler explains, that transaction involved

a construction project on which the lender apparently foreclosed
early in construction; the higher resale price apparently reflected
the difference between the value of the completed, project and the
value of the uncompleted distressed project.265 As that example
suggests and as my profiles indicate, it is not at all uncommon for
lenders to incur extraordinary expenditures to stabilize properties
after foreclosure.266 As Wechsler acknowledges, his calculations
overstate the lender's recoveries on resale to the extent that they
ignore those expenditures.267
Moreover, even taken on its own terms, Wechsler's foreclosures
did not produce results nearly so sanguine as the text of his article
suggests. Excluding the construction-loan transaction mentioned
262. Even if Wechsler's data did support that conclusion for his sample, I would have
some concerns about his sample, which appears to involve unusually small commercial real
estate loans: an average loan amount on the 16 loans of about $276,000, with a median loan
amount below $90,000. My calculations are derived from Appendix A to Wechsler's article,
id. at 899-900. I base my calculations on 16 of the 21 loans that he lists as commercial loans. I
excluded four loans for which he could not determine the disposition because the resale was
exempt from tax (his loan numbers 191, 1611, 1612, and 3088). I also excluded one construc
tion loan (his loan number 5182) for which his methodology was inappropriate because of its
inability to determine the amount the lender invested in completing construction of the
building. See infra note 265 and accompanying text (discussing that transaction.)
263. See id. at 880 n.170 (noting the inaccuracies of his methodology as applied to a construction-loan transaction).
264. See id. at 867 (discussing calculation of sale price).
265. See id. at 880 n.170 (discussing that transaction); id. app. at 900.
266. See, e.g., Profile 55 (reporting that expenditures to cure environmental hazards on
the property were obtained through the deed in lieu of foreclosure).
267. See Wechsler, supra note 197, at 886. Wechsler's calculations also do not take ac
count of the lender's carrying costs: the interest that would have accrued on the investment
during the period of time between the foreclosure and the date of resale. My calculations
also ignore these costs, because the insurance company did not record accruals of interest
after the date on which it obtained possession of collateral.
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above, Wechsler's lenders made small profits268 in four of the six
teen transactions, averaging fourteen percent of the original loan
amount269 - eleven percent if the transactions are weighted by
amount.21° To get a sense for the profits in question, the total profit
on the four transactions was only $21,700, less than $6,000 per
transaction. To put those "profits" in perspective, an expenditure
by the lender of a modest ten percent of the loan amount in each
case - to cover brokerage commissions, title-insurance policies, re
pairs, and other closing costs - would have converted two of those
four transactions to losses and reduced the average profit on the
four transactions as a whole to a minuscule $630, about 1.3 % of the
total loan amount.211
By contrast, the losses tended to be much more significant. The
average loss on the eleven losing transactions was thirty-five per
cent272 - forty-eight percent if the transactions are weighted by
amount.273 Thus, the average loss on the losing transactions was
more than $ 180,000274 - more than thirty times the size of the av
erage profit Wechsler records on the transactions that he treats as
profitable. To put it in perspective, even under Wechsler's method
the average outcome on all sixteen transactions275 was a loss of
268. My method for determining the lender's profit (or loss) depends on whether the
lender purchased the property at the foreclosure sale. For transactions in which the lender
purchased at the sale and subsequently resold the property, I use Wechsler's Profit or Loss
( ) on Resale Column (which equals the difference between the Resale Price and the Total
Due Mortgagee at Foreclosure). For transactions in which a third party purchased the prop
erty at the foreclosure sale, the lender can only break even or sustain a loss; the lender
cannot profit. See infra note 275. For the lender's loss, I use Wechsler's Deficiency ( ) or
Surplus column (which equals the difference between the Foreclosure Sale Price and the
Total Due Mortgage at Foreclosure.) There are no loans involving commercial transactions
in which the lender purchased at the foreclosure sale and failed to resell the property before
the date that Wechsler collected his data.
269. Mean computed by dividing sum of percentages (56%) by number of transactions
-

-

(4).
270. Profits of $21,700 on loans totaling $191,800.
271. A recent article offers anecdotal evidence that carrying costs during a residential
foreclosure proceeding average about 14% of the loan amount. See Debra Pogrund Stark,
Facing the Facts: An Empirical Study of the Fairness and Efficiency of Foreclosures and a
Proposal for Reform, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 639, 675-77 (1997). $21,700 minus $19,180 is
$2,520, 1.3% of the total Joan amount in those transactions ($191,800).
272. Mean computed by dividing sum of percentages (389.5%) by number of transactions
(11).
273. Losses of $2,004,453 on Joans totaling $4,217,991.
274. Losses of $2,004,453 on eleven transactions.
275. Wechsler treats four transactions as profitable, eleven as losses, and one (his loan
number 3898) he treats as if the lender broke even - a transaction in which a third party
purchased the property at foreclosure for an amount that exceeded the lender's debt. The
lender in that last transaction received the precise amount of its outstanding debt, with the
surplus going to the mortgagor, or inferior Jienholders, if appropriate. See 1 NELSON &
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about $124,000, forty-five percent of the average loan amount.276
To be sure, that forty-five percent figure is significantly better than
the seventy-seven percent average loss that I found in my case
study,211 but it is severe enough to support my view that the ra
tional business lender expects to lose quite a bit of its loan when
ever it presses a transaction to foreclosure.
*

*

*

The simplest interpretation of those findings would be the
starkest: lenders hardly ever can hope to liquidate collateral at a
value that would approach the amount of their debt. But that con
clusion by itself ignores the sorting accomplished by the mecha
nisms discussed in the first section of this subpart.

From my

perspective, the disastrous losses that lenders face in foreclosed
transactions are to be expected, because they underscore the effec
tiveness of the mechanisms that allow debtors to protect any equity
they might have in their businesses.
The basis for that view is easy to see if we assume that the uni
verse of distressed debtors with secured debt includes debtors
whose businesses have values ranging from amounts that substan
tially exceed the amount of their debts to amounts that are substan
tially less than the amount of their debts. Two logically separate
effects deter the lender from responding immediately with forced
liquidation. The first affects the lender directly: the transaction
costs of liquidation, which need JJ.Ot be expended if the debtor re
sponds to the distress by satisfying the lender. The second affects
the lender indirectly, by providing the debtor opportunities to sat
isfy the lender if it chooses to do so. Those opportunities are likely
to remove debtors at the upper end of the spectrum from the pool:
they protect themselves by refinancing, using cash flow from opera
tions, or selling all or a portion of the collateral. The debtors that
remain after those possibilities have run their course are likely to be
the worst of the pool, those whose assets are worth much less than
the debt. When the lender forecloses on the collateral of those few
remaining debtors, the natural result - that is to say, the result in
my few foreclosure profiles and in Wechsler's somewhat larger uniWmTMAN, supra note 225,§ 7.31, at 669 (explaining the applicable rules for distribution of
proceeds of a foreclosure sale).
276. A net loss of $1,982,753 on 16 transactions involving a total !�an amount of
$4,417,673.
277. That difference is to be expected, given the inability of Wechsler's methodology to
capture the lender's entire costs.
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verse of foreclosures - is for the lender to lose quite a large por
tion of its loan.
My case studies present only a limited amount of direct evi
dence of the results of foreclosures, and that evidence is limited to
real estate foreclosures.278 But that evidence fits so well with the
more general analysis of the market options available to distressed
debtors in both real- and personal-property contexts that it lends
plausibility to the whole framework. If that framework is correct,
the problem of abuses in the foreclosure process is much less im
portant than previously supposed. However logical the theoretical
basis for the concern that lenders can use foreclosure to capture
valuable assets from their debtors, the market in practice leaves lit
tle opportunity for that to occur. Because the debtor ordinarily has
a unique ability to obtain the highest possible value for its business
assets, even a distressed debtor has considerably more leverage
than conventional wisdom would suggest.279
278. The only direct evidence of personal-property liquidation comes from two finance
company profiles in which collateral was liquidated by the borrower, under the supervision of
the lender in one case and a bankruptcy court in the other. In the first case, the finance
company allowed the debtor to conduct a liquidation sale. The sale produced $80,000 against
a debt of $190,000, leaving 58% of the debt unpaid. See Profile 24. In the second, liquidation
produced $1,050,000 against a debt of $1,200,000, leaving 13% of the debt unpaid. See Profile
23. In two other cases, my lenders refrained from liquidation in the face of considerable
provocation based on specific estimates as to the losses that they would suffer from liquida
tion. See Profile 7 (decision by the finance company not to repossess inventory in the face of
fraudulent inventory reports from the debtor based on a determination that the collateral
could be sold for $2,000 against a debt of $20,000); Profile 26 (decision by the bank not to
liquidate repossessed inventory and equipment based on a determination that a liquidation
sale would bring only $50,000 against a debt of $295,000). Restraint turned out to be effec
tive: in both of those profiles the debtors promptly repaid the entire balance of their debts.
279. Throughout this portion of the article I have ignored the possibility that a lender
could recoup a portion of its loss by obtaining a deficiency judgment against the debtor,
largely because of the limited likelihood that a lender could obtain and collect such a judg
ment in a commercial transaction. There was only one such judgment in all of Wechsler's
loans - he does not say whether it was obtained in a residential or commercial transaction
- and that judgment was not satisfied. See Wechsler, supra note 197, at 877-78. As Jim
White and Steve Harris have pointed out to me, there is good reason to believe that some
consumer lenders, specifically General Motors Acceptance Corporation, operate on the as
sumption that deficiency judgments are important to their transactions. Existing evidence,
however, makes it difficult to ascertain whether they actually succeed in obtaining and col
lecting such judgments with any significant frequency.
In the profiles of mine that involved foreclosure, all of the loans were nonrecourse trans
actions in which the lender contractually waived its right to seek a deficiency judgment. Re
lying on a contractual exception to that waiver - which allowed the lender to pursue a
personal judgment for fraud - the lender in one of my profiles sought, obtained, and col
lected a judgment of about $1 million against the principal of one of the debtors based on a
claim of fraud. See Profile 70. Based on a right to withhold funds from the property's in
come to pay bona fide management fees, the debtor had withheld more than $1 million that
in fact was not attributable to management expenses; much of the money was used to pay
legal fees supporting the debtor's resistance to the lender's foreclosure action. My descrip
tion of the loss on that loan, see supra note 216, credits the recovery on the fraud judgment
against the loan balance; without that recovery the loss would have been even larger.
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The Incidence of Foreclosure and Repossession

Perhaps the most obvious question raised by my study is why I
observed so few instances of the exercise of remedies by the lender.
As mentioned above, not a single one of my forty-four personal
property profiles involved a repossession and sale of collateral.
Although the frequency with which the lender took possession of
the collateral was much higher in my real estate profiles (6 of 28
profiles, 21 % ) , even there the incidence of repossession struck me
as surprisingly small. The low frequency of repossession is particu
larly troubling given the strong anecdotal evidence of at least two
types of loans in which lenders frequently do take possession of
,
their borrowers collateral: home mortgages and automobile
loans.280 The apparent frequency of repossession and foreclosure in
those markets suggests that my analysis is not complete without
some explanation as to why repossession is so rare in the markets I
studied and so common in those markets.
Because I have not studied those markets directly, any explana
tion I offer is largely speculative. Nevertheless, building on the
work of Bill Whitford and Art Leff in the consumer-credit area,281 I
can offer a plausible explanation of the differing frequencies of re
possession. My explanation starts from a premise familiar from
Lefes work: Because coercive collection is a destructive process, a
borrower and lender normally can increase their joint wealth by
reaching a negotiated solution to the collection problem.282 That

�

280. I have no statistical evidence to support my perspective that forced repossession of
collateral is common in those two markets. Accordingly, it is at least theoretically possible
that I am wrong in worrying about this point: perhaps there are no markets left in our econ. omy in which lenders repossess collateral. For example, I cannot prove that homeowners do
not generally avert foreclosure by selling their homes to raise money to pay the debt. My
sense, however, is that homeowners avert foreclosure, if at all, by filing for bankruptcy. See,
e.g., Rake v. Wade, 508 U.S. 464 (1993); Nobelman v. American Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324
(1993); Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78 (1991). My impression that repossession is
a frequent incident in the automobile lending market is based not only on the plausibility of
such popular cultural phenomena as the film Repo Man (Universal Studios 1983), but also on
conversations with Jim White and Steve Harris - both of whom assure me that the major
automobile finance companies care deeply about the relevant rules governing the conse
quences of repossession and sale of their collateral - and on a persuasive, albeit dated,
empirical study of that market, see Robert W. Johnson, Denial ofSelf-Help Repossession: An
Economic Analysis, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 82, 90 (1973) (presenting statistics indicating that
California automobile lenders in the early 1970s repossessed 8.7% of the new cars against
which they loaned money).
281. See Arthur Allen Leff, Injury, Ignorance and Spite - The Dynamics of Coercive
Collection, 80 YALE L.J. 1 (1970); William C. Whitford, A Critique of the Consumer Credit
Collection System, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 1047.
0
282. See Leff, supra note 281, at 5-6 (presenting a graph demonstrating why it is rational
in the presence of positive costs of coercive collection for the parties to reach an agreed
solution to the dispute); id. at 12 (summarizing the reasons why coercive collection is costly
and destructive); id. at 38-39 (attributing failure to settle to "market breakdown [that] stems
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analysis is consistent with the results I found in my studies. The
harder problem is to identify precisely why the markets I studied
differ from the markets in which those negotiations fail. I offer two
separate justifications for the failure of negotiations and frequency
of foreclosure in the home and motor-vehicle markets. First, those
are markets in which the assets are so liquid that the losses from
coercive collection are relatively small - often smaller than the
transaction costs of negotiating a solution. Second, because those
markets involve predominantly unsophisticated consumer borrow
ers and relatively small loans, the transaction costs of negotiating a
solution are likely to be relatively high, limiting the attractiveness
of attempts at negotiated solutions.283

a. Liquidity of the Collateral. The first point is the most obvious
It is easy to see that the incidence of repossession and foreclo

one.

sure should increase with the liquidity of the assets that a lender
takes as collateral. For relatively liquid assets that regularly are

sold in an organized market, the lender can determine quite reliably
what its net return will be after it incurs the costs of repossessing,
holding, and selling the assets. To some degree, increased liquidity

is reflected in a higher price for the assets.284 But even for two
assets that have the same market value - that is, two assets that

would be expected to sell at the same price in an ordinary market
from an institutional insufficiency which blocks the efficient exchange of information");
Whitford, supra note 281, at 1053 ("[T]here is . . . a range of possible settlements, consisting
of consensual debtor payments, that will simultaneously benefit the creditor more and hurt
the debtor less than coercive execution."); id. at 1129 (discussing the " 'lost value' phenome
non that characterizes all property execution"). But see Alan Schwartz, The Enforceability of
Security Interests in Consumer Goods, 26 J.L. & EcoN. 117, 139-48 (1983) (arguing that Whit
ford (and implicitly Leff) err in postulating the "lost value" phenomenon, based on
Schwartz's view that debtors would not rationally grant security interests if those interests
would result in greater losses to the debtors than gain to the creditors).
283. A third factor affecting the likelihood of a negotiated solution would be the number
of creditors. As Stuart Gilson has argued, firms that face a greater number of creditors
should have more difficulty reducing their debt because of the possibility of individual credi
tor holdouts. Accordingly, Gilson predicts a connection between greater dispersion of debt
and reliance on judicial restructuring through Chapter 11 proceedings. See Gilson, supra
note 10, at 169 (making the argument); id. at 185 (reporting evidence to support it); cf.
MARCEL KAHAN & BRUCE TUCKMAN, PRIVATE VS. PUBLIC LENDING: EVIDENCE FROM
CoVENANTS 6-15 (Harvard Law Sch. Program in Law and Econs. Discussion Paper No. 151,
1995) (presenting empirical evidence to support the argument that holdout problems cause
debt covenants in publicly traded debt to be less onerous than debt covenants in privately
placed debt). My impression, however, is that holdout problems should not be as significant
in the resolution of troubled secured debt, because the creditor's lien on the assets limits the
significance of holdout problems. Cf. Mann, Pattern ofSecured Credit, supra note 3, at 651-54
(arguing that secured credit enhances the value of loan covenants because it protects for the
creditor the benefits of covenants associated with specific assets).
284. See, e.g., Ronald J. Mann, Searching for Negotiability in Payment and Credit Systems,
44 UCLA L. REv. 951, 957-58 {1997) (explaining how liquidity can increase the value of
otherwise similar assets).
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transaction, taking into account any market premium paid for
liquidity - it seems likely that a lender would be more apt to pur
sue repossession and foreclosure on the more liquid asset.
The most ob\rious reason that liquidity of collateral would en
hance the attractiveness of repossession and foreclosure is that li
quidity lowers the dead-weight losses associated with forced
collection.285 That is so because the price that a lender receives
upon sale of an asset that is more liquid should be closer to the
"market" price that the borrower could have received in an ordi
nary-course sale of the asset. By definition, the more liquid the as
set, the less the price should depend on the particular marketing
skills and expertise of its seller.
To be sure, the parties should recognize the enhanced liquidity
at the time they are negotiating over consensual solutions, and thus
theoretically should be just

as

able to reach consensual solutions in

the high-liquidity context as they are in any other context. Argua
bly, the only difference would be that the likely consensual solution
would be more favorable to the lender, reflecting the greater value
of the lender's foreclosure option. The problem with that theory,
however, is that it ignores the transaction costs of negotiating a so
lution. The lender's net recovery from a negotiated solution is un
likely to exceed the value of the collateral to the debtor.286 In cases
where the collateral is highly liquid, the lender can sell the collat
eral for a net return

as

high, or almost as high, as the value that the

debtor places on the collateral. Accordingly, the lender has little to
gain from attempting to negotiate a solution. To put it more
starkly, it would not be rational for the lender to pursue a negoti
ated solution in cases where the transaction costs of negotiating a
solution would exceed the difference between the liquidation value
of the collateral and the value of the collateral to the debtor.
285. Another less definitive reason would be the lower variability of recoveries from liq
uid collateral. If the lender is risk averse, a decrease in the variability of expected recoveries
from foreclosure would enhance the attractiveness of the foreclosure option. Although I
think that reason has some explanatory force, I do not rely on it heavily, given the difficulty
of obtaining solid evidence about the risk aversion of institutions and the officers that make
decisions about workouts. For what it is worth, my impression is that any explanation based
on risk aversion will decline in significance as information technology enhances the sophisti
cation, uniformity, and objectivity with which institutions make the relevant decisions. See,
e.g., Mann, Small-Business Secured Credit, supra note 3 (explaining how credit-scoring sys
tems can improve the accuracy of underwriting decisions).
286. If the lender insisted on a greater recovery, the borrower would be better off step
ping aside and letting the lender take the collateral. I assume, of course, that the parties give
no weight to the possibility of a deficiency judgment against the borrower. See supra note
279 (justifying that assumption as a general working hypothesis).
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Viewed from that perspective, it is easy to understand the rela
tive attractiveness of foreclosure in the markets for motor vehicles
and single-family homes as compared to the markets for most busi
ness assets. The market for used automobiles in particular appears
to be extremely predictable.287 Lenders should be confident that
they can dispose of repossessed cars within a matter of days or
weeks at a price that bears a predictable relation to the price for
which the vehicle sold at retail.288 Similarly, although a considera
bly greater element of unpredictability is present in sales of single
family homes,289 it is fair to expect that a lender could sell a home
fairly quickly for a large portion of the home's "market" value.
By contrast, in the contexts that I studied lenders would be
much less likely to dispose of collateral so easily. As Part I of this
article chronicles, many, if not most, general business assets de
grade in value substantially upon repossession. Even in what must
be close to the best of all possible worlds - the repurchase
agreement-backed lending discussed in my finance company study
- lenders generally are confident that they cannot sell the collat
eral for anything approaching the value for which the debtor could
sell it. The substantial losses my lenders see coming upon reposses
sion pose a powerful deterrent to repossession as a common strat
egy.

Conversely, the only market in which I saw any forced

transfers of possession was the market in which the borrower's abil
ity to bring value to the asset was the most uncertain - the com
mercial real estate market.WO

b. Consumer and Business Borrowers.

Just as liquidity en

hances the frequency of coercive collection by lowering the transac
tion c:,osts of collection, the presence of consumer borrowers
287. See William C. Whitford, The Appropriate Role of Security Interests in Consumer
Transactions, 7 CARDOZO L REv. 959, 994 (1986) (discussing typical results obtained on
resale of repossessed motor vehicles); Whitford, supra note 281, at 1125 ("[A] secured credi
tor whose collateral is a motor vehicle
regularly uses coercive execution as a direct means
of collection, partly because there is a well established market in used motor vehicles.").
288. See Profile 30 (relating the statement of a bank officer that he "without a doubt"
could resell cars repossessed from a dealer's lot at 97% of the wholesale price paid by the
dealer for the car, reduced only by the expenses of moving the cars).
289. I speak from the personal experience of two difficult home sales forced by past
relocations.
290. I emphasize that my argument is only that repossessed homes and automobiles are
relatively liquid compared to business collateral. I recognize that there is good reason to
believe that even for those assets a substantial amount of value is lost upon repossession and
sale. See Leff, supra note 281, at 42-46; Scott, Coercive Creditor Remedies, supra note 2, at
734-35 (summarizing the literature about the lost-value hypothesis, particularly in the auto
mobile lending market). My point is only that the value lost upon repossession seems likely
to be even higher in loans involving business assets that ordinarily are not susceptible to
resale in an organized market.
• • .
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enhances the frequency of coercive collection by increasing the
transaction costs of a negotiated solution.
In the business context, there is every reason to expect the result
my studies suggest. Sophisticated repeat players should do the ra
tional thing and reach an agreement that allows them to avoid the
losses inherent in any coercive collection effort. Art Leff put it
well: "When . . . transactions [between businessmen] lead to dis
pute, businessmen avoid the judicial-coercive system, that very
flower of Western common law, like some rare Asiatic plague. "291
As Bill Whitford has explained most thoroughly, however, sev
eral factors come together to limit significantly the likelihood of a
fully rational disposition of collection disputes in the consumer
arena.292 Among other things, consumers are relatively unlikely to
understand their legal rights, much less the practical leverage those
rights give them.293 Moreover, even the rare consumer that does
understand the significance of its position will have a hard time con
vincing the creditor to credit the consumer with a potential for an
informed and rational response to the problem.294 Businesses in
dispute frequently will have effective channels of communication,
prior relationships, and reputational interests that make it easy for
them to provide their counterparts credible commitments of forth
coming actions.295 Consumers, by contrast, will not have access to
similar opportunities. Their relationships with their creditors are
much more likely to be one-shot affairs, with limited past opportu
nities for trust-building communications, and a limited likelihood of
future transactions.296 The rational creditor would do better assum
ing that consumers generally will not understand their rights and
will not act rationally in pursuing their interests whether or not they
understand those interests.291
291. Leff, supra note 281, at 24.
292. See Whitford, supra note 281, at 1106-09 (explaining why consumer credit collection
involves "too little bargaining and informal settlement, and too much litigation and coercive
execution").
293. See id. at 1060-66.
294. See id. at 1064-66 (suggesting that debtors will not be able to negotiate successfully
with creditors unless the debtors hire attorneys).
295. See Leff, supra note 281, at 24-30.
296. See id. at 41; Scott, Coercive Creditor Remedies, supra note 2, at 746 (suggesting that
"trust is often achieved by the continuity of the relationship between the parties" and that in
consumer transactions "the future casts an insufficient shadow over the present to discipline
reliably the current behavior of the parties").
297. See Whitford, supra note 281, at 1107 (suggesting that one "important cause of un
necessary execution is failure of a debtor who can pay to believe a creditor's execution
threat, or failure to appreciate the serious consequences of execution"); id. at 1108 ("I be-
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Thus, in the end, the rational creditor would be likely to adopt a
harsh stance that does not allow for case-by-case assessment of the
rationality and intelligence of the particular consumer. As Leff
states:
[I]t is too expensive, given the current institutional framework, for
[consumer] collection transactions as currently designed to be han
dled individually on the basis of the peculiar needs of particular par
ties in particular instances . . . . [O]ne cannot easily customize dispute
resolution any more than one can customize manufacture or distribu
tion for a mass market.298

If the lender is to adopt one standard approach, the most sensible
course certainly would be to wait until the debtor's lack of payment
becomes serious, and then proceed with foreclosure as promptly as
possible.299 Indeed, there is a ring of sad reality in Bob Scott's anal
ysis of the reputational incentives forcing the lender to the sternest
possible responses: little likelihood of a negative effect on the
lender's reputation with potential future borrowers, coupled with a
strong likelihood of a positive effect on the lender's reputation for
toughness with future defaulters.3oo
B.

Distressed Debt in Context

The process for terminating distressed debt is not a free

standing economic institution. It is the last step in a lengthy process
that starts with the transactions in which debt originates. A com
plete understanding of the mechanisms of distress thus must evalu
ate the interplay between what happens in the end-game of distress
and what happens up front - at the time of the initial debt contract
- when the players establish the rules for the relationship. Turning
to that topic, my evidence is directly relevant to two of the most
lieve debtors make [rational settlement] offers less often than they should from a perspective
of personal wealth maximization.").
298. Leff, supra note 281, at 38.
299. See id. at 42 {"It is no accident that much current collection practice is handled in a
relatively rigid, stylized and automatic manner, based on stereotypes and game-like statistical
strategies."). My perspective on the reactions of an institutional lender faced with an intelli
gent consumer is informed by a transaction in which a senior credit officer at a Houston life
insurance company, a frequent client of mine, attempted without success to reach a negoti
ated solution regarding her personal liability on a mortgage on an Austin condominium that
was worth substantially less than the outstanding balance on the mortgage. The lender's
internal procedures did not permit it to accept any proposal short of complete payment. That
procedure can be rational only if it is based on a perspective that there is such a small likeli
hood of a consumer debtor offering or accepting a value-increasing workout proposal that
the lender cannot justify the costs of evaluating such proposals.
300. See Scott, Coercive Creditor Remedies, supra note 2, at 749-51, 773; see also Whit
ford, supra note 287, at 964 {discussing the incentive for creditors "always [to] be concerned
about how their actions in a particular case will affect judgments that others, particularly
debtors, make about their behavior in future cases").

November 1997]

Secured Debt

233

fundamental issues of commercial law: the reasons for the use of
secured credit; and the effect of distress, and the legal rules that
govern it, on the willingness of creditors to issue debt in the first
instance.

1. Why Secured Credit: Strategy or Force?
Secured credit is an economic institution founded on a set of
legal rules that are designed to enhance the lender's ability to col
lect its debt through force, specifically through the forced reposses
sion and sale of the collateral.301 Legal rules regulate every aspect
of the exercise of that force: the types of arrangements that create
an opportunity for the use of that force,302 the events that must
occur before a lender is entitled to exercise that force,303 what the
lender can do with the collateral after repossession,304 and who will
have priority over any proceeds produced by the lender's disposi
tion of the collateral.3os
I have argued in previous articles that the possible benefits of
force (liquidation) are much less important than the benefits of
strategy. Essentially, my argument has been that the possible re
turns from liquidation are less important to the potential secured
creditor than the various ways in which secured credit indirectly al
lows the debtor to precommit to actions that enhance the likelihood
of repayment.306 All that I have been able to do in my previous
articles, however, is present anecdotal evidence that individual
debtors and creditors believe that strategy is important in some cir
cumstances. Because it is clear that liquidation occurs in some
301. See, e.g., BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 30, at 1 (describing the archetypal secured
transaction as one in which "[o]ne person extends credit to another and, as a condition of the
loan, both parties agree that in the event of default, the extender of credit can take posses
sion of personal property of the other and sell it to satisfy the debt"); Steven L. Harris &
Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Property-Based Theory of Security Interests: Taking Debtors'
Choices Seriously, 80 VA. L. REv. 2021, 2051 n.83 (1994) (containing statement by reporters
for revised Article 9 that the "essence'.' of a security interest is the lender's right to possess,
dispose of, exclude others from, and sell collateral).
302. See, e.g., u.c.c. § 9-203 (1987); REsrATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY-SEC. (MORT
GAGES) §§ 1.1-1.5 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1991).
303. See, e.g., u.c.c. §§ 9-502 to -503 (1987); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY-SEC.
(MORTGAGES) § 8.1 (Tentative Draft No. 5, 1996).
304. See, e.g., u.c.c. §§ 9-504 to -505 (1987); REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY-SEC.
(MORTGAGES) §§ 8.2-8.6 (Tentative Draft No. 5, 1996).
305. See, e.g., u.c.c. §§ 9-301 to -316 (1987); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY-SEC.
(MORTGAGES) §§ 2.1-2.4 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1991); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP
ERTY-SEC. (MORTGAGES) §§ 7.1-7.8 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1995).
306. See Mann, Pattern of Secured Credit, supra note 3, at 639-58; Mann, Small-Business
Secured Credit, supra note 3; see also Scott, Relational Theory, supra note 2, at 950 (sug
gesting a similar perception "within the [lending] industry").
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cases, I have not been able in my past work to provide a clear pic
ture of the relative importance of force and strategy.
The case studies presented here, however, speak to that topic
directly, with a much broader empirical foundation than any of my
prior work. The message of those case studies is clear: At least in
the contexts that I studied, forced liquidation of collateral is quite
rare. My lenders forced liquidation of collateral in only four per
cent (three cases) of my entire universe of seventy-two profiles. To
be sure, that figure understates the significance of liquidation to
some degree because it does not take into account the secondary
effects of liquidation - cases in which the debtor was motivated to
act by concern over what would have happened if the creditor had
resorted to forced liquidation. Be that as it may, the fact remains
that compared to the much higher frequencies of disposition by
refinancing, cash flow from operations, and sale,307 liquidation
comes off as a relatively unusual result. That is especially true in
the fifty-one profiles from my finance-company and bank studies,
where there were no cases of forced liquidation at all.3os
Given the infrequency with which forced liquidation occurs, it is
difficult to contest the view that, at least in some contexts, the ma
jor motivations for secured credit must be the indirect effects that
play a role in all transactions by affecting the debtor's behavior dur
ing the period

before

the loan becomes distressed: limiting the

debtor's ability to obtain excessive subsequent financing and repair
ing the debtor's risk-preferent incentives.309
That conclusion suggests an odd dissonance in the organization
of the secured-credit system. The legal system provides commercial
actors a detailed set of legal rules designed to facilitate forced trans
fer of collateral, but commercial actors use those rules almost en
tirely for other purposes. A view of the system in light of the uses
that commercial actors actually make of it suggests some hard ques
tions about the propriety of the current path of legal developments
in this area. As I write, both of the major institutions that provide
legal frameworks for secured lending - Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code and the

Restatement of Mortgages

-

are in the

final stages of projects generally designed to enhance the ease with
307. See supra section Il.A.1.
308. For a similar anecdotal assessment, see James Interview, supra note 232, at 14-15
(stating that Wells Fargo Bank forcibly liquidates collateral in less than 10% of the transac
tions in which the borrower's business fails).
309. For a general explanation of those effects, see Mann, Pattern ofSecured Credit, supra
'
note 3, at 639-57.
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which parties can engage in secured lending.310 The general ration
ale for those developments starts from the premise that secured
lending provides a cheap and effective credit source and reasons
from that premise to the conclusion that the lending market as a
whole would work better if we made it easier for parties to use that
source by extending the system to cover all conceivable assets: let
ting the creditors "plow the comers of the field. "311
In my view, the propriety of that reasoning is linked inextricably
with the implicit assumption that forced liquidation is the focal
point of the enterprise of secured lending. Thus, I understand why
the policymakers who are the ultimate constituencies of those
projects can look benignly on a project that is designed simply to
lower the transaction costs of forcing nonpaying debtors to hand
over the promised collateral in the event of default. Similarly, I see
no substantial policy problems with the spread of a system whose
principal practical effect is to provide an effective limit on future
borrowings.312 As Douglas Baird has noted,313 however, it is not
nearly so obvious that we should be unconcerned about the spread
of a device that operates to enhance the leverage the creditor has
over the debtor - holding the debtor hostage, if you will.314
Although this article certainly is not the place to work out the
details of an alternative set of financial legal institutions, the policy
concerns associated with the hostage-related effects of secured
credit pose an obvious question: Could we develop a more radi
cally revised financing system that both eliminated the potential for
leverage and incentive-alteration that comes with the current
liquidation-based system and provided the enforceable mechanism
for preventing excessive future borrowing that is missing from the
310. See Ronald J. Mann, The First Shall Be Last: A Contextual Argument for Aban
doning Temporal Rules of Lien Priority, 75 TEXAS L. RE.v. 11, 11-12 (1996) (summarizing
those developments).
311. Memorandum from Elizabeth Warren to Council of the American Law Institute 1
(Apr. 25, 1996) [hereinafter Warren Reform Proposal] (on file with author) (describing "the
operative metaphor" of proposed revisions to Article 9). Although the wide variety of assets
that will remain outside Article 9 even if the revisions are adopted suggests that Warren's
perspective is a bit overstated, it is fair to say that the reporters "think the transfer of an
effective security interest ought to be as easy, inexpensive, and reliable as possible." Harris
& Mooney, supra note 301, at 2021.
312. See Mann, Small-Business Secured Credit, supra note 3 (arguing that the principal
reason for taking collateral from small businesses is to limit future borrowing).
313. See Douglas G. Baird, Security Interests Reconsidered, 80 VA. L. REV. 2249, 2263-66
(1994).
314. See, e.g., Mann, Pattern ofSecured Cref[,it, supra note 3, at 646 (analogizing the grant
of collateral to the general theory of hostages as a contracting device).
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current legal framework?315 If one of the main reasons that parties
use secured credit is to provide a credible limitation on future bor
rowings, is it not possible that it would be a significant advance to
move to a system that preserved that advantage and yet - by limit
ing the creditor's ability to force liquidation - eliminated, or at
least truncated, the less palatable hostage- and leverage-related ele
ments of the current system?316
Of course, erection of a new system that eliminated some of the
potential benefits of the current system might raise the costs of
credit by eliminating the benefits that parties currently derive from
the incentive-altering effects of secured credit. But it is highly
likely that there are some identifiable contexts in which those ef
fects are not a significant positive factor, so that the loss of them
would cause little harm.317 Moreover, some policymakers might
choose to limit those transactions even if they prohibited some
value-increasing transactions in the process; that is the kind of
moral choice policymakers make all the time.
The problem in the secured-credit context is that the treatment
of liquidation as the focal point of the system has obscured the pol
icy issues raised by the actual uses to which the system is put. By
abandoning the focus on secured credit as a tool for enhancing
creditors' ability to liquidate collateral, scholars could tum their ef
forts to more relevant inquiries: identifying areas in which secured
credit serves unambiguously benign functions, evaluating the policy
ramifications of the less benign functions of secured credit, and de
signing systems that enhance the efficacy of the more benign func
tions while limiting the use of the less benign functions.318

315. See id. at 643-45 (explaining why the current system does not provide a practical
mechanism for offering a credible commitment to refrain from excessive future borrowing);
Mann, Small-Business Secured Credit, supra note 3 (presenting empirical evidence of the
acute significance of that problem in small-business lending).
316. Alan Schwartz presents a related proposal in Alan Schwartz, Priority Contracts and
Priority in Bankruptcy, 82 CORNELL L. REv. {forthcoming 1997). His proposal, however,
would merely enhance the ability of creditors to obtain credible commitments against future
borrowing, by creating a cause of action enhancing the enforceability of negative-pledge and
negative-debt covenants. He would not go on to limit the liquidation-forcing rights of the
secured creditor - as I suggest here.
317. See Mann, Small-Business Secured Credit, supra note 3 (arguing that limiting future
borrowing is the only significant benefit of secured credit in the market for bank-issued lines
of credit to small businesses).
318. Any serious examination of those questions is beyond the scope of this project. My
point here is· just to suggest the kinds of issues that are relevant to the situations distressed
debtors face in practice.
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Distress and the Market for the Origination of Debt

Most of the highly controversial topics for commercial-law
scholars in the last decade have focused on the perceived inefficien
cies of the legal system's rules for dealing with financial distress. In
the bankruptcy area, a swarm of commentators, generally writing
from a law and economics perspective, has castigated the inefficien
cies of the bankruptcy processes for distressed businesses.319 One
of the central issues to be faced in evaluating their concerns is the
ex ante question: Do aspects of the bankruptcy process that hinder
creditors' rights to collect their debts adversely affect the market
for the origination of debt? For example, if the bankruptcy process
makes it harder to collect debts, then, the argument goes, the sup
ply of credit should contract, raising the price of loans in the first
instance.320
A similar problem arises in the secured-credit literature, where
academics are engaged in an ongoing policy debate about priority
among secured and unsecured creditors. The dominant perspective
on the topic is that one of the principal effects of secured credit is to
shift the risk of financial loss to unsuspecting creditors that either
are too unsophisticated to protect themselves by taking collateral or
obtain their claims in ways that do not give them an opportunity to
take collateral, such as a tortious act by the debtor.321 Responding
to that concern, Elizabeth Warren has offered a controversial pro
posal that would "carve out" a twenty percent share of the value of
collateral held by distressed debtors and set it aside for unsecured
creditors.322 Others have argued that the remedy for that problem
is to give tort creditors priority over consensual secured credi
tors.323 As with provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that are per319. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation, 11 CORNELL L. REv. 439,
440-42 (1992); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101
HARv. L. REV. 775 (1988); Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for
Chapter 11, 101 YALE LJ. 1043 (1992); Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice: A Menu
Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 TEXAS L. REv. 51 (1992).
320. See Alan Schwartz, The Absolute Priority Rule and the Firm's Investment Policy, 72
WASH. U. L.Q. 1213, 1218-22 (1994) (presenting a formal mathematical analysis of that
problem).
321. The leading exponents of that perspective are Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M.
Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857
(1996), and Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80 VA. L. REv. 1887 (1994).
322. See Warren Reform Proposal, supra note 311. That proposal, together with the arti
cles by Bebchuk, Fried, and LoPucki, supra note 321, were the subject of a February 1997
conference at the Harvard Law School, the proceedings of which are forthcoming in the
Cornell Law Review.
323. See, e.g., David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91
CoLUM. L. REv. 1565, 1649, 1646-49 (1991) ("Subordinating all lenders to tort claimants
would eliminate the advantage of leverage, and would remove the ability of corporate or-
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ceived to delay secured creditors in the exercise of their rights,324 a
fundamental concern with those proposals is the possibility that
they will have an adverse effect on the market for the origination of
credit. If secured creditors will be able to collect only a portion of
their collateral when their debtors face distress, then, the argument
goes, secured creditors will constrict the supply of credit; that con
striction in turn will slow the pace of investment and thus harm the
economy as a whole.325
The concern for the origination market is natural for observers
that start with the classic presupposition that the function of se
cured credit is to enhance the creditor's ability to liquidate collat
eral. But the evidence I present here suggests that the link between
the creditor's ability to liquidate collateral and the origination of a
secured loan is much looser than traditional analysis would suggest.
Although lenders ordinarily set their loan amounts by reference to
a posited liquidation value of the collateral, their experience
teaches them that in many cases they will be unable to sell the col-

ganizers to unilaterally detennine an artificial level of exposure to tort judgments.");
LoPucki, supra note 321, at 1893, 1897-98 (discussing how the priority of secured creditors
allows finns to externalize tort risk); Robert K. Rasmussen & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Eco
nomic Analysis of Corporate Bankruptcy Law, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 85, '01 (1995)
("[C]ompensating tort claimants injured by the finn ahead of contractual creditors
forces
corporations to take into account the injuries their behavior imposes on third parties."); Rob
ert K. Rasmussen, An Essay on Optimal Bankruptcy Rules and Social Justice, 1994 U. ILL. L.
REv. 1, 31-35 (cataloging the "ills caused by the current regime" of according secured credi
tors priority over tort creditors).
324. The most useful explanation of the delay imposed by chapter 11 is Lynn M. LoPucki,
The Trouble with Chapter 11, 1993 Wis. L. REv. 729, 732-45.
325. For analysis of the proposal starting from the assumption that secured creditors in
fact will constrict their lending to about 80% of the amounts they currently are willing to
lend, see Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Measuring the Social Costs and Benefits
and Identifying the Victims of Subordinating Security Interests in Bankruptcy, 82 CORNELL L.
REv. (forthcoming 1997); Lynn M. LoPucki, Should the Secured Credit Carve-Out Apply only
in Bankruptcy? A Systems/Strategic Analysis, 82 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 1997). Pro
fessor Steven L. Schwarcz provides a similarly negative assessment:
One therefore would expect, and this has been corroborated with leading finance and
bankruptcy lawyers, that a partial priority rule would create an economic disincentive
that would cause many potential lenders simply to refuse to make loans to debtors , ,
(T]his Article will assume that a 75% partial priority rule would cause between 10-25%
of debtors that need liquidity to be unable to find willing lenders. That assumption has
been corroborated as being reasonable and perhaps even conservative.
Steven L. Schwarcz, The Easy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy: A
Response to Professors Bebchuk & Fried 51-52 (Feb. 24, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author) (citations omitted}; see also id. at 3 & nn.6-7 (quoting letters from attorneys
that support that perspective). Although the practitioners to whom Professor Schwarcz
spoke and with whom he corresponded - such notables as Ken Klee, Howard Ruda, and
Edwin Smith - have, like Professor Schwarcz himself, impressive practice experience as
attorneys, they differ from the subjects of my interviews because they are not themselves
lending professionals.
.
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lateral for anything approaching that value.326 Moreover, in prac
tice both involuntary liquidation of collateral and bankruptcy are
quite unusual, even within the relatively small universe of loans that
fall into distress.327 As I have explained above, the creditors in my
sample of distressed loans forcibly liquidated the collateral of their
debtors in only three profiles (four percent of the entire sample), all
of which were in the insurance company study. Not a single one of
the forty-four personal-property secured loans in my sample328 re
sulted in a forced liquidation of collateral. Furthermore, the values
obtained on the insurance company's liquidations were so low averaging less than twenty-five percent of the unpaid debt - that a
twenty percent deduction from those values would have a relatively
326. At first glance, the widespread use of loan-to-value ratios in underwriting signifi
cantly undermines my argument, because it suggests that lenders carefully assess the liquida
tion value of collateral in deciding whether to make secured loans. My tentative view,
however, is that, at least in institutional lending by banks and insurance companies, the use of
loan-to-value ratios does not really reflect a serious concern about liquidation value. In the
insurance company context, my impression, based on several years representing an insurance
company in dealing with its distressed loans and on my review of files for this project, is that
the asset value described in insurance company credit documentation is derived almost en
tirely from projections of the cash flow of the asset rather than independent assessment of
likely sale proceeds. Essentially, the lender determines how much cash flow the project will
produce and then capitalizes the cash flow to produce a value; I think it is almost unheard of
for that capitalization to result in denial of a loan application for which the cash flow suggests
adequate coverage of the anticipated debt service. Admittedly, capitalizing cash flow is not
an unreasonable approach to determining valuation, but it does suggest that cash flow, rather
than liquidation, is the point of central significance. Similarly, in a recent study of small
business lending by banks, the lenders to whom I spoke generally stated that cash flow suffi
cient to cover the anticipated debt service was much more significant to their underwriting
decisions than any direct assessment of the value of any available collateral. Indeed, several
of the lenders admitted that they readily would make loans that failed to satisfy loan-to-value
guidelines provided they were comfortable with the cash flow of the business. See Mann,
Small-Business Secured Credit, supra note 3, at n.68.
327. The universe of distressed loans that I studied is itself only a tiny part of the entire
lending market, given the likelihood that well over 95% of loans will be repaid as agreed
without incident. See, e.g., Finance Company Credit Executive Interview, supra note 67 (stat
ing that less than one-half of one percent of the finance company's loans are in default at any
given time); see also Gordon Matthews, Declining Loan Reserves Stir Analysts' Concern, AM.
BANKER, June 20, 1996, at 1, available in 1996 WL 5562586 (reporting FDIC statistics indicat
ing that net chargeoffs on business loans made by banks throughout an entire business cycle
are in the range of 0.60%, with the worst year ever (1991) recording chargeoffs of 1.63% );
Kerry D. Vandell, Predicting Commercial Mortgage Foreclosure Experience, 20 J. AM. REAL
Esr. & URB. EcoN. AssN. 55, 56 (1992) (reporting insurance company industry statistics from
1981-1988 indicating that the total of loans that were delinquent, in the process of foreclo
sure, or actually foreclosed ranged during the 1980s from a low of about two percent to a
high of almost five percent). Although the five percent figure would be conservative under
normal economic conditions, delinquencies at insurance companies can rise significantly
above that level in periods of pervasive real estate distress. See Kerry D. Vandell et al.,
Commercial Mortgage Defaults: Proportional Hazards Estimation Using Individual Loan
Histories, 21 J. AM. REAL Esr. & URB. EcoN. AssN. 451, 451 {1993) (reporting delinquency
and foreclosure statistics for 1992 that totaled 9.78% of insurance company portfolios, and
characterizing those statistics as "at their highest levels since the Depression").
328. The 44 personal property profiles are all of the 72 profiles other than the 28 real
estate profiles identified at supra note 251.
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small effect on the lender's recovery even in those cases.329 Of
course, the effects of the carveout would be felt not only in the
cases in which liquidation occurred, but also in cases in which the
parties negotiate a solution predicated on what would happen if liq
uidation did occur. But the limited direct significance of liquidation
casts doubt on any theory that gives it a weighty role.
The incidence of bankruptcy as a response to a distressed loan is
similarly uncommon.

In my seventy-two profiles, the debtors

sought relief in bankruptcy in only seven cases, ten percent of the
entire sample,330 and two of those cases were filed without opposi
tion from the secured lender.331 Indeed, even if I look only to the
profiles that involved failed businesses, the incidence of bankruptcy
remains surprisingly modest (6 of 15, 40%).332
Given the relative infrequency of bankruptcy and liquidation
even in the universe of distressed loans, it seems most unlikely that
either the problems with the bankruptcy system or Warren's
carveout proposal would have the kinds of direct deleterious effects
on the market for origination that a focus on liquidation might sug
gest. For something that happens so rarely to have a long-term cog
nizable effect on the willingness of lenders to issue new debt, the
change of result in the rare case of liquidation or bankruptcy would
have to be quite striking, and the changes in question do not seem

329. See supra note 217 and accompanying text (discussing the losses that the insurance
company realized in caies in which it foreclosed).
330. See Profile 23; Profile 48; Profile 53; Profile 60; Profile 69; Profile 72; Profile 74.
That number does not include the three profiles in which principals of bank debtors filed for
bankruptcy, see supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text, because those bankruptcies were
motivated not by the lender's pursuit of the collateral, but by its pursuit of an unsecured
claim against the principal.
331. See Profile 53; Profile 74.
332. I count only six bankruptcies in that class because one of my seven bankruptcy
profiles involved a tax-motivated bankruptcy with the lender's consent that did not result in
severe distress for the property. See Profile 74. For the 15 profiles of business failure, see

�����������������

file 55; Profile 60; Profile 66; Profile 69; Profile 70; Profile 71; Profile 72.
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significant enough to have serious effects in the massive universe of
cases in the market333 for loan origination.334
To test that intuition, I discussed Elizabeth Warren's carveout
proposal with lending executives at each of the three companies
whose loans I examine in Part I of this article. Given the direct
purpose of the proposal - to lower their recoveries in loan transac
tions in which their borrowers fail - it did not surprise me that
none of the lenders received the proposal sympathetically.335 For
example, the executive at the finance company stated firmly that his
firm would constrict its lending if the proposal were enacted.336
But the overall reactions to the proposal suggest that the long
term reactions to that proposal might be relatively small. For exam
ple, given the higher frequency of liquidation in his type of lending
than in the other types of lending that I studied,337 I expected the
insurance company executive to respond most negatively to the
proposal.338 I thus was not surprised at his view that his institution
would react to the proposal by declining to make some loans that it
otherwise might have made and by reducing the loan amount in
333. My argument must be limited to the markets that I investigated. There probably are
heavily collateral-based areas of lending in which the proposal would have a more direct
effect. My main point, however, is that I think it unlikely that the proposal will have the kind
of serious, direct, across-the-board impact that critics suggest. Serious effects are likely to be
limited to particular markets in which collateral has unusual significance. For example, Paul
Shupack tells me that securities clearinghouses retain large amounts of collateral to ensure
that entities that use them to clear trades will be able to satisfy their obligations. He reasons
that the Warren proposal would upset their operations by significantly increasing the amount
of collateral necessary to maintain their operations. He is in the early stages of a project
attempting to obtain some empirical support for his view.
334. For empirical evidence supporting an analogous argument, see Michael H. Schill, An
(1991) (con
cluding that differences in mortgagor-protection laws do not have a statistically significant
effect on the market for the origination of loans); see also Whitford, supra note 281, at 107778 (outlining reasons why restrictions on creditor's remedies would not directly affect the
availability of credit). To get a sense for the tremendous difficulties in careful empirical in
vestigation of such a question, see the frankly ambiguous results reported in William C. Whit
ford & Harold Laufer, The Impact of Denying Self-Help Repossession of Automobiles: A
Case Study of the Wisconsin Consumer Act, 1975 Wis. L. REv. 607.

Economic Analysis of Mortgagor Protection Laws, 71 VA. L. REv. 489, 500-15

335. Cf. Whitford & Laufer, supra note 334, at 634 (noting a similar problem with re
sponse bias in a survey of automobile lenders regarding their perspective on legal reforms
limiting their right to repossess automobiles from defaulting borrowers).
336.

See Supplemental Branch Operations Manager Interview, supra note 26.

337. All of the cases of forced liquidation that I studied were in the insurance company
profiles.
338. I should point out that my discussion of the proposal with the insurance company
executive was purely hypothetical because the existing proposal would not apply to real es
tate loans. Warren contemplates only an amendment to Article 9, not the Bankruptcy Code
or any other body of law applicable to real property. See Warren Reform Proposal, supra
note 311, at 1 (summarizing the proposal); cf. LoPucki, supra note 325 (discussing criticism of
the proposal based on the exclusion of real estate loans).
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others.339 I was a bit surprised, however, by his subsequent com
ments expressing doubt that the response would reflect a perma
nent change in lending practices. First, because his institution
suffered considerable losses on its real estate portfolio during the
last decade, he believes that his institution is considerably more
cautious than many of the institutions against which it competes for
business.340 Accordingly, he thought it at least possible that other
institutions would continue to advance funds on the terms that cur
rently are customary, with the end result being less a reduction in
lending and more a shift in business from his institution to less cau
tious institutions.341 Second, he thought that even at his institution
a contraction of lending would dissipate if experience of the indus
try indicated that the carveout rule did not impose substantial losses
on lenders. As he put it: "I think there would be a general slow
down, but my guess is that after people gulp a little bit - the en
gines might get geared up again - especially if we work through a
cycle and see how it works."342 Thus, even the insurance company
executive - whose institution lost tens of millions of dollars just on
the loans I studied - was not confident that the carveout rule
would have a significant long-run impact.
Finally, the banking executive firmly believed that the proposal
would have no effect whatsoever on bank lending. As he put it,
loan officers responsible for origination "don't think or give one
hoot about bankruptcy/workout scenarios. They hope to hell it
won't happen. . . . [I]t won't affect one iota how the banks initiate
loans."343 He initially attributed that result to the imperfect incen
tives that confront bank loan officers. From his perspective, those
officers are institutionally unlikely to be adequately concerned
about the risk of loss in their loan transactions, both because of
their responsibility to "get money out the door" and because the
effects on them of failed loans are much more indirect: "[T]hey are
there to make loans - that's how they are compensated and that's
how they are rewarded and anything that potentially will happen is
way down the road and they will probably be gone or moved
339. See Telephone Interview with Insurance Company Executive (Mar. 6, 1997) [herein
after Supplemental Insurance Company Executive Interview].
340. See id. at 5 (suggesting that his institution is "more on the conservative side" and
"more willing to walk away . . . from a deal that wouldn't work").
341. See id. at 5 (stating that his institution's conservatism distinguishes it from competi
tors for whom "that's the job, there's the money, you've got to put it out").
342. Id. at 2.
343. Telephone Interview with Bank Division Manager (Mar. 6, 1997) [hereinafter Sup
plemental Bank Division Manager Interview].
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on."344 He maintained that opinion even when I pressed him to
consider what would happen if the compensation incentives for
loan officers were altered to remove that problem. Even then, he
stated, the effects would not be enough to alter underwriting pat
terns: " [A]n officer by his . . . job is an optimist that things are
never going to go wrong and I'm a good underwriter and those are
things that don't happen to me, it always happens to the other per
son. So [the proposal] would have no bearing at all."345
Together with the numerical evidence from my case studies,
those interviews support my thesis that adoption of current pro
posals to limit secured-creditor priority in liquidation or insolvency
would not have nearly so serious an effect on lending as a
liquidation-focused analysis would suggest. Analysis of those pro
posals thus should not be diverted by concerns that they would
have a substantial effect on the lending market.346 Rather, those
proposals should be evaluated based on their effects in the situa
tions in which they are more directly relevant: the transactions in
which they directly alter liquidation allocations and the transactions
in which liquidation is sufficiently likely for the proposals to alter
the parties' strategies in responding to distress.
·

CONCLUSION

Secured credit is a complex institution that appears in many
forms in many different parts of our economy. Given the wide vari
ety of contexts in which it is used, I would not have been surprised

if my three case studies produced widely varying perspectives. But
as it happened, they produced evidence of striking homogeneity.
All three case studies suggest that, even on distressed loans, it is
unusual for secured creditors to take possession of their collateral,
that it is common for secured creditors to be repaid through refi
nancing or sale of their collateral, and that the great majority of
their debtors' businesses survive unscathed in the face of the dis
tress that causes the secured creditor to terminate its relationship
344. Id. at 2. The bank division manager's perspective that loan officers are insufficiently
sensitive to risk is not universally shared. See, e.g., James J. White, Efficiency Justifications
for Personal Property Security, 37 VAND. L. REv. 473, 494-502 (1984) (arguing that bank
officers seek collateral because they are excessively sensitive to risk).
345. See Supplemental Bank Division Manager Interview, supra note 343, at 2.
346. My perspective might be different if I were convinced by the suggestion, see, e.g.,
Schwarcz, supra note 325, at 3 (quoting letters from concerned attorneys), that negative ef
fects would be concentrated in particular sectors such as small businesses, which play a dis
proportionately important role in overall economic development. Given my general belief
that secured credit is disappearing from the small-business market, see Mann, Small-Business
Secured Credit, supra note 3, that concern strikes me as misplaced.
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with the debtor. To be sure, those observations might be untrue in
some contexts - in other markets that I did not examine or in par
ticularly distressed portions of the business cycle. But the consis
tency of the picture in the widely disparate environments that I did
examine strongly suggests that the :findings noted above are impor
tant parts of the overall picture.
Those findings, in tum, suggest two global conclusions about the
world of distressed debt. First, creditors and debtors, acting with
relatively limited assistance from positive law, have developed
mechanisms that allow creditors to identify and respond to distress
at a surprisingly early stage, long before businesses become termi
nally ill. Second, distressed debtors can tum to a strikingly well
functioning market to respond to the concerns of their creditors.
Taken together, those conclusions present a world in which - with
little thanks due to the products of the legislative process - the
plight of the distressed debtor is surprisingly sanguine.

